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Abstract 
 
This study explains the varying levels of criticism in news coverage in China and tests 
the news effects on public opinion. It proposes a revision to the traditional censorship 
paradigm—fractured censorship system. It finds that in authoritarian China, censorship on the 
news media is not monolithic. Nor is it entirely decided by ideology. In fact, censorship is a 
locus where negotiations among political and business powers occur. Specifically, the potentially 
diverging interests between the central and local governments, the strong commercial interests of 
news organizations, and the aspirations of certain journalists may constitute fractures in the 
censorship system that allow sporadic criticism on local governments and officials. Fractured 
censorship does not mean fault lines. The fundamental characteristic of China’s censorship 
system remains to be its swift and effective intervention over news content.  
While fractured censorship helps us understand the news production process, once critical 
news is published or broadcasted, how does such news affect public opinion, if at all? What are 
the implications of such fractured censorship for authoritarian duration in China? Through two 
field experiments conducted in east and central China, this study finds that critical news does not 
necessarily undermine public evaluation of the regime. In fact, critical news may blow off the 
steam of public anger over contentious social and political issues that emerged during China’s 
economic and political development process, which helps consolidate, rather than undermine, the 
authoritarian rule. 
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Chapter 1 The News Media as a Political Actor in Authoritarian China 
 
 Control over the news media characterizes Chinese authoritarianism. An important 
manifestation of such control is the lack of criticism on the regime, including governments and 
officials at central and local levels. After the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, the 
Chinese media experienced marketization that consists of deregulation, commercialization, and 
partial privatization (Stockmann 2013). As a result, the media market, that is, audience and 
readers, has become an important factor in the news production process. The receded state 
control does not mean, however, that the state is losing control. The media now have to satisfy 
both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the market. The two forces often pull media 
content in different directions, creating a dilemma for media practitioners (Brady 2008; 
Stockmann 2013; Zhao 1998, 2008). Consequently, Chinese media remain tightly controlled by 
the CCP. The increased but still limited reporting freedom in the news media actually contributes 
to, rather than undermines, the authoritarian rule in China (Stockmann 2013).  
 While this study comes to a similar conclusion that the news media in China helps 
consolidate the authoritarian rule, it challenges both the perception of the lack of political 
criticism in authoritarian China and the understanding that political and market forces drive news 
content in different directions. Focusing on varying levels of criticism in news, this study finds 
that the diverging interests of the central and local governments, the commercial interests of 
news organizations, and journalistic aspirations constitute fractures in the censorship system that 
allow sporadic political criticism at local levels. The diverging political interests of central and 
local governments can sometimes drive news in a critical direction, consistent with the direction 
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of market competition. However, such criticism tends to stay at the local level, and the 
censorship system remains effective.  
 This study also finds that such critical news has limited effects on public opinion. 
Specifically, while it can lead the public to be more dissatisfied with local governments on 
contentious issues, it does not undermine the public’s confidence in the government’s capability 
to ultimately solve difficult social issues. In other words, it blows off the steam of public anger 
without compromising the overall legitimacy of the CCP. Therefore, the fractured censorship 
system contributes to, rather than undermine, the authoritarian rule in China. Next, this chapter 
reviews the literature of authoritarian politics and the media, introduces the research questions, 
discusses the mixed-methods approach used in this study, and concludes with an overview of the 
remaining chapters. 
*** 
News media has long been entangled with authoritarian politics (e.g. Farrell 2012; 
Garnham 2000; Lee 1990; Lerner and Schramm 1967; Pye 1963; Randall 1998; Skidmore 1993). 
In many authoritarian regimes, the opening of the economic system, that is, increasing market 
competition and receding state control, is not accompanied by the loosening of media control, at 
least not to the same extent. In Vietnam, despite the promotion of an open economy, surveillance 
and imprisonment of critical journalists prevail (CPJ 2012). In Russia, reports critical of the 
regime can lead to assassinations of journalists (The Economist 2006; 2009). In China, the 
situation of press freedom is among the worst in the world.1 The recent incident of censors 
modifying an editorial that a liberal newspaper Southern Weekend prepared to publish resulted in 
public gatherings in support of media freedom in January of 2013. The lack of press freedom is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reporters Without Borders ranks China at 174 out of 179 countries and regions in the world in the Press Freedom 
Index 2011-2012.  
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seen as a defining characteristic of authoritarian regimes and thus has been broadly reported by 
foreign media especially from democracies. In most authoritarian regimes media are state-
controlled. In the journalistic discourse, the state-controlled media may help propagate news and 
commentary praising the regime; minimize the spread of news and commentary critical of the 
regime; and sometimes help mobilize the public for political campaigns launched by the regime. 
While journalists seem to have reached converging views that perceive the state-controlled 
media as tools of authoritarian regimes, scholars have probed this topic through the lens of 
authoritarian politics and have reached different, if not opposite, understandings. What is the 
political role of the news media in the functioning of authoritarian regimes?  
 After the end of the Cold War, the political role of the media in authoritarian societies has 
attracted much scholarly attention (e.g. Chan and Lee 1991; Price et al. 2002). Within the 
discipline of political science, democratization scholars have pointed out that access to 
alternative information may be an essential enabling factor in regime transition through eroding 
regime legitimacy that aids collective action and the emergence of an independent public sphere 
(Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Fox 1988; Huntington 1996; Randall 1993; Rawnsley and 
Rawnsley 1998a; Rozumilowicz 2002; Skidmore 1993). Even during the height of the Cold War, 
modernization theorists have already argued that media may play a facilitating role in 
destabilizing authoritarian regimes and creating a sociocultural atmosphere that is conductive to 
democracy (Lerner 1964). Evidence supporting such arguments has been found in Poland 
(Millard 1998), Taiwan (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 1998b), Mexico (Lawson 2002), the Muslim 
world (Howard 2010), and many other countries that have undergone regime change (Fox 1988; 
Teorell 2010). However, media can also be part of authoritarian control (Stockmann and 
Gallagher 2011; Stockmann 2013; Brady 2008; 2012). For example, Stockmann (2011) finds that 
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the Chinese state is proactively using television advertisements to promote propaganda messages. 
White et al. (2005) find that in Russia the regime resists challenge to its authority through 
manipulating the media, especially television. Of course, there are cross-national variations in 
the ability and willingness of authoritarian states to restrict press freedom (Egorov et al. 2009; 
Norris and Inglehart 2009). How can we understand and reconcile the mixed evidence on the 
political role of the news media and the seemingly contradictory theoretical explanations in the 
existing literature?   
I argue that the very assumption behind the contradictory evidence and theoretical 
explanations should be evaluated. One of the most fundamental problems with this way of 
framing and understanding state-controlled media in authoritarian regimes is that many scholars 
treat the media as either facilitating or inhibiting democratic transition. Democratization thus is 
the fundamental framework where scholars situate the media in authoritarian regimes. This is 
problematic. In 1999, Geddes (1999) proposes a typology of authoritarian regimes in order to 
help us better understand the enormous variations in how authoritarian regimes break down and 
transit to democracies. While Geddes (1999) brings authoritarianism to the dialogue, thirteen 
years later, Art (2012) takes a step further and argues that we should treat authoritarianism as it is, 
instead of a transitional regime type. In other words, instead of studying “authoritarian survival,” 
we should focus more on “authoritarian duration.” While normatively scholars have every reason 
to study democratic political systems so that democracies can function better, authoritarianism 
nonetheless deserves full scholarly attention, as understanding how authoritarian regimes endure 
provides insights on how we can better think about and design political systems.  
While the call for scholarly attention on authoritarianism is recent, Art (2012) points out 
that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a group of scholars have already started to 
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take authoritarian regimes seriously and gained real traction on the question of durability. A 
representative work in this strain, for example, is symbolically titled “Authoritarianism in an Age 
of Democratization” (Brownlee 2007), which signals the transition of focus in the scholarship 
from democratization to authoritarianism. According to Art (2012), this group of works located 
the reasons for authoritarian stability or breakdown in “longstanding patterns of behavior, both 
formal and informal,” (Art 2012, 352) rather than merely pointing to exogenous shocks. So the 
central question in the study of authoritarianism has shifted from “what contributes to 
authoritarian break down and the ensuing democratic transitions” to “what contributes to 
authoritarian duration.”  
Three works specifically on China represent the most recent efforts at understanding 
authoritarian duration from within. Pointing at different mechanisms, these works show how 
social protests (Chen 2012), commercialized media (Stockmann 2013), and social organizations 
(Hildebrandt 2013) actually help consolidate, rather than erode, the authoritarian rule in China. 
Following this burgeoning group of research on mechanisms that sustain authoritarian rule 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005; Brownlee 2007; Tsai 2007), I examine authoritarianism 
through explaining varying levels of criticism in news content and the effects on public opinion. 
Instead of asking whether the media facilitate or inhibit political liberalization, I situate the 
production and effects of news that criticizes local governments in the grand scheme of 
authoritarian duration. In this way, this study examines the political role of the state-controlled 
media in China.  
There are a number of actors involved in the news production process. They include state 
institutions, both formal and informal (government agencies, laws and regulations, government 
officials), news organizations, journalists, and citizens. The central puzzle, however, is that the 
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Chinese media outlets all operate within the same political environment, and they are all subject 
to authoritarian media control. If so, then why does the level of criticism, i.e., quantity and 
intensity, in the news content vary? Moreover, how does such news criticism affect public 
opinion on key social issues? 
*** 
Overall, the importance of this study is twofold: the contribution to the theoretical 
development of authoritarian duration, and the empirical implications for press freedom. First, by 
examining political institutions of media control this study may advance our understandings of 
authoritarian institutions in general and the complicated processes of authoritarian news 
production in particular. As Geddes (1999) points out, there is much to be learned about 
authoritarian institutions, a premise for better understandings of democratization. Slater (2003, 
81) echoes with a similar observation that while “democratic institutions have long enjoyed pride 
of place in comparative politics…authoritarian institutions remain inadequately conceptualized, 
theorized, and investigated.” Given this gap, current theoretical disagreements on whether media 
facilitates or obstructs democratization underlines the importance of the media in authoritarian 
regimes. Indeed, the press “reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of 
individuals and institutions are adjusted.” (Siebert et al. 1956, 2) Focusing on authoritarian 
duration as a framework to approach the political role of state-controlled media, China is a 
critical case because of its highly sophisticated institutions of media control (Bradsher 2012) and 
the broad impact of its lack of press freedom (Gerring 2008). The findings on Chinese 
institutions of media control will further shed light on media control mechanisms in other 
authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam and Russia. Therefore, through investigating the state-
media-public relations, we can gain better understandings of authoritarianism, specifically on 
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whether, and to what extent, the media is part of authoritarian control. These findings will then 
constitute a premise for better understandings of the role of the media in democratization. 
Second, the main object of inquiry in this study—news that criticizes local governments 
and policies—has generated significant social impact in the Chinese society (Liu et al. 2007; Zhu 
2005). For example, a stylized type of television news shows referred to by scholars as 
“television life news,”2 not only is famous for its often critical reporting, but also has the 
potential to set the agenda of what people think about (Cohen 1963; McCombs and Shaw 1972), 
or even influence and shape public opinions on specific issues (Liu et al. 2007; Tang and Iyengar 
2012), as its consistently high ratings and advertising revenues3 imply. Thus, for policy-makers 
and interested public, to understand what decides the news content and the effects of such critical 
news on public opinion is vital to understand the political and social consequences of critical 
news in China. This study can also provide information for international and domestic activists, 
civil society groups, and non-governmental organizations promoting press freedom and the value 
of information for a free society. 
*** 
If we observe what news stories about China make to the headlines of American 
mainstream media outlets, we would find that especially since the 2000s, different ways of media 
control that are absent in democracies have caught many American journalists’ attention and 
amazed the public in advanced industrial democracies. Scholars and acute observers have 
pointed out that China is not only practicing sophisticated methods of media control, but also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There has not been an agreed-upon translation of this term. While Chinese scholars have agreed to use minsheng 
xinwen (民生新闻) to refer to this type of news programs, there have been several English translations seen in 
scholarly works, such as “livelihood news” (Yang 2010) and “citizen news” (Miao 2011). In this project, I will use 
“life news” as the English translation of minsheng xinwen. 
3 For example, shortly after the initial launch of Just in Nanjing, a pioneer life news show aired on Jiangsu 
Television Station City Channel, the ratings rose considerably to 9.2% between January and April 2003 (Miao 2011, 
103). In July 2004, the average rating of Just in Nanjing was 8.3%, with the highest rating of the month being 17.7% 
(Wang 2011).  
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pressuring foreign media outlets to censor reports that are deemed by the Chinese party-state4 as 
sensitive (Cook 2013) as well as exporting techniques of media control to other authoritarian 
regimes such as Zimbabwe and Iran (Eades 2014; ZBC 2013). As scholars and the general public 
know more about the Chinese way of producing news, the general consensus seems to be that 
censorship is a major paradigm to make sense of news production in China. Censorship in China 
is unfortunately effective and monolithic. Moreover, censorship has been generally viewed as a 
black box that needs to be unpacked in order to understand how news is suppressed and released 
in China.  
 While censorship constitutes an important aspect of media control, when we examine the 
actual content of news, we would find that criticisms on local governments and policies actually 
exist quite extensively in Chinese media discourse. Moreover, the quantity and intensity of such 
criticisms vary across news outlets and time. For example, Southern Weekend among 
newspapers, Just in Nanjing among television news shows, and 163.com among online news 
portals are well known among the public, journalists, and scholars for their frequently critical 
tone towards governments and policies, yet not so much for other news outlets. How can we 
explain such variations? How do such variations affect public opinion, if at all? Building on the 
traditional paradigm of censorship, this study proposes a revised paradigm I refer to as “fractured 
censorship.” However, it is helpful to first examine the traditional paradigm of censorship and its 
application to the China case.  
Censorship marks authoritarian rule across the world. “Free media are an anathema for 
any dictator.” (Egorov et al. 2009, 645) How censorship helps, if we hypothesize so, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Party-state is a core feature of the Leninist notion of communist party and its regime. According to the notion of 
Leninist party-state, “a highly hierarchical and centralized single elitist party is completely intertwined with the 
state, with an array of party organizational structures that supplement state institutions from the top right down to 
bottom, forming a set of party-state apparatus and replacing to a large extent the governmental functions.” (Guo 
2012, 25) Therefore, in this study I use “party-state” to refer to the political regime in China.  
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authoritarian duration can be understood through the framework of legitimacy. For any political 
regime, legitimacy is an important concern as it is the basis of political rule and effective 
governance (Lipset 1959). Conceptually, legitimacy can be defined as “the belief of citizens that 
the nature and functioning of national state institutions conform to their own basic political and 
moral values.” (Chen 2005, 4; Easton 1965; Lipset 1959; Muller and Jukam 1977) Therefore, 
legitimacy is a relational term that can be seen as a reflection of the appropriateness and 
lawfulness of the regime in the minds of the citizens (Nathan 2003). One of the most direct ways 
to ensure political legitimacy is free and fair elections for political leaders—the minimal 
definition of democracy. This is also among the most visible differences between nondemocratic 
and democratic regimes, even though “illiberal democracies” where elections are held but civil 
liberties are still infringed upon are on the rise (Zakaria 1997). However, this is not to say that 
nondemocratic regimes have no legitimacy. In fact, in many authoritarian regimes, the support 
for political leadership is higher than that of democracies. In China, 92.7% of respondents from a 
nationally representative sample said they trust the national government, according to the 2007 
World Values Survey. In contrast, merely 38.6% of American respondents in the same survey 
said they trust the national government. Of course, we cannot ignore the problem of validity for 
surveys conducted in authoritarian contexts (e.g. Havel 1978; Scott 1985). Still, especially in 
sophisticated authoritarian regimes like China, the support for the regime exists. The question is 
how much. 
In order to maintain a reasonable level of legitimacy and support, authoritarian regimes 
have to use various means. To actively influence citizens’ perceptions of the regime naturally 
grants the primary role of media control in authoritarian regimes. Indeed, “one of the chief ways 
used by the (Chinese) regime to forge supportive sentiment is to control information flow.” 
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(Chen and Shi 2001, 87) There are at least two mechanisms based on which censorship as a 
major form of media control helps sustain authoritarian rule. First, censorship may limit 
“citizens’ ability to overcome coordination problems in organizing a revolt.” (Egorov et al. 2009, 
645; Shirk 2011, 5) Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) point out that “coordination goods” 
such as free press can pose a serious threat for authoritarian regimes to survive, because they can 
reduce the costs of strategic coordination central to the formation of powerful opposition. This is 
also what King et al. (2013) refer to as “collective action potential.”  
Second, censorship may help suppress dissent, such as the expression that “finds fault 
with elements of the Chinese state, its policies, or its leaders,” (King et al. 2013, 2) so as to 
create a public opinion environment where the regime is glorified to win public support. Besides 
censorship, distributing economic benefits (e.g. Stokes 2005; Hicken 2006) and reducing 
economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) can also 
help create such a favorable environment for authoritarian regimes. Indeed, “In spite of their 
dictatorial qualities, the rulers in Peking do not govern the nation solely by naked force.” (Yu 
1964, 3) As a recent example, the Chinese party-state introduced a self-censorship program 
among the journalists, through which to indoctrinate them with the Marxist views of journalism 
and order them not to take stances in support of Japan on contentious historical and territorial 
disputes (McDonnell 2013). Through this censorship, the party-state tries to create a public 
opinion environment where nationalistic sentiments are fueled, a likely result of which being 
increased support for the regime. Another recent example involves an incident of oil pipeline 
blast that happened in a coastal city of Qingdao, Shandong province. According to Freedom 
House (2013), the party-state has tried to restrict media coverage of the explosion on November 
22, 2013 that killed over 50 people and injured more. Specifically, a leaked instruction from the 
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Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on November 24 
“strictly prohibited media from dispatching reporters to the site of the disaster, discussing the 
possible cause and responsible parties, or publishing summaries of past accidents.”  This 
represents efforts by the party-state to minimize the negative effects from accidents like this, 
which may involve official negligence or wrongdoings. The two mechanisms of censorship thus 
can reduce the cost of authoritarian control because they reduce the probability of threatening 
protests and other forms of political challenge.  
For the CCP, censorship in particular and media control in general are also indispensable 
parts of the Leninist party-state framework, according to which “the party seeks to indoctrinate 
its members as well as the citizens under its rule with its political ideology, and uses or modifies 
its political ideology according to concrete or changing circumstances to justify its political 
leadership and political action.” (Guo 2012, 24) As early as 1902, Lenin pointed out in What Is 
to Be Done? that “A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator but 
also a collective organizer.” (Lenin 1963-70, vol. 5, 10-11) Lenin also practiced such idea of 
media control in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1917 when he declared that 
“all bourgeois newspapers be shut down.” (Fu 1996, 144) Similarly, in the People’s Republic of 
China the party-state took over control and monopolized areas such as education, newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio broadcasting, and social science research, all of which “were 
regarded as tools of political indoctrination under the jurisdiction of the party’s Department of 
Propaganda.” (Fu 1996, 144) Similar to other types of authoritarian regimes, persuasion and 
indoctrination are major purposes of such media control.  
*** 
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However, the examination of the purposes and mechanisms of censorship does not 
sufficiently explain why we see varying levels of criticism in news content. If censorship is 
vitally important to authoritarian duration because it can influence public opinion and prevent 
collective action, why is there criticism at all, and more importantly, why does the quantity and 
intensity of such criticism vary? Is it because the Chinese party-state is losing control over the 
media, or is it because criticism is intentionally allowed by the party-state? So far, there is little 
sign that the party-state is losing control over the media. In fact, the method of media control is 
evolving. For example, according to The New York Times, “China maintains the world’s most 
extensive and sophisticated system for Internet censorship.” (Bradsher 2012). On the other hand, 
if the party-state intentionally allows media criticism, how may such criticism benefit 
authoritarian rule? While existing literature has described and explained the importance of 
censorship for authoritarian regimes and how it works, it did not pay much attention to the 
possibility of and situations where censorship may not work as well as it is supposed to.  
 This study proposes a revision to the traditional censorship paradigm, which I refer to as 
“fractured censorship.” I find that in authoritarian China, censorship on the news media is not 
monolithic. Nor is it entirely decided by ideology. In fact, censorship is a locus where 
negotiations among political and business powers occur. Specifically, the potentially diverging 
interests between the central and local governments, the strong commercial interests of news 
organizations, and the aspirations of certain journalists may constitute fractures in the censorship 
system that lead to varying levels of criticism in news content. It is important to stress that 
fractured censorship does not mean fault lines. The fundamental characteristic of China’s 
censorship system remains to be its swift and effective intervention over news content through a 
variety of methods that range from soft methods such as issuing directives and phone calls to 
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editors at news organizations, to harsh methods such as demoting editors and detaining 
journalists. My main argument here is that, based on the generally effective and mostly 
predictable censorship system, it is important to realize that under certain circumstances, this 
censorship system can have fissures and cracks that allow sporadic criticisms on local issues. 
Some of these criticisms serve distinct interest of the central and local governments, thus they 
can be understood as being embedded in the political institutions; some of these criticisms are 
unintentional results of media commercialization. As will be discussed in the following chapters, 
these fractures are results of (1) central-local power negotiations, (2) media market competition, 
and (3) journalistic aspirations.  
Such findings also challenge the existing research that seems to have reached the 
consensus that the Communist politics and the market forces have been pulling the media in 
different directions. Media professionals, be they journalists or film directors, struggle to 
maintain a balance between the two forces, as they have to make profits, while at the same time 
maintain the traditional role of the media as the mouthpiece for the party-state (He and Chen 
1998; He 1997; 2000; Lee 1994, 2000; Zhao 1998). This is dubbed as a “tug-of-war” (He 1997). 
I argue that the political and economic forces do not always pull the media content in different 
directions. In fact, the central-local relations embedded in the Chinese political system, 
specifically local noncompliance, may under certain circumstances lead to criticism at local 
levels in news content. In such situations, the political forces coincide with the market forces in 
driving news towards a more critical direction.  
 While fractured censorship helps us understand the news production process, once critical 
news is published or broadcast, how does such news affect public opinion, if at all? What are the 
implications of such fractured censorship for authoritarian duration in China? For those fractures 
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intentionally allowed by the regime, criticism in news may help release steam of public anger 
over key social issues such as corruption. Over the summer and fall of 2013, I conducted two 
field experiments on media effects in Yangzhou in eastern China and Xi’an in central China 
using a contentious issue of demolition and relocation. The results suggest less media effects 
than we would expect based on previous research on media effects in democratic contexts, such 
as agenda-setting and priming effects. Specifically, while series of studies confirmed that reading 
newspapers and watching television may set the agenda of what the public think about as well as 
how to think about important issues in democracies (e.g. McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987), contrary to this, in the Xi’an experiment being exposed to negative news does not 
change participants’ opinions on the issue of demolition and relocation. In the Yangzhou 
experiment, although the experimental results suggest agenda-setting and priming effects, 
watching negative news does not undermine public confidence in the government’s capability to 
ultimately solve the issue. This implies that critical news on key social issues does not 
necessarily undermine public evaluation of the regime. In fact, critical news may blow off the 
steam of public anger over contentious issues that emerged during China’s economic and 
political development process, which may consolidate, rather than undermine, the authoritarian 
rule. 
Recent studies echo with such findings. King et al. (2013) find that the party-state 
actually does not delete all criticism in cyberspace, as generally expected. Instead, the Chinese 
party-state tends to delete the online comments that intend to incite collective action. This type of 
incomplete censorship has been explained by the safety valve argument. Specifically, the central 
leadership of the Chinese party-state has been using local criticisms to release the steam of 
public anger over contentious social issues such as corruption and income inequality. While 
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reaffirming the good intention of the central leadership at solving all kinds of political and social 
problems, the central leadership’s allowing criticisms on local governments is believed to 
function as a safety valve to maintain the legitimacy of the central leadership, even though this 
may come at the expense of public evaluations of the local governments (e.g. Hassid 2012; King 
et al. 2013). The results from this study further confirm the safety valve argument by providing 
experimental results that criticism in news does not necessarily undermine regime legitimacy.  
More importantly, the results from Xi’an experiment suggest the importance of non-
media factors in attitudinal change. As implied by the literature of “two-step flow” (Lazarsfeld et 
al. 1944; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Katz 1957), discussing politics with family and friends may 
be an important factor as family and friends can function as opinion leaders affecting individual 
attitudes. Based on the experimental results, I find that the more participants discuss politics with 
family and friends, the less democratic but more politically efficacious they tend to be. Other 
non-media factors such as participants’ own experience with the issue of demolition and 
relocation tend to increase their perceived importance of the issue. Therefore, the experimental 
results on the actual effects of the critical news that is intentionally allowed by the party-state 
reaffirm the conceptualization of fractured censorship, which does not mean fault lines. It would 
also be appropriate to understand fractured censorship as the party-state injecting the right 
amount of criticism into public discourse as a way to release tension on controversial political 
and social issues, without sacrificing legitimacy of the central leadership.  
Therefore, this study treats the news media as a political actor in authoritarian China. 
Cook (1998) develops a theoretical framework that treats the news media in the United States as 
a political institution. His framework is derived from the American media experience, and is 
premised upon the perceived strong media power in American politics. In contrast, in 
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authoritarian China, the news media should be understood primarily based upon the fact that they 
are strictly controlled by the party-state. This leads to the understanding of the nature of the 
Chinese news media that they are much more restricted in almost every aspect of news 
production than their American counterparts. As Zhao (2000) observes, even the most critical 
sphere of the Chinese news media, the investigative reporters are, at best, “watchdogs on party 
leashes.” Of course, at the same time we cannot ignore the independent influence, no matter how 
limited, of journalists and news organizations in affecting public opinions. The news media are 
“a producer of meaning, a creator of social consciousness.” (Hallin 1985, 141) Despite the 
visible differences between the Chinese and American news media, they share an important 
similarity, that is, the political nature. I conceptualize the Chinese news media as a political actor 
in authoritarian China. The “political” aspects of the Chinese news media are threefold: (1) the 
news media continue to perform the traditional role of mouth-piece, as defined in communist 
politics, helping sustaining regime legitimacy; (2) the news media are used by the central 
government to boost legitimacy at the expense of the popularity of local officials; (3) the news 
media are used by aspirational journalists to push for more space for criticism.  
 Modernization theory suggests that political criticism may be a sign of opening political 
discourse and receding authoritarian control, as socioeconomic development will eventually 
produce a middle class that demands more political rights. The political criticism discussed in 
this study, however, is not equal to the criticism suggested in the modernization theory or the 
criticism we see in western democracies. The political criticism in the Chinese media discourse 
is a result of an agenda-building process involving the CCP, the media, and the journalists. Only 
when the CCP allow certain political criticisms can the news media pursue and publish or 
broadcast these political criticisms. The CCP’s tolerance of criticism certainly has a strict limit. 
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In this sense, the criticisms are not real criticisms that we see in democracies. They are results of 
the negotiations between political and business powers.  
*** 
In order to answer the research questions, this study employs a mixed-methods approach 
consisting of semi-structured interviews, direct observation, content analysis, a survey, and field 
experiments. The sources and the research methods are discussed in Chapter 2. 
The reasons for using the mixed methods approach are twofold. First, the qualitative 
analysis is essential for acquiring in-depth understandings of the interactive influence of the state, 
the news organizations, and the journalists on news content, which remains understudied. The 
partially inductive nature of this study requires thorough analysis through qualitative data that is 
better at exploring complex issues (NSF 2005). Moreover, the politically sensitive nature of the 
topic of media freedom in China demands a meticulous investigation of the news production 
processes through direct observation. Anonymity of the interviewees and other ethical issues will 
be strictly and properly addressed (Wilson 1993). Finally, the qualitative analysis can help better 
interpret the results from the quantitative analysis.  
Second, quantitative analysis, especially field experiments, is ideal for quantifying and 
testing the hypotheses of media effects on public opinion in more precise terms (Krippendorff 
2004). Quantitative analysis is also useful at cross-examining the findings from qualitative 
analysis on media effects and expanding the applicability of the results (Brannen 2005; Bryman 
2006).  
*** 
 This study is comprised of two parts. In the first part, I explain why we see varying levels 
of criticism in news content through introducing the concept of “fractured censorship.” Focusing 
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on the news production process, the first part discusses three specific types of fractures. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss the first type of fracture that is rooted in the political institutions of the 
Chinese party-state. The Chinese party-state is not a unitary actor. As discussed earlier, the 
assumption of a monolithic authoritarian regime impedes our understandings of how the Chinese 
party-state works and its relationship with other societal actors (Chen 2012; O’Brien 1996; 
O’Brien and Li 2006; Perry 1994). In fact, the central government uses a complex system to 
supervise and regulate personnel and administrative affairs at the local levels. However, local 
noncompliance has persisted. For example, since the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, 
the central government has recurrently sought to control excessive taxation by local 
governments. According to relevant laws, rural taxes should not exceed 5 percent of farm 
income. By 1990, however, taxes averaged 10 percent of farm income, with some localities 
reportedly levying taxes up to 20-40 percent of farm income (Wedeman 2001). Therefore, there 
have been power negotiations between central and local governments. While the center wants 
compliance, the local governments want more autonomy. Negotiation here refers to informal 
ways used by government to achieve a certain goal, such as incomplete execution of central 
policies and various forms of corruption. 
Based on the assumption of multilevel governments, local news reporting can be seen as 
a way for the central government to shift parts of the burden of monitoring local officials to the 
local news media. In this way, the local news media can be seen as agents for the principal of the 
central government. Therefore, the central government would tolerate a certain degree of 
criticism in news on local issues as long as it sees such criticism as favorable for discovering 
local problems and improving local governance (Brady 2008; Egorov et al. 2009; Shirk 2011; 
Tong 2010). This is not a new argument. Many scholars have used the framework of central-
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local relations and local noncompliance to explain a variety of problems, such as the increasing 
numbers of social protests in China (Chen 2012) and local public goods provision in rural China 
(Tsai 2007). Lorentzen (2012) develops a formal model in which an authoritarian regimes 
balance media openness with regime censorship in order to minimize local corruption while 
maintaining regime stability. 
Another purpose is that through exposing local officials’ wrongdoings, the central 
government can establish the image of “central good, local bad,” so that the public can attribute 
whatever problems they see to local officials, instead of the central government. Serving as a 
kind of safety valve for the expression of popular resentment in a relatively harmless way, such 
critical news program encourages ordinary people to assume that the top leadership is on their 
side, because the real troublemakers are at the local levels. Lorentzen (2010) described these 
tactics as “deliberate incomplete press censorship.” This type of fracture is, therefore, known to 
the party-state and is intentionally allowed by it in order to maintain the authoritarian rule. I will 
use in-depth case studies based on semi-structured interviews and secondary sources to 
demonstrate the arguments above. 
 In Chapter 3, I discuss the second type of fracture in the censorship system that can be 
attributed to the media reforms, specifically the commercial interests of news organizations. 
Before the media reforms in the 1980s, almost all the media organizations in China received 
complete state funding and were under strict state control. After the media reforms, state funding 
reduced substantially, and media organizations now have to rely on advertising and other 
revenues to maintain operation (Chan and Qiu 2002; De Burgh 2003; Esarey 2005; Shirk 2011; 
Volland 2012). For television stations, the instant success of life news shows, as their 
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consistently high ratings show, clearly demonstrates a model of profitable news production5. As 
a result, news organizations may have commercial interests in increasing the level of criticism on 
local issues. Based on the qualitative data, there are several ways editors and producers use to 
push for more space for critical reporting. First, television producers may use “follow-up reports” 
to balance the negative content in the initial report. In the follow-up reports usually aired on the 
following day of the initial critical reports, correction by relevant government agencies and 
officials or problems being successfully resolved would be emphasized. In other words, the 
follow-up reports generally end with a positive tone. Through this type of informal negotiation 
with government officials, television producers can get away with further intrusion or even 
cancellation of news reports by government officials.  
Second, television producers and newspaper editors may choose to report negative news 
at lower administrative levels or in other administrative jurisdictions. For both newspapers and 
television stations, they are affiliated with and managed by particular government branches, thus 
they have administrative ranks similar to those of governments. This creates an unequal status 
between news organizations at higher administrative levels such as provincial and municipal 
levels and governments and officials at lower levels such as district and township levels. This 
may lead to more difficult situations for local governments to negotiate with news organizations 
at higher levels on the issue of critical reports. On the other hand, reporting on negative stories in 
other jurisdictions, usually in other provinces, may also make it easier for news organizations to 
publish or broadcast such stories, because news organizations are less bound by governments and 
officials in other jurisdictions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 To be clear, Chinese television news programs can resort to other measures to increase ratings, such as “vulgar” 
news stories involving sex and violence (Chen and Han 2007). The point here is that criticism is one way, among 
others, to increase ratings. My interview with the producer of a popular life news show in the summer of 2012 
supports this argument. 
 
	   21 
Third, television producers and newspaper editors may choose to report on the negative 
news that is already widely discussed online, especially on Chinese social media sites. 
Employing the theory of agenda-setting from journalism studies, new media in China, such as 
online social media and blogs, can set the agenda of traditional mainstream media such as 
newspapers (Hassid 2008) and television. My interviews with television directors, producers, and 
newspaper editors reveal that such situation is entirely possible and in fact widespread. Moreover, 
from time to time journalists can actually make use of the social media6, especially Sina Weibo7, 
to push for critical reporting of local issues. In particular, television journalists can report the 
popular topics discussed online that may have negative implications for local governments, 
because they can defend themselves by arguing that these topics have already been discussed on 
the Internet, should they face questions from higher authorities. This is also an important way for 
television media to capture and reflect public opinion that government officials increasingly care 
about (Shirk 2011). 
Finally, website executives may bribe middle-level censors to guarantee lighter 
punishment should any of their reports be deemed as crossing the line. As mentioned earlier, 
critical news has broad audience bases. Commercial online news portals have great incentives to 
attract online readers. For some of them, publishing critical reports and commentary thus has 
become a major business model. Under such circumstances, as my in-depth interview with a 
senior online news portal editor reveals, top executives at those websites may bribe middle-level 
censors, usually at propaganda departments or Internet management office at the municipality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Economist claims that “One of the greatest achievements of the Hu era has been the creation, through social 
media, of the next best thing to a free press,” and that “Chinese microbloggers relentlessly expose injustices and 
attack official wrongdoing and high-handedness.” See The Economist (2012). 
7 Sina Weibo is China’s biggest microblog service launched in 2009, according to The Economist (2012). A recent 
working paper by King et al. (2013) examines China’s online censorship by analyzing data from a number of social 
media websites, including Sina Weibo.  
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level and in the form of gift cards, to ensure punishment at lesser extent, should there be any 
critical reports that are deemed inappropriate. Normally, punishment for such critical reports can 
be fine, retracting reports, removing editors, or closing down the websites all at once. Therefore, 
there is, obviously, great variation among these different forms of punishment. If the punishment 
could be fines instead of retracting reports, for example, then the boundary of critical reporting is 
actually pushed back, a result of which is more space for critical reporting, at least for the time 
being. 
 In Chapter 4, I profile three news professionals, two television producers and one 
newspaper editor, whom I interviewed during the fieldwork. These news professionals constitute 
the third type of fracture. They work for newspapers and television stations, and they are at the 
middle ranks, in charge of news production for a news show at a television station or the 
investigative report department of a newspaper. I argue that the position of news professionals in 
a news organization is an important factor deciding whether they can push for more critical 
reporting. News professionals at the middle level have the most potential, if they hold liberal 
ideals of news production. They have more say over news content than entry-level journalists, 
and they have less responsibility than the top leaders in a news organization. I will also discuss 
the results from a small survey I conducted among the journalists at Changchun television station 
in northeast China in the summer of 2013.  
Journalistic aspiration is another key factor contributing to critical reporting. Western 
journalistic values may push television news shows and liberal newspapers in the direction of 
higher levels of criticism. Starting from the 1990s, it has become evident that some journalists 
try to fulfill the liberal notion of professional autonomy, such as independence from political and 
business influence and objectivity of factual information (Tong 2011; Zhou Y. 2000). 
 
	   23 
Journalistic values have become increasingly important at affecting the content of reports and 
commentary (Hassid 2011), as reflected in the rise of investigative journalism both in newspaper 
and on television in China (Tong 2011; Zhou Y. 2000). The rise of investigative journalism 
partially demonstrates the pride that some Chinese journalists take in writing the exposés that 
lead to change in policy and improvement in governance (De Burgh 2003; Shirk 2011). On the 
other hand, however, the propensity to self-censorship among some journalists, a result of media 
control and other personal and societal factors (Hassid 2011), may decrease the level of criticism. 
Therefore, individual journalistic preferences may have an influence on news content. 
Before moving on, it is important to stress that for analytical purposes, I discuss the 
above three fractures individually. In actuality, they are intricately intertwined. For example, it 
would never be possible for news professionals to separate their liberal aspirations from the 
reality of restricted media environment. It would also be inappropriate to separate the pursuit of 
commercial interests by news organizations from the influence of government officials. 
Therefore, the different fractures work together, resulting in sporadic criticisms coming out of 
the fractured censorship system, as demonstrated in the case studies from these chapters.  
 Having discussed fractured censorship in the news production process, in the second part 
I discuss the results of two field experiments where I test the effects of critical news on public 
opinion in authoritarian China. Through this, I draw implications on what effects such criticism 
may have on authoritarian duration. In this way, this study situates critical news in authoritarian 
duration through a two-step examination: (1) unpacking the news production process with a 
focus on fractured censorship, followed by (2) an examination of whether, and to what extent, 
critical news affect public opinion, a test for whether the critical news intentionally allowed by 
the party-state actually functions as the party-state intends it to.  
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In Chapter 5, I discuss the results from two field experiments where I focus on criticisms 
in news that are intentionally allowed by the party-state. The field experiments are designed to 
test hypotheses derived from previous studies on media effects in democratic contexts. 
McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) pioneer study is among the first to empirically examine the effects 
of news. The major finding, conceptualized as agenda-setting and confirmed by later studies, is 
that the focus of attention by the news media on public issues can be transferred to the public’s 
focus of attention (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; MacKuen 1981; McCombs 1981). Building on this, 
later studies of news effects find that by emphasizing certain issues over others, the news media 
can influence voters’ evaluations of political actors (Krosnick & Kinder 1990). This is priming 
effect. Based on the effects of agenda-setting and priming found in democratic contexts, I derive 
two hypotheses using the widespread and contentious issue in China—demolition and relocation. 
The agenda-setting hypothesis postulates that being exposed to critical news on demolition and 
relocation will make participants more concerned about the issue. The priming hypothesis states 
that being exposed to critical news on demolition and relocation will make participants 
dissatisfied with the government’s way of handling the issue.   
Based on the quantitative analysis, I find that in the first field experiment—Yangzhou 
experiment conducted with adults in the eastern Chinese city Yangzhou, both agenda-setting and 
priming hypotheses are confirmed. However, being exposed to critical news on demolition and 
relocation does not undermine the participants’ confidence in the government’s capability to 
ultimately resolve the issue. The second field experiment shows different results. In the Xi’an 
experiment conducted with university students in the central Chinese city Xi’an, the results show 
neither agenda-setting nor priming effects. However, the results suggest the importance of non-
media factors, such as participant’s personal experience with demolition and relocation, and their 
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frequency of watching television news. The disparity in experimental results suggest that for 
different groups of people especially in terms of education and age, critical news may have 
different effects. While critical news may affect public opinion among less educated and older 
people, such effects seem to be lacking among more educated and younger people. 
Overall, controlled media do not exhibit as much media effects as free media do. In the 
Xi’an experiment with university students, being exposed to critical news on the issue of 
demolition and relocation does not change any attitude of the university students on this issue. 
The controlled media exert less influence on public opinion in authoritarian China to begin with, 
and even among the critical news that does affect participants’ attitudes such as in the Yangzhou 
experiment, it does not change the participants’ confidence in the regime’s governing capability. 
While this implies relatively weak media power, politically the results imply a mechanism that 
sustains the authoritarian rule. News reports that are critical of local governments and policies 
can blow off steam of public anger without compromising the legitimacy of the central 
leadership. Through this, the communist regime in China is able to buy more time to solve 
difficult social and political issues. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the study with a discussion of the implications of the findings. This 
study investigates the political role of the news media in authoritarian duration in China through 
(1) understanding the news media as a venue where power negotiations among politicians, 
journalists, and citizens occur; and (2) examining the potential effects of critical news on public 
opinion. In authoritarian China, censorship on the news media is not monolithic. There are 
fractures in the censorship system allowing sporadic criticisms on local governments and policies. 
In addition, the field experiments suggest agenda-setting and priming effects of television news 
on public perceptions of key social issues for certain demographics, especially the older and less 
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educated. Even when such media effects exist, they do not necessarily undermine public 
confidence in the governing capability of the regime. Moreover, for younger and more educated 
citizens, critical news has little effect on their attitudes on key social issues.  
It has been a growing consensus among scholars that the CCP has become adept at 
making use of the news media to advance its political goals, fractures in the censorship system 
being such a strategy. The effects of critical news on public opinion are complex, but in general 
contribute to authoritarian duration in China. The nuanced understandings of the fractured 
censorship system and its effects on public opinion are important building blocks to comprehend 
the news media as a political actor in authoritarian China. 
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Chapter 2 Political Fracture: Monitoring Local Officials, Establishing Personal Authority 
 
Scholarly opinion has settled on the consensus that the Chinese party-state is not a 
monolithic actor. Indeed, the observation of distinct political interests at central and local levels 
has been used to explain a number of phenomena in authoritarian politics. For example, Egorov 
et al. (2009) find that dictators may use the news media to check local officials and ensure 
faithful local implementation of policies. Lorentzen et al. (2014) point out that the transparency 
initiatives in China stemmed from the top, reflecting the central leadership’s motivation to rein in 
local government officials. More directly, scholars have found that local officials in China may 
selectively implement policies, depending on local officials’ interests (O’Brien and Li 1999). As 
a result, the Chinese party-state has adopted several strategies to ensure local compliance, 
including tolerating small-scale social protests (Chen 2012), implementing village elections 
(Kennedy 2007), and granting more media freedom (Nathan 2003). Focusing on political 
fractures in the censorship system, this chapter examines two specific fractures embedded in the 
Chinese political system: (1) the need of the central leadership to monitor local officials, and (2) 
the need of local leaders to establish authority over their subordinates and to increase popularity 
among their superiors. Despite the diverging political interests of central and local leaders, they 
may both resort to the news media, specifically critical news, to help realize their political goals. 
Next, this chapter discusses the two specific fractures, with a focus on the embeddedness of these 
fractures in the current Chinese political system. 
Central Leadership Using Criticism in News 
One of the central puzzles observed in Chinese politics is that the support for the central 
leadership is actually quite high, especially when compared with the support for national 
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leadership in democracies. Moreover, public support is generally higher for the central leadership 
than for the local governments in China (Li 2004, 2008; Saich 2007), which adds to the 
uniqueness of the puzzle. So far scholars have identified at least two mechanisms to explain such 
a puzzle. First, the discontent with the local governments can be attributed to the side effects of 
economic reform, such as the loss of social welfare, lay-offs from state-owned enterprises, and 
government corruption (Hurst and O’Brien 2002; Manion 2004; Pei 2006; Sun 2004), which tend 
to be blamed on the “closest face of the state” for most citizens and therefore the easiest target of 
grievances (Hildebrandt 2013, 40). Second, the public may blame the implementers of policies, 
that is, the local governments, rather than the central leadership who is actually responsible for 
creating unpopular policies (Hildebrandt 2013, 40). While these mechanisms focus on either the 
actual issues of contention or the chain of policy creation and implementation, I argue that an 
important missing factor in explaining the puzzle is the use of the news media by the central 
leadership. In fact, the central leadership has been using criticism in news to (1) create an image 
of “central good, local bad” and to (2) monitor local officials in cases of local noncompliance. 
While the former targets the public, the latter targets local officials. A result of using such critical 
news is higher public satisfaction with the central leadership than with local governments. This 
constitutes the political fracture. Next, this chapter tries to explain why and how the central 
leadership uses the news media to monitor local officials and establish a positive image among 
the public through examining the political institutions in the Chinese party-state.  
The elaborate system of control over local officials 
 The institutional arrangement of the Chinese party-state is elaborate. It ensures the 
absolute authority of the central leadership over local governments and officials. At the same 
time, it provides a reasonable amount of autonomy to local governments in policy creation and 
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implementation. Vertically, the Chinese party-state consists of five distinct administrative levels: 
central, provincial, municipal, county, and township levels. Because of the vast geographical 
region the party-state has to rule over and a complex set of issues facing the Chinese society, to 
ensure local compliance has been a locus of contention. Local compliance is defined as local 
governments and officials closely following and faithfully implementing the laws, regulations, 
and directions from the central leadership. In order to ensure local compliance, the Chinese 
party-state has three important institutional components. First, in terms of formal institutions, the 
Chinese party-state is constitutionally a unitary state whereby all local governments are 
subordinate to the central government (Zheng 2006, 103). Specifically, the State Council, the top 
executive organ of the Chinese government, holds absolute authority and power over provincial 
governments as they must “accept the unified leadership by the State Council, implement 
administrative measures, regulations and decisions by the State Council, and be responsible and 
report to the State Council.” (Pu 1995, 223). 
Second, the party-state uses the nomenklatura system (Burns1989; 1994) to exercise 
personnel control over local officials. Introduced from the Soviet model, “the nomenklatura is a 
list of leading positions over whose appointments the Party exercises full control.” (Edin 2003a, 
44) Based on the nomenklatura, the Party Organization Departments at each level have the 
authority to make personnel decisions, including promotion, dismissal, and transfer, at one level 
down the administrative hierarchy. As a result, cadres at lower levels are accountable to the next 
level up. According to Burns (1999), the Chinese party-state remains Leninist today partially 
because of the nomenklatura.  
Third, in the early 1990s, the central leadership introduced a cadre responsibility system 
(CRS) in an attempt to improve governance. This elaborate system includes decentralization of 
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authority, employment contracts, setting of quantitative goals, introducing competition among 
state bureaucrats, use of economic incentives to encourage goal fulfillment, and using third 
parties to measure government performance (Edin 2003a, 37). The goals of the CRS are 
twofold—to increase governing efficiency and to better monitor and control local cadres (Edin 
2003a). The CRS has a profound impact on the central-local relations in the Chinese party-state. 
Based on the evaluations specified in the CRS, cadres with outstanding performance can be 
promoted to a concurrent post at a higher level. This is to ensure that priority policies from the 
center are carried out by local cadres, and faithful implementation is linked to promotion and 
demotion decisions (Edin 2003b). Another important component of the CRS is that cadres may 
also be rotated to different geographical areas or administrative levels. The main purpose of 
cadre rotation is to curb localism, a perceived dangerous tendency to defy the central CCP 
leadership (Edin 2003a).  
The problem of local noncompliance 
Despite the institutional arrangements intended to ensure local compliance in terms of 
policy implementation, local noncompliance has persisted. Indeed, many scholars have noted 
that local governments in China and many other communist countries should not be viewed as 
mere implementers and faithful followers of the central leadership (e.g. Nelson 1980; Triska 
1980). Local noncompliance can take on various forms, including delaying the execution of a 
policy or bending the details of a policy to serve local interests (Berman 1978; Chung 2000; 
Wang 2013).  
There are several possible explanations, some of which are institutional, some not. 
Institutionally, the CRS requires segments of local governments to monitor and report the 
performance of local cadres. This can create a serious problem for fair and accurate evaluations 
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of local cadres, as it allows local cadres not to present accurate and comprehensive evaluations of 
local cadres (Edin 2003a). Moreover, fiscal decentralization and the development of local 
corporatism have contributed to the rise of local interests that may not always be consistent with 
the interests of the central leadership (Chen 2012, 63; Walder 1994, 311). Non-institutional 
factors include the nature of the policy being implemented. If the policy is perceived to threaten 
local interests, it may encounter resistance from local cadres to protect their vested interests 
(Chung 2000).  
For example, in the early 1990s, the central government realized the seriousness of the 
problem of excessive financial burden on farmers in the forms of taxes and fees collected by 
local township governments. As a result, on the one hand, the central government seemed to 
agree with farmers that the excessive financial burden should be lightened. In fact, in 1993 the 
Law on Agriculture stipulated that rural taxes should not exceed 5 percent (Luo and Sun 1993, 
56), even though local taxes averaged 10 percent of total farm income, with some localities 
levying taxes up to 20-40 percent of total farm income (Wedeman 2001, 59). On the other hand, 
however, the central government was unwilling to take serious consideration of the limited 
resources available to local cadres (Kennedy 2007). This only resulted in increasing difficulty in 
local cadres’ tax and fee collection tasks as well as sustaining the local cadres’ incentives to 
collect taxes and fees higher than officially approved. Besides local interests, the inherently 
contradictory central policy in the 1990s on rural taxes and fees also contributed to local 
noncompliance.  
Implications for central responses 
 Even though some scholars have advocated conceptualizing the Chinese political system 
as federalism (Zheng 2006), the Chinese party-state remains unitary in the sense that the higher-
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level governments have absolute authority over lower-level governments, although there is room 
for negotiation between local cadres and higher-level leaders on local implementation of certain 
policies. Indeed, ensuring local compliance is a major concern for the CCP leadership as it is a 
central component of the Leninist party doctrine. For Leninist parties, “membership is highly 
selective, and the party demands strict loyalty and obedience on the part of members.” (Gunther 
and Diamond 2003, 180) As Party organizations essentially control all levels and branches of 
government, and party members are expected to follow policies coming down from the 
institutional hierarchy strictly, all levels of party branches as well as governments are put under 
strict control by the central CCP leadership, at least in theory. It is through this level of strict 
control that the central leadership is able to create and implement policies, some of which are 
meant to tackle difficult and controversial problems involving intricate and entrenched local 
interests. For example, the Leninist means of control that emphasizes the nomenklatura system, 
centralization of decision-making, and supervision of implementation has been applied to 
regulate China’s financial industry (Heilmann 2005).  
 However, the extent to which such Leninist control actually works depends largely on 
political and economic conditions. For China, the economic reform-led fiscal decentralization 
has important political implications. Local governments in China, with the GDP-centered 
evaluation system, have great incentives to bow to local businesses more than higher political 
authorities. This has created a more “downward” and less “upward” orientation among local 
officials (Walder 1994, 311). Consequently, the Leninist control through formal institutions of 
supervision may not be as effective as it was designed to be, mainly because the prioritization of 
the local economy has compromised the importance of the Leninist party-state as an ideology. In 
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other words, generating economic growth has, to a certain extent, replaced the status of the 
communist ideology in the actual practice of Chinese central and local governments.  
 If the Leninist control is not as effective as it used to be to ensure local compliance in 
China, how did the Chinese central leadership react to maintain its firm control over local 
officials? Using critical news as one method, among many others, the Chinese central leadership 
has established an image of “central good, local bad” among the public. In the meantime, it 
selectively encourages the news media to disclose local officials’ wrongdoings, from 
incompetency to corruption, in order to correct recalcitrant local behaviors. Next, this chapter 
discusses the dual purposes of critical news used by the central leadership.  
(1) Creating an image of “central good, local bad”  
 In a free media environment, there are a number of ways to write news stories critical of 
governments and officials. In China, however, even though local criticism exists, the way it is 
presented to the public can be specific. In fact, news criticisms have to accord with the  “central 
good, local bad” image, or at least “local bad.” In order to achieve this goal, critical reports tend 
to center on cases of corruption or incompetency after higher-level political authorities have 
dealt with them. Sometimes such critical reports may follow political campaigns launched by the 
central leadership, such as the anti-corruption campaign launched in late 2012 by the current 
Chinese President Xi Jinping. It was widely understood among scholars that the main reason 
behind the launch of the campaign by Xi Jinping, who came to power during the 18th CCP 
Congress in November 2012, was to consolidate his authority and power, as well as the 
legitimacy of the CCP regime. Specifically, the anti-corruption campaign, despite its limited 
effects on strengthening rule of law, may serve Xi and the regime through (1) showing to the 
public the determination of the party leadership to rule out corruption that has contributed to 
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wealth inequality and social injustice; (2) signaling to CCP officials that Xi, as a new leader, has 
the authority and capability to implement guidelines and policies that he envisions and oversees; 
and (3) actually reducing the scale of corruption, as such a campaign does have effects, no matter 
how limited, on restraining officials’ behavior (Wedeman 2012). For example, according to 
Huashang Daily, an influential newspaper published in Xi’an, Shaanxi province, after the anti-
corruption campaign was launched, many local officials hurried to find real estate agents to sell 
apartments under their names, which may have been purchased using public money8.  
 After the 2012 anti-corruption campaign was launched, several high-level officials have 
been investigated and convicted, such as the mayor of Lanzhou, the capital city of Gansu 
province, the director of the propaganda department of the Chengdu municipal government in 
Sichuan province, the former governor of Hubei province, and the former deputy governor of 
Liaoning province9. Under the trend of punishing corrupt officials as part of the political 
campaign, news media followed up and published critical reports on officials that were already 
investigated or convicted. For example, The Beijing News, a liberal newspaper that will be 
discussed in detail as a case study in Chapter 4, published an investigative report10 on Zhu 
Tianxiao (hereafter Zhu), a real estate developer who benefited from his close relationship with 
the former mayor of Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu province. The intimate relationship 
between the former mayor of Nanjing, Ji Jianye (hereafter Ji), and real estate developers such as 
Zhu brought about benefits not only to Ji in the forms of wealth and political track records, but 
also to Zhu in the form of wealth. This was thus a mutually beneficial relationship between a 
politician and a businessman. As Ji was investigated by the Central Discipline Commission of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The report can be accessed here: http://finance.qq.com/a/20121223/000196.htm  
9 Xinhua News Agency, the official news agency of the CCP, compiled a list of convicted officials after the 2012 
anti-corruption campaign. The list can be accessed here: http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-
10/30/content_1150976.htm  
10 The report can be accessed here: http://www.bjnews.com.cn/inside/2013/11/21/293832.html  
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the CCP, Zhu was investigated, as well. This investigative report also traced Ji’s relationship 
with other businessmen during his political career as mayor of Yangzhou and mayor of Nanjing. 
The downfall of Ji has resulted in the downfall of a number of business-men and -women. 
Beyond this specific case, the report also points out the seriousness of the problem of politician-
businessman collusion.  
Although such reports focus on cases that were already dealt with by the party-state, they 
can help the party-state achieve the goals of the anti-corruption campaign. Reporting on such 
corruption cases not only publicizes to the public the efforts by the party-state to eliminate 
corrupt officials, but also functions as a warning sign to local officials that may have engaged in 
similar corrupt behaviors. Of course, the intention of the central leadership is highly difficult, if 
not impossible, to prove, as is a common problem in the study of authoritarian regimes. 
Nevertheless, public opinion data can indirectly corroborate the hypothesis that the central 
leadership intends to create an image of “central good, local bad” to maintain the overall 
legitimacy of the regime. For example, based on survey data, Li (2008) finds that Chinese 
farmers have more confidence in the central leadership’s intent than its ability to ensure faithful 
implementation of its policies by local governments. This suggests a successful example of the 
established image of “central good, local bad.”  
(2) Monitoring local officials for compliance 
 The second purpose for the central leadership to use critical news is to monitor local 
officials and to ensure local compliance. In order to achieve this goal, the critical reports tend to 
disclose local recalcitrant or even illegal behavior before relevant officials are investigated and 
disciplined. This is different from the critical reports discussed in the above section.  
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 For such critical reports, a common technique used by journalists is to evoke laws and 
regulations to show local noncompliance and to provide legitimacy to the reports, should they 
encounter obstacles to publication. This is a common technique used by both newspapers and 
television news shows. In fact, protesters may also evoke laws and regulations to make a case 
and bargain with officials (Chen 2012). Scholars have coined a term to describe such a strategy--
“rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li 2006). However, because such reports disclose cases that 
may have not been brought to official attention, such reports tend to be critical at a lesser extent, 
as compared to critical reports in the previous category. Specifically, such critical reports may 
focus on issues such as incompetence on the part of local officials that stems from negligence or 
miscommunication, but not nefarious schemes or gross corruption.  
For example, Focus is a reputational television news show broadcast on China Central 
Television (CCTV), the central-level television station in China. Focus is known for its 
investigative and often critical reporting. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, television 
stations in China are affiliated with governments at different administrative levels. This has 
granted television stations at higher administrative levels the power to monitor and criticize 
governments at lower administrative levels. Focus, for example, a CCTV news show, often 
criticizes local governments at township, county, and municipal levels. Sometimes it may even 
criticize provincial governments. Consequently, due to its central-level status, many of its reports 
have led to changes in policy implementation and governance at local levels. In fact, its 
investigative reports and criticism have been so effective that on its official website11, there is a 
section devoted to specifying how relevant government agencies have responded to its reports, 
mostly correcting noncompliant or incompetent behavior. For example, in its October 22, 2013 
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report12, Focus discloses problems in a local county government’s work to help farmers acquire 
loans from local banks. The problem was not corruption, but miscommunication between the 
bank and the government. This miscommunication led to the failure of farmers’ efforts to acquire 
loans and develop livestock businesses. The case happened in Guanghe County in Gansu 
Province. During the night this episode of Focus was broadcast on CCTV, provincial-level 
leaders in Gansu issued directives to solve the problem of miscommunication. Municipal-level 
leaders convened an emergency meeting that night to discuss possible solutions13.  
 In certain cases, reports from Focus may attract attention from ministry leaders at the 
central level. For example, in its October 23, 2013 report, Focus discloses illegal medical 
practices in Beijing and Hubei. This has led to the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, a central-level commission directly under the State Council14, to establish a special 
task force with the aim to eliminate illegal medical practices15.  
 As compared to the reports serving the purpose of establishing an image of “central good, 
local bad,” critical reports that intend to help ensure local compliance usually stay modest. 
Indeed, if a television news show at the central level criticizes local governments on “mild” 
problems such as incompetence, local television news shows would encounter greater difficulties 
in critical reporting, as they are subject to local governments’ control due to their low 
administrative levels. These difficulties will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Local Leaders Using Criticism in News to Establish Authority and to Please Superiors 
While central leadership may use critical news to establish a positive image among the 
public and to ensure local compliance, local leaders may also resort to critical news in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The transcript can be accessed here: http://news.cntv.cn/2013/10/22/VIDE1382443319781520.shtml  
13 The report can be accessed here: http://news.cntv.cn/20131204/104262.shtml  
14 The State Council is the top executive branch of the Chinese party-state. 
15 The report can be accessed here: http://news.cntv.cn/20131204/104261.shtml  
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establish his or her authority among subordinates and to please superiors. This has its roots in the 
cadre management system in China. 
Political leaders in China are not popularly and democratically elected. They are 
appointed by superiors through the nomenklatura system. As a result, a number of problems such 
as localism may arise. Simply put, in the Chinese politics context, localism overlaps with local 
noncompliance, referring to the problem that local officials may not fully obey directives from 
the center. In fact, localism appeared back in the Maoist period. During the early period of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao felt that his power was challenged not only by top leaders 
such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, but also by provincial leaders. Consequently, he 
replaced all party-secretaries at the provincial level (Li and Bachman 1989, 84). In the post-
reform era, localism takes on a dual form—political and economic. While political localism 
refers to the power centers at local levels that may not fully carry out central policies, economic 
localism exists due to financial decentralization and the development of local industries. 
Specifically, the profit retention policy and the increase in extra-budgetary funds provided local 
governments with greater financial independence. Moreover, with regards to local economic 
development policies, local governments have more power to make decisions such as allocating 
loans and offering tax exemptions to local enterprises (Li and Bachman 1989, 85-6).  
From the perspective of economic growth and effective governance, a certain degree of 
localism may not necessarily be undesirable. For the central leadership in China, however, 
curbing localism is deemed vital to maintaining the CCP rule. Indeed, a central doctrine of the 
Leninist party-state is the absolute control over all government branches at all levels by the 
Communist Party. Therefore, provincial level leaders such as the party secretaries and governors 
are directly appointed by the Central Organization Department of the CCP. Moreover, provincial 
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leaders are routinely moved from province to province, or in and out of posts in Beijing, in an 
attempt to prevent local power centers from growing (Bo 2002, Ch. 4; Lawrence and Martin 
2013; Li 2001, Ch. 3). For leaders at lower levels such as the municipal, county, and township 
levels, it is the leader at the next level up that appoints the subordinates. This is the “one-level-
down management” model (O’Brien and Li 1999). For example, the county head is usually 
appointed by the mayor of the municipality to which the county belongs.  
The Chinese party-state also tried to institutionalize such practices in cadre promotion to 
curtail localism. In June 1999, the Central Organization Department of the CCP issued The 
Regulation of Cadre Exchange, which specifies that (1) county and municipal top leaders should 
not be selected from the same region; (2) those who head a county or city for over ten years 
should be transferred to another place; and (3) provincial leaders should be transferred more 
frequently to another province or the central government (Li 2001, 65-6). Based on such a cadre 
promotion system, provincial-level leaders have great incentives and needs to establish personal 
authority in the jurisdiction, as many of them rotate between provinces or in and out of Beijing.  
One such provincial leader was Li Yuanchao (hereafter Li). He was the Vice Minister of 
Culture from 1996 to 2000, before being appointed as the deputy party secretary of Jiangsu 
province in 2000. From 2001 to 2003, he held concurrent positions also as the party secretary of 
Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu province. From 2002 to 2007, Li was the party secretary of 
Jiangsu province. After five years of being the head of Jiangsu province, Li was again promoted 
back to Beijing as the head of the Central Organization Department of the CCP and a member of 
the Political Bureau from 2007 to 2012. During this time, he held the concurrent position of 
Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP. Since 2013, Li has served as the vice president 
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of China16. Based on this brief account of Li’s recent political career, he is an example of a high-
level official that was appointed and promoted in and out of Beijing.  
As discussed earlier, the main reason for the central leadership to move leaders from 
provinces to provinces and in and out of Beijing is to prevent localism. However, precisely 
because of this practice, provincial leaders have great incentives and needs to establish personal 
authority in an unfamiliar environment, both to consolidate personal power and to facilitate 
smoother and more effective governance. Li, who was transferred to Jiangsu from Beijing in 
2001, resorted to critical news in order to establish an image of a tough and formidable leader 
who means business. He personally visited the newsroom of a popular television news show Just 
in Nanjing, and encouraged the anchor Meng Fei, who was famous for his outspoken and sharp 
commentary, to produce more critical news to supervise the government, so that government 
officials can better serve the people. Moreover, Li even specified that the criticism could go all 
the way up to officials at bureau chief level (Interview 16). As a result, Just in Nanjing devoted a 
substantial amount of airtime to critical reporting, most of which centers on the lack of or 
insufficient provision of public goods, government incompetency, and bureaucratic ineptitude. 
According to a content analysis of Just in Nanjing, among the 170 news reports, only 5 were 
about positive party and policy news. In contrast, there were 93 reports that were critical of 
governments and officials (Chen 2004).  
On a side note, in the case of Just in Nanjing, Li’s encouragement for criticism is only 
one part of the picture. The producer of the show is the other indispensable part that decides 
news content, which will be discussed in detail as a case study in Chapter 4.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 An official account of Li’s political career can be accessed through the official Xinhua News Agency: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/14/c_132233077.htm  
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Following the strategy to use criticism and supervision to establish personal authority, 
besides critical news, Li also launched a public event, “Tens of Thousands of Citizens Evaluate 
Government Departments” 万人评议机关 in 2001 when he was the party secretary of Nanjing. 
This was part of the notion of “service-oriented government” that he put forward. The tenet of 
this notion was that the public evaluates government leaders (Miller 2011). During this event, the 
Nanjing government first provided a list of 70 government departments under the Nanjing 
municipal government to the public. Then the government randomly selected around ten 
thousand Nanjing citizens and invited them to anonymously evaluate the 70 government 
departments. For those departments that ranked at the bottom based on the citizen evaluations, 
relevant officials in charge were subject to criticism or even demotion. For those departments 
that ranked at the top, the Nanjing municipal government publicly praised them and set them as 
models for other departments to learn from. In fact, this event was institutionalized as a yearly 
public evaluation event. The most recent “Tens of Thousands of Citizens Evaluate Government 
Departments” was held in 201317.  
Indeed, the impact of such events in Nanjing was real. For example, in the 2001 event, 
the bureau chiefs of the bottom five bureaus on the public evaluations list were all punished. 
According to a report18 from People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the 
CCP, the chief of the real estate bureau was demoted; the administrative post was removed for 
the chief of city appearance bureau; the remaining three bureau chiefs were criticized and 
educated. Besides People’s Daily, the official Xinhua News Agency also published 
commentary19 praising such events, commenting that this “reduces the distance between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Nanjing Daily, the party paper of the CCP Nanjing Committee, published a report on the 2013 “Tens of 
Thousands of Citizens Evaluate Government Departments” event. http://www.njdaily.cn/2013/1220/702720.shtml  
18 This report can be accessed at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/historic/0219/5814.html  
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government and the people.” In other words, Li’s strategy to turn to criticism and supervision by 
the news media and the public, a decision that stemmed from his need to consolidate his personal 
authority, was met with approval and praise from the central leadership.  
*** 
For local leaders, besides establishing personal authority, they have to please their 
superiors. As discussed earlier, Chinese officials are not elected by the people, but selected by 
the party-state. The control over personnel is a key component of the Leninist party-state system. 
Due to this need, some local leaders creatively use the news media to publicize and show off 
their political track records, not only in front of the public, but more importantly, in front of their 
superiors.  
But how to use the news media is a tricky question. Unlike the Maoist time when 
overwhelming propaganda and suppression over alternative information were the rule, with the 
unquestioned but questionable assumption that manipulating news and commentary in mass 
media can greatly help shape the hearts and minds of the people, the public does not believe in 
excessive positive news any more. When the real lives of ordinary citizens are confronted with a 
number of problems ranging from rising housing prices, shrinking medical resources, widening 
urban-rural gaps, to local protests due to land grabs and other kinds of injustice, positive news 
and commentary not only may not create a positive image of the government, but may instigate 
antagonistic feelings among the public that the government is incompetent and negligent. This is 
especially true for local governments, as discussed earlier, who often take the blame for many 
kinds of social issues. But creative local leaders resorted to criticism in the news media, realizing 
that political shows can mobilize substantial popular support and create an image of a popular, 
competent, and innovative leader in the eyes of the superiors.  
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 Asking Politics on Television 电视问政 is a highly popular television show aired on 
Wuhan Television in Hubei province. It was created in 2011 under the direct leadership of the 
party secretary of Wuhan municipality Ruan Chengfa (hereafter Ruan). According to a report20 
from Southern Weekend, a renowned liberal newspaper in China, during the decision-making 
process of creating the show, there was disagreement among top leaders of Wuhan municipality 
regarding whether to live broadcast the show or to record and edit it before broadcast. With 
Ruan’s push, the standing committee of the CCP Wuhan Committee decided to live broadcast 
Asking Politics on Television. This is a yearly special show, and each year there are about two to 
five episodes, depending on the decisions from the municipal government. For Wuhan television 
station, this show was a task coming from the municipality. Although this show has been highly 
popular and has brought in considerable revenue to the television station, the idea to create such 
a show directly came from the political leadership at the municipality. As a result, although this 
was a political task, it was an easy task for television producers and anchors, as bureau chiefs 
and relevant leaders-in-charge at government departments have no choice but to attend the show, 
sometimes to be grilled, once their names were listed by Ruan and the discipline commission of 
the CCP Wuhan Committee. In fact, it was reported that Ruan once requested the anchor to 
question a member of the standing committee of the CCP Wuhan Committee “until he sweats” 
(Chu and Luo 2013).  
 Asking Politics on Television is highly popular among the public. Its ratings were even 
higher than primetime television dramas in 2012, according to a report21 from People’s Daily. 
There are at least three factors contributing to its popularity. First, part of the audience in the 
studio that could directly question and challenge government officials were ordinary Wuhan 
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citizens, who registered through online open enrollment. According to the People’s Daily report, 
many of these audience members and their families and friends became loyal viewers of the 
show ever since. Second, this show has had a real impact on local politics. Since the creation of 
the show in 2011 to April 2012, there were 96 cases discussed on Asking Politics on Television, 
among which 16 leaders were punished by the discipline commission of the CCP Wuhan 
Committee and 106 leaders were criticized, according to the People’s Daily report. Of course, 
this does not mean that all incompetent or corrupt government officials were punished as a result 
of the show. Nor does it mean that the anchor can ask any questions to the government officials. 
In fact, there were specific limits as to which questions cannot be asked. For example, questions 
about whether and how much gifts, no matter in the form of money or commodity, should not be 
asked. In addition, political questions were restricted within certain limits (Chu and Luo 2013).  
Third, the format of the show, that is, essentially grilling government officials publicly, 
attracts public attention not only because of its novelty but also because it functions like a 
punching bag for ordinary citizens, who face all kinds of social problems that can be attributed to 
government negligence, incompetency, or corruption. In fact, in media reports on Asking Politics 
on Television, a common observation that was reported over and over again was the fact that 
many government officials “sweat” or “bow and apologize” to the public when questioned about 
their abysmal job performance as public servants. Videos of the excerpts of the show have gone 
viral in the Chinese cyberspace. One government official privately complained to the anchor of 
the show that, “I just bowed to the audience once, and CCTV (China Central Television) re-
broadcast my bow 17 times!” (Chu and Luo 2013) Indeed, government officials “sweating” and 
“apologizing” were such uncommon phenomenon in China’s state-society relations and political 
landscape that live broadcasting such embarrassing moments created strong reactions in the 
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public discourse. For ordinary citizens, no matter how much they believe in such apologies or 
whether they believe real change would come after this, the act alone by government officials 
that was amplified through television screens already prompted wide and deep attention from the 
public, local governments in other localities, and the central leadership.  
 After Asking Politics on Television became popular, municipal governments in other 
provinces quickly followed up and created similar television shows. In fact, all the television 
shows share the same name, that is, Asking Politics on Television. So far there are Asking 
Politics on Television in Wuhan of Hubei province, Changsha of Hunan province, Yinchuan of 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Bazhong of Sichuan province, and many other cities in 
Guangdong and Henan provinces. The People’s Daily report dubbed such a new form of 
television supervision as the “final exams” for government officials, since such shows are also 
seen as a year-end review and evaluation of government officials.  
 The central leadership, however, through its mouthpiece media such as CCTV and 
People’s Daily, has sent out inconsistent signals regarding its view on the popularity and future 
of the asking politics shows that exist at municipal levels. On the one hand, People’s Daily in its 
December 27, 2013 report22 praised such television shows based on (1) their popularity among 
the public, (2) the removal of formalism embodied in the direct questioning and grilling of 
government officials, and (3) their real impact in terms of punishment on incompetent or corrupt 
officials. Overall, the commentary from People’s Daily takes a positive tone towards the asking 
politics shows. Moreover, citing a law professor from Beijing University, People’s Daily argued 
at the end of the report that asking politics shows should be normalized or institutionalized.  
 CCTV, on the other hand, put forward a different interpretation of the asking politics 
shows. In a news magazine show News 1+1 aired daily on CCTV news channel, the title of its 
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December 24, 2012 episode23 was “Asking Politics on Television, What Were They Able to 
Ask?24” Skepticism toward the asking politics shows filled the episode. Besides questioning the 
format of the show, that is, excessive gimmick and the selective list of officials to be questioned 
on the show, the anchorwoman also raised the question of how to “normalize” or 
“institutionalize” such a supervisory mechanism. The guest on the show argued that local 
people’s congresses should be the political entity to supervise governments. Therefore, instead of 
using television shows to supervise government officials, a legal way to normalize or 
institutionalize the supervisory mechanism is to voice opinions, concerns, and criticisms through 
local people’s congresses. In other words, CCTV’s opinion was that Asking Politics on 
Television shows cannot legitimately supervise government officials, because news media do not 
have the right to do so. It was the people’s congresses at various levels that have the right and 
responsibility to supervise government.  
 Interestingly, the guest on CCTV’s News 1+1 that voiced the above opinion is the same 
law professor from Beijing University quoted in the People’s Daily article. Indeed, the two 
reports from CCTV and People’s Daily center on the same question—how to normalize or 
institutionalize such a supervisory mechanism, which is obviously needed for effective 
governance in China. Although quoting the same law professor, People’s Daily omitted the 
professor’s opinion to rely on people’s congress, rather than the news media, to supervise 
government, whereas CCTV broadcast the full version of this professor’s view. Of course, 
without prior discussion and pre-approval from the propaganda department, this professor’s view 
would not be published or broadcast on central-level media outlets. Nevertheless, the distinct use 
of the professor’s view by CCTV and People’s Daily begs further investigation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The transcript and video can be accessed at http://news.cntv.cn/2012/12/24/VIDE1356358685995606.shtml  
24 电视问政，问出了什么？ 
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 However, like many other political issues in authoritarian regimes, it is often times very 
difficult, if not impossible, for scholars to get a full and true picture of what was really going on. 
A possible explanation for the diverging path between CCTV and People’s Daily on this issue is 
media competition. Although blessed with abundant financial and talent resources as compared 
to television stations at lower levels, CCTV is also more restrained in terms of content. It is the 
mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the CCP, thus it bears the important task of representing 
the central leadership. Local television stations, in contrast, are mainly managed and controlled 
by local governments. With less financial support from local governments compared to the 
CCTV, local television stations have relatively more room to experiment with new forms of 
shows, the primary goal being profits. Singing shows such as The Voice of China and Chinese 
Idol and dating shows such as You Are the One, were all originated from local television stations 
and spread horizontally to other local television stations. In fact, these popular shows, including 
Asking Politics on Television, enjoy high ratings and thus have brought in envious amounts of 
profits to local television stations. For example, the rating of Wuhan Asking Politics on 
Television in 2012 was three times that of primetime television dramas, according to a report 
from a Shanghai-based metropolitan newspaper News Morning. In Chenzhou, Hunan province, 
Asking Politics on Television has greatly increased the rating of the first channel of Chenzhou 
Television. In 2013 the rating of Asking Politics on Television was three times that of the 
channel’s previous show in the same time slot. Moreover, the ranking of the first channel of 
Chenzhou Television increased from Number 10 to Number 3 among the over 60 channels 
available in the Chenzhou area, due to the broadcast of Asking Politics on Television (Xiang and 
Zhou 2013). Therefore, local television stations are powerful competitors of CCTV. Based on 
this, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that CCTV’s diminishing the role of television in 
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government supervision serves its own interest as a dominant force in the Chinese television 
landscape.  
 If CCTV’s skepticism over Asking Politics on Television is due to its competition with 
local television stations, then we can reasonably reach the understanding that local leaders can 
use criticism in the news media to earn attention and please superiors through showing off his or 
her political track records and the ability to use the news media. The praise from central-level 
People’s Daily and the fact that this format of political show has been adopted in a number of 
other localities demonstrate the success of the show. The person that wins most is the party 
secretary of Wuhan municipality, who was key to creating and sustaining the show. The wide 
publicity and positive reactions that resulted from live broadcasting Asking Politics on Television 
earned Ruan the reputation of being able to proactively use the news media to the advantage of 
the government among his superiors.   
Conclusion 
 The media have always been an important tool controlled and used by the party-state for 
political purposes, based on the Leninist party-state system. However, the way the party-state 
uses the media evolves under different political conditions. As the economic and political reform 
proceeds, the political realities in China, specifically the diverging interests of the central and 
local governments, propelled politicians to resort to non-political means to achieve political 
goals, be it ensuring local compliance or establishing personal authority. One of those means is 
criticism in the news media. The central government can use critical news not only to monitor 
local officials, but also to establish the image of “central good, local bad.” Local leaders can use 
critical news to establish personal authority and consolidate power bases, as well as to please 
superiors through publicizing their political track records and showing off their ability to use the 
 
	   50 
news media. In fact, the media reform in the 1990s, an important result of which is increasing 
media market competition, provides another fracture in the censorship system. The pursuit of 
profit has sometimes driven news professionals to pursue political criticism. It is to this fracture 
that Chapter 3 turns.  
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Chapter 3 Market Fracture: Market Competition Among News Organizations 
 
The concept of media market only came into prominence among news professionals since 
media marketization was launched together with market reform in 1978 and accelerated after 
1992. Before media marketization, almost all media organizations in China received complete 
state funding and were under strict state control. After media marketization, state funding 
reduced substantially, and media organizations now have to rely on advertising and other sources 
of revenue to maintain operation (Chan and Qiu 2002; De Burgh 2003; Esarey 2005; Shirk 2011; 
Volland 2012). Characterized by deregulation, commercialization, and partial privatization 
(Stockmann 2013), media marketization directly resulted in a sharp increase in the number of 
news outlets, which naturally caused intense competition for audiences and readers in the media 
market. The competition in turn influences the content and style of news. Specifically, in order to 
appeal to broader audiences and readers, traditional media such as television and newspapers 
have resorted to either “vulgar” news that often involves sex, violence, and sensational celebrity 
gossip, or critical news that exposes officials’ wrongdoings or incompetency. For television 
stations, the instant success of television life news shows, as their consistently high ratings show, 
clearly demonstrates a model of profitable news production. Of course, the force of market 
competition can drive news production in a number of directions, and criticism is only one of 
those directions. Nevertheless, reporting on news stories critical of local governments and 
policies can establish a strong media reputation among audiences and readers. Based on this, 
newspaper and website editors as well as television producers employ a number of techniques 
navigating a media environment that does not usually welcome politically critical news.   
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 In this chapter, I first outline media marketization consequential to the fierce market 
competition in today’s media landscape. Then I specify the techniques that news professionals 
have developed in order to navigate a strict media regulation environment. Next I use case 
studies to demonstrate how the need to earn profit drives news professionals to pursue critical 
news through various techniques, as well as the limitations for market-driven critical reporting. 
Finally, I find that market-driven critical reporting has transformed media responsibility in 
contemporary Chinese society.  
 Before delving into the complex components and dynamic process of media 
marketization, it is helpful to first outline the consequences of media marketization and to 
connect the chapters of fractures that are individually discussed for analytical purposes but are in 
actually intricately related. There are three important actors in the fractured censorship system—
the central and local governments and officials, news organizations, and journalists. So far we 
have discussed the political actors. The central leadership allows critical reporting in order to 
maintain a positive image of itself among the public through blaming local officials, and local 
officials allow critical reporting in order to establish personal authority or to please superiors 
(Chapter 2). In addition, the governments allow criticism also for news outlets to attract audience 
and readers, because of the substantially reduced state funding (Chapter 3). As a result, the party-
state has to maintain a fine balance between firm control over the news media and more market 
freedom for news organizations. On the other hand, news organizations have great incentives and 
needs to earn profits through news production, a direct result of media marketization (Chapter 3). 
There are, certainly, a number of approaches to news production that can attract audience and 
readers, but criticism in news is an important one. Based on this, the central argument of this 
chapter is that the need of news organizations to earn profits may drive journalists to pursue 
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critical reporting in order to increase ratings or circulation, which constitutes the market fracture 
in the censorship system.  
Media Marketization and Competition 
Media marketization marks the transformation of the Chinese media in terms of (1) its 
evolving political nature and (2) the expansion of news outlets and the consequent market 
competition. Before 1978, all forms of mass media in China were seen by the CCP as tools of 
propaganda. They were strict instruments of political power. According to Liu (1971, 6), the 
most important function of the mass media in Leninist states is to “transmit the Party’s or state’s 
programs and instructions to the masses.” As a result, the media “are adjunct to the Party 
apparatus and must be controlled completely by it.” (Liu 1971, 6) In other words, the media were 
supposed to serve only the party-state. After 1978, under the overarching policy of reform and 
opening-up, “media were intended to serve both the state and the market.” (Stockmann 2013, 50) 
While the nature of being propaganda tools remains true and important, the media are also 
expected to generate profits, state-owned and partially privatized alike. Reflected in the actual 
news content, for example, many television news shows and newspapers have to carry news 
information from the party-state and commentary that conforms to the party-state’s official 
positions, as well as news that appeals to the public. News of the latter kind will bring profits to 
news organizations. The evolving political nature of the media, that is, from a pure political tool 
to a marketized entity that also needs to serve the party-state, signifies loosening control over the 
media. This has led to the expansion of news outlets and subsequent market competition.  
 With the receding importance of being a political tool and the increasing space allowed 
by the party-state for diversity in news content, the number of news outlets and the production of 
news grew exponentially. According to China Statistical Yearbook published by the National 
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Bureau of Statistics25, the number of officially licensed newspapers has grown almost five times, 
from 69 in 1979 to 1,918 in 2012, although with a sharp decline in the late 1980s due to the 
political upheaval that culminated in June 1989 on Tiananmen Square, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The speed of increase was the fastest in the 1990s, the peak of media marketization, but the 
number of newspapers stabilized at around 1,900 since the mid-2000s. As the number of 
newspapers circulated in the market increases, the competition among newspapers has also been 
growing. For example, the number of printed copies of newspapers shows a pattern of consistent 
increase. According to China Statistical Yearbook, the annual printed copies of licensed 
newspapers increased from 0.8 billion copies in 1950 to 47.8 billion copies in 2013, a 60-fold 
increase in 63 years, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 Such exponential increase, however, does not necessarily imply that it adds to the 
difficulty for the Chinese party-state to monitor and control newspapers. Besides the licensing 
system that is in place to control newspaper publications, there are partially state-owned media 
groups—conglomerates of media outlets to be more specific—that encompass most of the 
newspapers. For example, Southern Newspaper Media Group 南方报业传媒集团, established in 
July 2004, is a state-owned enterprise belonging to the CCP Guangdong Committee. It is 
managed by the propaganda department of the CCP Guangdong committee, according to the 
Communiqué on the Structure of the Southern Newspaper Media Group issued by the institution 
commission of Guangdong province26. It has 10 newspapers, 8 magazines, and 4 websites. The 
media groups bear responsibilities to ensure politically correct news reports. Therefore, despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The data are accessed through China Data Online, a database published by China Data Center at the University of 
Michigan. It was founded in 1997 and it brings together data inaccessible to many scholars because of language and 
format difficulty. 
26 The communiqué can be accessed at http://www.gdbb.gov.cn/admin/attachment/upload/1348458164623.pdf  
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the increase in the number of newspapers, through the mid-level state-owned media groups, the 
Chinese party-state is able to exercise firm control over newspapers.  
 
Figure 3.1 Number of Licensed Newspapers in China, 1950-2012 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, accessed through China Data Online 
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Figure 3.2 Number of Printed Copies of Licensed Newspapers in China, 1950-2013. 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, accessed through China Data Online 
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Outline for Radio and Television Work.27 According to this document, Chinese governments at 
central, provincial, municipal, and county levels should all have affiliated television stations 
(Huang and Zhou 2003, 31). This led to a substantial expansion of television stations, which 
peaked in 1997 with 923 stations. In 1999, however, the State Council, the top executive body in 
China, issued Instructions on Strengthening Radio and Television Cable Network Construction 
Management 关于加强广播电视有线网络建设管理的意见28,  deciding to streamline the 
structure of Chinese television. This can be attributed to a number of factors such as limited local 
audiences, especially for county-level television stations, low-quality television shows, and an 
increasingly diverse media market that seemed more difficult to manage (Huang and Zhou 2003). 
Consequently, county-level radio and television stations were cancelled, which led to a sharp 
decrease in the number of television stations in 1998, as shown in Figure 3.3. By the end of 2012, 
there were a total of 183 television stations in Mainland China29.  
Despite the decrease in the number of televisions stations, the competition in the Chinese 
television market has not been declining. For example, each television station has multiple 
channels, so even with decreasing television stations, the number of television channels has been 
growing steadily, from 219 in 1985 to 3,272 in 2010, a 15-fold increase in 25 years, as shown in 
Figure 3.4. On the other hand, the penetration rate of television in China has grown from 78% in 
1989 to 97.62% in 2010. Since 2004, the penetration rate of television in China has remained 
above 95%. As the size of the television audience has only been mildly growing, especially after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 中共中央发出的 1983年 37号文件，正式批准《关于广播电视工作的汇报提纲》。 
28 国发办［1999］82号文件 
29 This is according to the annual Report on Radio, Film, and Television Development in China 中国广播电影电视
发展报告 (2013), published by China Communication Research Center, affiliated with the State Administration of 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, available at 
http://www.cnr.cn/gundong/201307/t20130704_512976177.shtml  
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2004, the climbing number of television channels with a higher speed after 2004 implies 
mounting competition.  
 
Figure 3.3 Number of Television Stations in China (1958-2007) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, accessed through China Data Online 
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Figure 3.4 Number of Television Channels in China (1985-2010) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, accessed through China Data Online 
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suggests a steadily growing number of staff working at television stations, an important sign of 
growing business for Chinese television stations.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Number of Television and Radio Staff in China (1984-2010) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, accessed through China Data Online 
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Indeed, an important consequence of media marketization is increased competition 
among media outlets. Research has found that the majority of journalists in Guangzhou, a major 
city in southern China, felt constrained by audience preferences because news organizations 
place emphasis on increasing revenue (Lin 2010). Criticism of local governments and policies 
being one type of news that is proven to attract audience and readers and thus to generate 
advertising revenues, journalists have great incentives to pursue critical reporting while being 
careful not to cross the generally ambiguous line set by the party-state. Next, this chapter 
specifies several techniques commonly used by journalists to push for critical reporting while 
being under various political constraints, in order to increase ratings or circulation for greater 
profits. 
*** 
Some of these techniques are shared by all kinds of journalists working at television 
stations, newspapers, and online news portals, while other techniques are unique to different 
news outlets. First, television producers may use positive follow-up reports to balance the 
political criticism in the initial report. In the follow-up reports usually aired on the following day 
of the initial critical reports, correction by relevant government agencies and officials or 
problems being successfully resolved is emphasized. In other words, the follow-up reports 
generally end in a positive tone, stressing positive results of originally negative cases.  
Second, television producers and newspaper editors may choose to report negative news 
at lower administrative levels. In China, each newspaper has to be sponsored by a government 
agency. The administrative level of the sponsoring government agency thus decides the 
administrative level of the newspaper. The situation is similar for television stations, as specified 
above. Due to the administrative level of the news outlets, journalists may have more negotiating 
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power when reporting on local officials’ wrongdoings or incompetency at lower administrative 
levels. This is because each news outlet is supervised by propaganda departments at 
corresponding administrative levels. Therefore, if local officials at lower administrative levels 
are dissatisfied at reports done by news outlets at higher administrative levels, the lower-level 
officials have to resort to propaganda departments at higher levels in order to place pressure on 
the news outlet to retract reports. This indirect “complaining” process provides leeway for 
higher-level news outlets to broadcast or publish critical reports on lower-level governments and 
officials.  
Third, television producers and newspaper editors may choose to report on negative news 
that has already been widely discussed online, especially on Chinese social media sites. In fact, 
this has been extensively used by both television and newspaper journalists to make an argument 
for critical reporting, should their reports be questioned by political authorities.  
Finally, online news portal executives may bribe middle-level censors to guarantee 
lighter punishment should any of their reports be deemed as crossing the red line. As revealed by 
one of my interviewees who formerly worked at a major online news portal as a senior editor, 
executives of that online news portal had regularly sent gift cards worth as much as 1 million 
Chinese yuan (about 170,000 USD) to middle-level censors at Beijing Internet Management 
Office and the Propaganda Department of the CCP Committee at the Beijing Municipality. 
However, under the current censorship system, this will not guarantee publication of critical 
reporting without consequences. What this does, instead, is to ensure that the punishment for the 
online news portals will be lighter when critical reports are published. Generally, the 
punishments for online news portals can be fine, retracting reports, demoting editors, or even jail 
time for journalists. If the punishment can be fine instead of retracting reports, for example, then 
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the space for critical reporting is actually pushed back. Therefore, bribing middle-level censors 
can sometimes ensure punishment at a lighter level.  
Another important consequence that results from market competition is that the function 
of the news media is being partially transformed in authoritarian China. Specifically, the news 
media, especially local television news shows, have gradually developed the function of “helping 
ordinary people solve problems,” 帮老百姓解决问题 which essentially helps local governments 
provide public goods. In this way, the local news television stations have formed a cooperative 
relationship with local governments, and at the same time ensured the possibility for critical 
reporting within certain limits. This will be discussed in detail in the last section of this chapter. 
This is not to say, however, that critical reporting at local levels is prevalent and easy. In 
fact, there are two important features of such news production that we need to recognize. First, 
even though news professionals have their own ways of dealing with government officials, when 
it comes to critical reporting, these techniques do not always work and the space for critical 
reporting does not stay the same. Second, the level of criticism, in terms of both quantity and 
intensity, varies constantly, depending on the negotiation between the news organizations and the 
local governments.  
 Next, this chapter uses an in-depth case study of a popular nightly news show, Attention, 
aired on Yangzhou television news channel, a municipal level television station, to illustrate the 
techniques used by television news professionals to broadcast critical news stories. The analysis 
consists of a quantitative content analysis of a segment of Attention, and a qualitative 
examination of the news production process.  
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The Most Popular Nightly News Show Attention in Yangzhou 
 Yangzhou Television Station (YTS) is the research site where I stayed for a month in the 
summer of 2013 to conduct semi-structured interviews and direct observation. I observed 
journalists and the news production process by staying in the journalists’ shared offices and 
following them when they went out to do interviews and shoot video footage. This is non-
participant direct observation. Besides, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with 
journalists and producers working at YTS’s most popular nightly news show, Attention. 
 As a municipal level television station, YTS has a number of news shows broadcast on its 
three channels. The main channel is Yangzhou Television News Channel. The most popular 
news shows are all broadcast on this channel. Other channels include Yangzhou Television City 
Channel and Life Channel. All channels launched by YTS are local channels, that is, audiences 
from regions outside of the municipality are not able to receive YTS channels. Since each 
municipality typically only has one television station, such municipal television station usually 
possesses a monopolistic position in terms of local news reporting, because it is the only 
municipal television news outlet that reports local news. The only exception is in capital cities 
where provincial-level and municipal-level televisions stations essentially focus on the same 
audience market. In other words, the jurisdiction of news reporting for municipal-level television 
stations resembles that of municipal governments. However, this does not mean less competition 
for municipal-level television news shows. In fact, there is usually intense competition among 
the news shows from the same or different channels within a municipal television station. In 
other words, internal competition may be intense.  
 Attention is seen as an old brand of YTS News Channel. Attention was launched in 2001, 
a time when television life news shows just started to draw audience attention. Thus, Attention 
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had gone through a period of high ratings and popularity. However, as with many other 
television life news shows, starting from the mid-2000s, Attention’s rating has been dropping, 
and there seems to be a consensus among scholars and journalists alike that television life news 
shows have encountered a bottleneck. The audiences have grown tired of news stories that often 
focus on street fights and gossip, that is, sensational stories with few social implications. But 
there does not seem to be a solution for such a bottleneck yet. The producer of Attention is thus 
under pressure to not only keep on air this news show that is seen as an old brand for local news, 
but also to increase ratings, generate advertising revenues, and revive the intimate relationship 
that this show once had with the audience. In fact, during my visit at YTS, I found that there 
were two books on each journalist’s desk: What We Can Learn from Steve Jobs’ Innovation and 
Good Employees Dispense Positive Energy. Both books are management titles targeting private 
businesses, with the aim to generate profits. I asked a journalist why everybody has the exact 
same two books. He said that reading and understanding these books were part of the evaluation 
for journalists, and they had to pass an exam based on those books along with official ideologies 
such as Marxist-Leninist news and propaganda theory. This suggests the prioritized status of 
profits in the management process at the television station. Indeed, the producer of Attention 
admits that ratings are one of the most important standards to evaluate a show; sometimes it can 
even decide whether a show could stay on air. Next, I use the results from content analyzing a 
segment of Attention to examine the trend of critical reporting as broadcast on television. This is 
followed by a qualitative analysis of the news production process that includes finding news 
sources, conducting interviews, and shooting video footage. The qualitative analysis illustrates 
the techniques journalists use to broadcast critical stories as a result of media market competition, 
as well as the obstacles they have encountered.  
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A content analysis of the “supervision by public opinion” segment 
 During the 30-minute nightly news show Attention, a segment named “Nightly Roll Call” 
is exclusively devoted to “supervision by public opinion,” that is, critical reporting on local 
governments and officials, businesses, and ordinary individuals. “Supervision by public opinion” 
is an official term first mentioned in 1987 in the Report to the Thirteenth Party Congress, where 
then General Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang stated that “we should use all kinds of modernized 
news and propaganda tools to increase reporting on government and Party affairs, let supervision 
by public opinion play a role, support the mass criticizing weaknesses and wrongdoings in our 
work, and struggle against bureaucracy and other kinds of unhealthy tendencies.”30 (Zhao 1987) 
During the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, it was stated in the report that “we should 
emphasize the supervision by public opinion function of the news media, complete the 
supervisory mechanism, and put state bureaus and officials at all levels under effective 
supervision.”31 (Jiang 1992) Another five years later, in 1997, the notion of “supervision by 
public opinion” was further developed and integrated with other forms of supervision that the 
CCP sees as beneficial to its legitimacy and political rule. It was stated in the Report to the 
Fifteenth Party Congress that “we should integrate intra-Party supervision, supervision by law, 
and supervision by masses, in order to let supervision by public opinion play a bigger role.”32 
(Jiang 1997) Legally, “supervision by public opinion” became part of the Regulations on 
Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Supervision (Trial) implemented in 2004. In Article 3333, 
it was stated “under the leadership of the CCP and according to relevant rules and procedures, 
news media should play the role of supervision by public opinion through either internal or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This report is available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526368.html  
31 This report is available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526308.html  
32 This report is available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html  
33 The full text of the regulation is available here: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2344222.html  
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public reports. Departments and cadres at all levels should emphasize and support supervision by 
public opinion, listen to criticisms and suggestions, and improve their work.” The major form of 
“supervision by public opinion” exercised by the news media is investigative reporting. 
Investigative reporting has its ebbs and flows. Around the year of 2003 is a small peak for 
investigative reporting in China, and the major targets of investigative reporting are government 
agencies, public policies, and business powers (Zhan 2007, 2). 
 As the current Chinese leadership came to power in November 2012 during the 
Eighteenth Party Congress, “supervision by public opinion” has seen renewed support from the 
party-state. After taking over power as the General Party Secretary and the State President, Xi 
Jinping launched a “Mass Line Education and Practice” campaign in 2013, with the aim to 
discipline Party members, improve the governing capability of the CCP, and to increase the 
popularity of the CCP among the public. The notion of mass line is an important component of 
Mao Zedong Thought. The tenet of mass line is “everything is for the mass; everything relies on 
the mass; from the mass, and to the mass.” Therefore, the creation of policy should incorporate 
the interests of the mass; the implementation of policy should rely on the mass. In the year of 
2013, one of the biggest enemies of mass line is corruption by Party members, seen as not only 
being away from the mass, but also betraying the interests of the mass. Under such 
circumstances, “supervision by public opinion” was reemphasized to facilitate effective practice 
of mass line. For example, Party papers such as China Youth Daily published an opinion-
editorial34 arguing the importance of “supervision by public opinion” in facilitating the “Mass 
Line Education and Practice” campaign. The official Xinhua news agency published an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The opinion-editorial was published on December 3, 2013, and can be accessed at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-
12/03/nw.D110000zgqnb_20131203_4-02.htm  
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editorial35 arguing that “supervision by public opinion is positive energy” that can push all forces 
in society toward progress. 
 At a deeper level, the word “supervision” in Chinese has a natural connotation that the 
supervised may be criticized for any negligence, incompetence, or wrongdoings. When 
incorporated into the official reports of the CCP, “supervision” implies an attitude that the Party, 
the supposed leader, is willing to stand on the side of the mass and listen to their suggestions and 
criticisms. More importantly, “supervision” implies that the basic rules are still set by the CCP. 
The mass can only supervise according to existing laws and regulations, and they do not make 
the laws and regulations. Therefore, the main function of “supervision by public opinion,” as 
understood by the CCP in its Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Supervision 
(Trial), is to uncover corruption cases involving officials and cadres. In this way, the party-state 
can benefit from “supervision by public opinion” in the sense that such supervision may help 
discover problems before problems escalate into conflicts. On the other hand, however, such a 
supervisory mechanism does risk the CCP’s political rule, since too many corruption cases may 
erode the very legitimacy of the CCP and public confidence in its governing capability. 
Therefore, the scope and depth of such supervision are often limited. For example, there have not 
been investigative reports uncovering corruption cases involving officials above the provincial 
level without the central leadership having decided to punish certain high-level officials.  
 Despite the limitations of “supervision by public opinion,” a slogan that has not been 
institutionalized or systematically practiced, it reflects the intention of the Chinese party-state to 
use the news media and the public to indirectly supervise government branches and officials. 
From an institutional perspective, this practice has its counterpart in established democracies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The editorial was published on July 16, 2013, and can be accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2013-
07/16/c_132544963.htm  
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McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) use the term “fire alarms oversight” to refer to the practice that 
the United States Congress establishes rules, procedures and informal practices to enable citizens 
and interest groups to supervise and oversee the executive branch in cases of violating 
congressional goals. Similarly, through the news media, the Chinese party-state can also exercise 
supervision and control over its subordinate government branches and officials. In this way, the 
party-state shifts the monitoring cost to the news media and citizens. In fact, such shift of 
monitoring cost by the party-state happens not only with the news media, but also with other 
institutional instruments such as direct village elections in rural China (Kennedy 2007). 
*** 
 The party-state’s intention to use the news media is met with the strong need of the news 
media to earn profits through increase in ratings or circulation, a direct result of media 
marketization. A segment of Attention – “Nightly Roll Call” – was created with the intention to 
use “supervision by public opinion” in order to increase ratings. However, with the delicate 
political nature of the notion of “supervision by public opinion,” the producer told me that they 
were not able to air this segment on a daily basis. In fact, the frequency of this segment depends 
on the political environment. During the time of important political or social events, this segment 
may have to stop airing. For example, in April of 2013, due to a local festival, it was an informal 
agreement between journalists and the Yangzhou government that positive news should occupy 
the majority of airtime or newspaper pages. As a result, “Nightly Roll Call” was only aired once 
during the whole month of April. This strongly suggests that “supervision by public opinion” has 
not been institutionalized, although journalists sometimes can make use of this notion to push for 
more critical reporting, as will be discussed in the qualitative analysis section. Next, I analyze the 
results of content analyzing “Nightly Roll Call” from December 2011 to June 2013. This 
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segment was created and first aired in December 2011. Thus, we can glean the trend, if any, of 
critical reporting at this municipal level television station. 
 There are a total of 241 reports in the segment of “Nightly Roll Call” from December 
2011 to June 2013. The producer of the show told me that in this segment, the anchor would call 
out the names of the government agencies/businesses/individuals that are criticized, hence the 
name of the section. In each episode of this nightly news show, “Nightly Roll Call” only focuses 
on one news story, so there is always only one government agency/business/individual that is 
called out each day. Based on this, each report is coded by (1) whether the subject that is called 
out is a government agency, a business, or an individual; (2) how many reports per month there 
are in the above-mentioned three categories. 
 Figure 3.6 shows that the number of critical reports decreased over time, and stabilized at 
around 13 reports per month. However, there are two outliers, September 2012 and April 2013. 
There were only 5 reports in September 2012 and 1 report in April 2013. The reason for such a 
sharp decline in the number of critical reports is political. The main industry of Yangzhou is 
tourism. In fact, this municipality is famous for its historical sites. As a result, the municipal 
government places great importance on tourism, and launches tourist festivals from time to time 
in order to attract tourists nationwide. September 2012 and April 2013 are the two months when 
the municipal government launched two tourist festivals. Therefore, as the producer told me, 
during these two months, the number of critical reports sharply declined. In addition, there is a 
ditch in the number of critical reports from September to November 2012. This is likely due to 
the Eighteenth Party Congress, a time when Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were selected as the new 
generation of Chinese leaders. During such a politically sensitive time, critical reports needed to 
tone down. This is the influence from national politics.  
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Figure 3.6 Number of Critical Reports in “Nightly Roll Call” by Month 
 
Note: The y-axis shows the frequency of critical reports.  
Source: author’s collection of news scripts. 
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Figure 3.7 describes the ratio of criticisms of government agencies and officials over 
criticisms of businesses. A ratio above 1 means there were more political criticisms than business 
criticisms. While in December 2011 and March 2012 there were more political criticisms than 
business criticisms, the situation was reversed since March 2012. In 7 out of the 19 months, there 
was no political criticism at all. This suggests shrinking space for political criticism over time. 
During my fieldwork, some television journalists commented that it has become more difficult to 
do politically critical news. As mentioned earlier, for a municipal level television station like 
Yangzhou television, journalists can only report on local news, that is, within the jurisdiction of 
the municipality. A direct result of this is that there are only so many government agencies and 
officials. Critical reporting for the first time may be negotiated and allowed, but not so easy for 
the second or the third time. For example, while government agency X may be criticized on local 
television news due to a dispute between an average citizen and an official working at the agency, 
television journalists may not be received in a friendly manner the next time they try to enter that 
agency building and conduct interviews. In fact, a journalist told me that he was on an unofficial 
blacklist of a local health insurance bureau. Whenever the security guard outside of the bureau 
building sees him, he would be blocked from shooting video footage or conducting any 
interviews before he could even enter the building. In other words, because television journalists 
can only report on local affairs, and the local government personnel tend to be stable, initial news 
criticism may lead to rejection and more difficulty in critical reporting for the second or the third 
time.  
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Figure 3.7 Ratio of Political Criticisms Over Business Criticisms 
 
 
Source: author’s collection of news scripts. 
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Overall, from the content analysis of the “Nightly Roll Call” segment of Attention, we 
can conclude that criticisms stay at local levels. More specifically, since the television station is 
at the municipal level, the government agencies and officials that this show has criticized were 
only at administrative levels below the municipal level, such as district, county, township, and 
village levels. This is decided by the nature of the television station. As mentioned earlier, since 
all television stations in China are state-owned and thus strictly controlled, when political leaders 
from the municipal level make phone calls or issue directives (打招呼) to prevent news stories 
from being broadcast, journalists have no other choice but to terminate the reports. Sometimes, 
television journalists even have to cancel the trip to go out and conduct interviews because some 
official has called the television station, asking to kill the report. If critical reports were deemed 
as crossing the line by political leaders after broadcast, television station leaders and producers 
may be called over to attend a “meeting” (被叫去开会), where they will be “criticized and 
educated” for their inappropriate reporting. The producer of Attention told me that once he and 
several other high-level television station leaders were called over by the propaganda department 
of the CCP committee at the Yangzhou municipal level to be “criticized and educated,” because 
the news show has broadcast a report, pointing out that some officials have used government cars 
for private trips, even though none of the officials’ names were called out. Therefore, at the 
lowest level television station in China, there can be various obstacles for critical reporting 
before, during, and after the news production process.  
However, market competition, specifically the pursuit of ratings and advertising revenues 
in this case, can drive producers and journalists to take a risk and test the red line for critical 
reporting. Of course, these are seasoned news professionals who have built their careers in the 
Chinese media environment. As a result, it is highly unlikely that they would put forward critical 
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reports that directly challenge the CCP rule or the regime, as that would not only end their 
professional careers, but also threaten the safety of themselves and their families. Given this, the 
“risky” critical reports may not be risky at all from a western journalistic point of view. Indeed, 
the level of criticism and riskiness is fundamentally comparative. In this case, although it is very 
difficult to quantify or even just specify where to draw the line of riskiness, seasoned news 
professionals have their own senses.  
Navigating an uncharted territory 
The producer of Attention joined the staff of the show in 2011 with the ambition to 
restore and keep the dominating status of the show in the television market in the municipality. A 
key, if not the only, indicator of such a status is rating, which is directly related to advertising 
revenue. Indeed, if the ratings of the show were below expectation, everyone working on the 
show would lose a portion of his or her bonus as punishment. The producer also has quite a say 
in deciding the amount of bonus for each journalist working for the show. Specifically, the 
producer gives a grade for each report produced by each journalist, just like a teacher would give 
a point grade for each student. Every month, all grades will be summed up and an average will 
be taken as an overall grade for the journalists. Based on the overall monthly grades, there will 
be a ranking list for all the journalists. In fact, such ranking lists are posted publicly on the wall 
of the office the journalists share, just like the situation where some teachers would post the 
ranking of exam grades in Chinese schools. Therefore, both the overall grades and the amount of 
bonuses are publicly available for all the journalists. This, according to the producer, was meant 
to be a motivation and incentive for the journalists to work harder. When those journalists who 
lagged behind saw the ranking and the difference in bonuses, they would try harder next time 
and produce better reports.  
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So what are the criteria that the producer uses to grade each report? There are two levels 
of grading. First, the report has to meet the basic requirements such as no grammar mistakes in 
news scripts. These also include regular professional codes such as protecting privacy of citizens 
by blurring informants’ faces and no mistakes in factual information such as name and location. 
Second, the report has to meet audience’s tastes, such as capturing a unique perspective to a 
news story that would make a seemingly idiosyncratic incident encompass broad social 
implications. For example, the news show received a hotline call during my fieldwork about an 
old lady buying expensive fake medicine after being deceived by frauds. The journalist assigned 
with this story decided to make this a lesson for all seniors in the city, easy targets of medicine 
frauds, to always be cautious when being approached by strangers about medical products. 
Stories that report local abuses and help citizens generate a loyal audience. Making use of 3-D 
animation technology on television, for another example, can help recount incidents more 
effectively and at the same time attract audience’s attention.  
Based on these grading criteria, aspirational journalists, certainly not all journalists, have 
the incentive to report on news stories critical of government officials, as disputes between 
citizens and government officials do happen, sometimes quite often, and these disputes generate 
high ratings. I followed a journalist named Zhang for a week, observing his day-to-day news 
production activities. He holds the belief that news should serve ordinary people, and function 
like a bridge between the government and the people. He is generally very concerned with the 
“vulnerable social groups” such as migrant workers and seniors. He once told me he would like 
to help as many people as he could by reporting on their stories. “Sometimes,” he said, “I think 
the platform of my television station is too small for me to help more people.” What he was 
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referring to was that television stations at the provincial or central levels, for example, have more 
space for critical reporting because of their higher administrative levels.  
During his career, Zhang once became an unwelcome guest of a district government 
under the municipality of Yangzhou. Earlier in 2013, Zhang used a hidden camera to investigate 
an accusation that a deputy chief of the district government beat a pregnant woman who was his 
staff member. When Zhang went to the district government for the first time to investigate the 
case, nobody admitted that it was the deputy chief who beat the woman. Instead, Zhang was told 
that it was a staff member who was temporarily hired that beat the woman. However, through 
meticulous investigation, Zhang found that this purported temporarily hired staff member was 
actually the deputy chief. After the report was broadcast on television, Zhang has been on the 
unofficial blacklist and was not allowed to be anywhere near the district government building 
again. This case shows that even though critical reporting comes with a moderate price, 
aspirational journalists have the incentive to test and sometimes push the boundaries of criticism. 
Facing obstacles, journalists have used a number of techniques to push for critical 
reporting. Building on the notion of “supervision by public opinion” that was written into official 
Party documents, journalists developed the concept “the right to information” 知情权 as a 
common bargain chip to press for more information, especially from government officials on 
potentially negative stories. The emphasis was that ordinary citizens have the right to know what 
has happened, as government officials are supposed to serve the people. For example, Zhang was 
working on a story from a hotline call that an ordinary worker was not able to acquire the entitled 
healthcare insurance card from the healthcare insurance bureau. There was a change of policy 
regarding public healthcare insurance, and according to the new policy, this worker should be 
able to get his healthcare insurance. However, due to the complexity of the policy change, the 
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official who dealt with this case refused to issue the insurance card. In fact, this worker had been 
trying for nine years just to get an insurance card, but never succeeded. Zhang went to the 
healthcare insurance bureau together with this worker, and the case was resolved in 20 minutes. 
Zhang said the key to the fast solution in this case was that he did not try to understand or 
explain the complex policy change. He instead pointed to the unhelpful attitude that the official 
had when dealing with the case. Zhang said, as a public servant, he or she should at least let the 
average citizens know what the policy was. This is the citizens’ right to information. After the 
story was broadcast, the leader from the bureau called Attention and said he already criticized 
and educated the official. In this case, choosing which perspective to report on a story is 
important. To focus on the unhelpful attitude of the official certainly made it easier for 
journalists to criticize government officials, and at the same time help ordinary citizens solve 
problems.  
This technique can also be understood with the framework of “rightful resistance” 
(O’Brien and Li 2006). “Serving the people” is the slogan that was inscribed in the stone at the 
doorway of Zhongnanhai, the place where the highest leadership of the CCP reside. The recently 
revived concept of “mass line” continues to show the party-state’s intention of making use of the 
rhetoric that the party serves the people in order to gain legitimacy and support. Journalists, out 
of the need to produce reports that the audience has an interest in watching, make use of such 
rhetoric to hold government officials responsible through critical reporting. Of course, such 
criticisms tend to stay at the margin, as the case study above shows. Zhang did not criticize the 
complex policy at all, but only focused on the official’s problematic attitude. Nevertheless, this 
technique has enabled journalists to report on negative stories of government officials. Next, this 
chapter uses specific examples from direct observation to document and analyze the news 
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production process of Attention. These examples illustrate the techniques journalists have used as 
well as the challenges they have faced when producing critical news.  
Case 1 - Feeling Agitated: A young female migrant worker and her overdue insurance benefits 
 It was a hotline phone call. Zhang received this assignment. A young female migrant 
worker, who migrated from a rural township under the administration of Yangzhou municipality 
to work in an urban district of Yangzhou, called Attention in the hope that the journalists would 
help her take back the overdue retirement plan benefits she believed she was entitled to. In the 
phone call, she detailed the policy, as she understood it, that her employer, which was a small 
business, should have paid 20% of the cost of the retirement plan. However, her employer only 
paid 18%, and she was asked to pay the 2% difference at the retirement bureau of Yangzhou. She 
thus demanded that the 2% difference be paid back to her from the retirement bureau. 
 As a migrant worker who moved from rural towns to urban cities, the change in self-
identity can be paramount. For a young migrant worker, the change can be even more 
overwhelming. When Zhang called her and set up a time to meet outside of the retirement bureau, 
she briefly recounted the story and her grievance. During this, Zhang was shooting video footage 
while doing the interview, asking her questions to make it a conversation. Zhang promised to 
blur her face to conceal her identity if broadcast on television. During the interview, her voice 
was trembling, and I could see her holding back tears in her eyes. For young migrant workers 
like her, they rely on their own capability and diligence to find employment in the cities. The 
self-reliant social mobility from rural towns to urban cities also means they are entitled to the 
various benefits that urbanites enjoy. Mistreatment of any sort is likely to arouse the feeling that 
they are unfairly treated, and their hard work is denied to a certain extent. Such grievances can 
be overwhelming for individuals that are on the margins of the rapidly modernizing society. 
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After hearing her account of what happened, Zhang obviously felt agitated and said, “Let’s go 
inside and take the 2% back!”  
 When we went inside, the officials at the bureau were very unfriendly, if not hostile. At 
the moment they saw the camera in Zhang’s hand, they instantly knew Zhang was a television 
journalist. As a result, the officials initially said they had no comments and asked us to leave. 
Physically, Zhang kept a distance of about two meters from the desks where the officials sat. 
Seeing that the conservation was going nowhere, Zhang switched to a mild tone, and said he was 
there just to solve the problem, not to look for trouble. He just wanted to know what the policy 
was and whether there was any mistake in the handling of this case. These accounts play into the 
notion of “the right to know,” as Zhang told me before, which is hard for government officials to 
shun away from.  
 Zhang’s approach worked. The request resonated with an official in the room who seems 
to be a leader, and he started to explain the policy to us. It turned out that because the migrant 
worker worked for a small business, and small businesses enjoy a reduction of the amount of 
retirement benefits that they have to pay for their employees. Therefore, the amount of retirement 
plan her employer needs to pay was indeed 18%. It was unclear, however, who should pay the 2% 
difference. 
 Knowing this, we left the office. The migrant worker was disappointed. She said the 2% 
was around 600 yuan, which was a substantial portion of her monthly salary. This story, however, 
was not broadcast in the show. The reason, as Zhang told me later, was that audiences may not 
like such stories where there were no escalated conflicts or information that the majority of the 
audiences can benefit from.  
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Case 2 - Knowing the Limits: Poorly built commodity apartments 
 Xu is another veteran journalist in the team who has been working at Attention for more 
than six years. During the day I was observing him, his assignment was quality problems of a 
commodity apartment.  
 The wife of the family who owns the apartment called the hotline, and we went to visit 
the apartment. The wife showed us around the two-story apartment where there were cracks, 
some minor, some major, on the walls of almost every room. She told us she had contacted the 
developer who had come to try to fix the problem, but the cracks showed again before long. 
After this, she had resorted to the Association of Consumer Protection, which is an official social 
organization with limited administrative power, but also ended up in vain. She felt she was 
cheated by the developer. She said her family has invested almost everything into this apartment. 
She is a housewife, and her husband is only a mid-level manager at a shipyard. Their family 
income was modest, and the apartment was a very expensive purchase for the family. Now she 
was worried about the safety of the apartment.  
 After hearing the story, Xu told the wife up front that she should not expect this to be 
solved. Xu said he had seen many cases like this during the past several years as a journalist, and 
few were resolved in the end. However, as a routine, Xu called an apartment quality inspector to 
give an expert examination of the problems leading to the cracks on the walls. The inspector 
came to the conclusion that these cracks were due to improper construction practices during the 
time when the apartment building was built. It was very difficult to fix since it would be 
unrealistic to tear down the whole building.  
 Then we went to the developers, although without too much hope in finding a possible 
solution to this problem. Interestingly, in the lobby of the developer’s building, there were three 
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medals that read “credible developer,” awarded by Yangzhou television station in 2009, 2010, 
and 2011. I asked Xu about potential conflict of interest in reporting the story since YTS 
obviously has relations with this developer. Xu said that this developer was a major 
advertisement client of YTS, and this was why it was awarded the medals. Xu said this story 
may be killed if the developer called high-level leaders in the television station, but that would 
be beyond his responsibility. 
 The manager at the developer company refused to be interviewed by Xu. In fact, only 
receptionists talked to us. After lingering around for 20 minutes, Xu decided that the manager 
would not talk to him. But the story needs an ending. Xu instead interviewed the wife, during 
which she said she hoped she and the developer could reach some kind of deal. Xu said this was 
only for the sake of news production. It was very unlikely that this would lead to a deal 
satisfactory to both sides.  
 While we were waiting for the inspector, Xu and I chatted about local television news 
and reporting on disputes like this. Xu disagrees with the idea that journalists should help 
ordinary people solve problems. For Xu, journalists should be objective, and should not be 
involved with either side of the story. News shows that primarily focus on helping people are 
“pathetic,” because they are not real news. At the same time, this phenomenon shows how 
incompetent the government can be. Xu said sometimes he would question government officials 
during interview that “why didn’t you guys pay attention to and solve such problems?” Usually 
the officials would respond that “Well, nobody told us these problem before.” Xu said this was 
an annoying answer. If you wait for others to tell you the problems, then what do you do? 
Shouldn’t you have any responsibilities? Xu was quite critical of government officials. Having 
said this, however, Xu admitted that journalists tend to take the side of the weak, that is, the 
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ordinary people when they have disputes with government agencies or officials, or business 
powers.  
Despite the potential conflict of interest since the developer was a major advertisement 
client of YTS, the story was aired that night. However, as the difficult negotiating process shows, 
the story ended with no solution for the lady and her family.  
Case 3 – Testy Negotiation: Property disputes involving a local people’s congress representative 
 This news story demonstrates that being a journalist can be a highly stressful job. I 
remember the atmosphere that day between the City Urban Management Bureau 城市管理局
officials (hereafter city officials) and Zhang was so tense, that I was afraid something violent 
may happen to Zhang and his colleague, and possibly me, too.  
 This story also came from a hotline phone call. A person complained to Attention that his 
neighbor, a Yangzhou People’s Congress representative, illegally built a sunroom on top of the 
apartment building and the room blocked sunshine for his apartment. He said city officials had 
been involved and ruled that it was the representative that violated the regulations, and that the 
sunshine room should be revised or demolished. However, this representative ignored city 
officials’ rulings.  
 When I followed Zhang to the city officials’ office that morning, the city officials were 
very unfriendly to Zhang and refused to answer any questions from Zhang. One official waved 
his hands in the air, trying to drive us away while shouting, “Go away!” Zhang was not willing to 
give up, and tried to talk to him though he didn’t even want to look at Zhang in the eye. At that 
moment, five or six other city officials approached us, and they were obviously on the same side 
as the first official, trying to kick us out. The atmosphere was once very tense. After a few 
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minutes of standoff, Zhang gave up, as he probably did not see any possibility of holding an 
interview with city officials.  
A few minutes later, however, a manager from the City Urban Management Bureau 
stopped us as we were about to walk out of the building. This manager greeted Zhang and was 
very friendly. He invited us to a conference room inside the city officials’ building, and made us 
tea. He first asked us why we were there. Zhang told him the dispute and said that as a journalist, 
he simply wanted to report the truth about the dispute. City officials were involved and played 
the role of a mediator, so they should have information on this case. The manager said he 
understood Zhang’s needs and would invite another city official to explain the dispute to us, 
since he was not directly involved in the dispute.  
About ten minutes later, the manager brought in three people—an official who’s 
responsible for dealing with the media, and two other officials who were familiar with the case. 
They told Zhang details of the case, and the atmosphere was generally friendly. In the end, 
Zhang decided to shoot the video footage where he let the city officials say something about the 
case, including the agreement that the sunshine room should be revised or demolished. 
After the interview was over, in the last minute before we walked out of the city officials’ 
building, the official who was responsible for dealing with the media asked Zhang, “Do you have 
to broadcast this?” Facing this question, as a seasoned journalist, Zhang responded, “Not 
necessarily.” This official then tried to talk Zhang out of reporting this story. At that point, I was 
not sure whether the effort to prevent the story from being publicized had anything to do with the 
representative, but it almost seemed obvious that it has to be the case, because city officials 
really had nothing to lose.  
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After we finished the business at the city officials’ building, it was time for lunch. During 
lunch, Zhang received a phone call. He answered the call while eating at the table, so I heard the 
conversation. The call was from somebody who was trying to prevent him from broadcasting the 
story. After the call, Zhang said, the story was killed. The efforts at the city officials’ building 
where Zhang and his colleague spent a whole morning were all for naught.  
Transformation of Media Responsibility - Providing Public Goods 
 After staying with the journalists at YTS for a month, I found it is difficult not to be 
involved when you are personally and directly exposed to news stories as they are happening. 
Many of the stories involve “vulnerable social groups” such as a female migrant worker asking 
for her entitled benefits or migrant workers working on construction sites asking for their entitled 
summer heat fees.  
 Now the party-state faces a number of problems, many of which are direct results of the 
economic reform. Losers of the reform, or those who did not benefit as much, are the majority. 
The duration of Chinese authoritarianism is partially a function of the extent to which their 
grievances are addressed. Under such circumstances, television news has become a venue that 
people with grievances often resort to, partly because there are many cases where grievances and 
problems were successful resolved. For television journalists, some of them prefer such stories 
partly because audiences like watching such reports. For the party-state, the inability and/or 
unwillingness of local governments to provide public goods such as infrastructure as well as rule 
of law is, to a certain degree, mended by the fact that television news programs are taking over 
some of the functions of the party-state. 
 In fact, the function of the television news media to help ordinary people solve problems 
has been so well known among the public that sometimes they treat television news shows as the 
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authority to turn to when they cannot get their problems solved. During my time at YTS, I found 
that hotline phone calls were the most important source of news for Attention. On June 10, 2013, 
one phone call was about a road outside a residential complex. A resident was complaining about 
the poor quality of the road. The staff member who answered the call said that she would write 
down the information, but it would be up to the producer whether to choose the story. She further 
explained that this story was not really news. “We are a television news show, not a government 
bureau.”  
 This also reflects the bottleneck that television life news faces. In the early 2000s, such a 
story about a poorly-built road would be broadcast on television immediately. After several years 
feeding such stories to audience, producers sensed that audience has grown tired of such reports. 
The producer of Attention told me that the criterion to judge a good story for his show was 
whether the story has implications for the whole society, not just for certain individuals. Even for 
stories that only involve certain individuals, journalists should try to dig out the underlying social 
implications so that audience would feel the stories are relevant to them. However, such efforts 
may sometimes go too far. For example, on June 10, 2013, I followed a journalist named Ting 
when a breaking news story happened around noon. A gas pipeline in a residential complex was 
leaking natural gas. For safety concerns, the authority turned down the supply of gas that was 
supposed to be transported to hundreds of households in the complex. The pipeline was leaking 
because a construction team repairing the road in the complex accidently broke the pipeline 
when digging under the ground. When Ting and I arrived at the site of the incident, the repair 
team had already arrived. After Ting got the video footage and interviewed several people on site 
about what happened, we went back to the television station. In the early afternoon, Ting wrote 
up the script to match the video footage, and then submitted it for the producer to review and 
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revise. In the late afternoon, Ting received the revised script, after which he went to the video 
editing room to edit the footage, the last stage of news production. While editing the footage, 
Ting complained to me that the producer has changed the script too much that it was difficult for 
him to match the script with the picture. Moreover, originally Ting wrote, “The gas leak has 
affected hundreds of households nearby.” But the producer changed “hundreds of” into 
“thousands of.” Ting disputed the number, doubting that there were thousands of households in 
that complex. However, he told me that the producer always wanted big numbers to create a 
sensational effect that he believed would attract audience. 
 Another obstacle for stories that provide public goods comes from government. A quote 
from a journalist that I became acquainted with summarizes the situation well. “The space for 
such critical news stories is shrinking as time goes by.” At the beginning of the rise of television 
life news, life news was not only new for audiences, but also new for government officials. The 
result was that government officials were not as experienced or sure about how to deal with 
journalists as they are now. While a journalist may get away with reporting stories of insufficient 
provision of public goods for the first time, he or she may not be so lucky the next time. After all, 
government officials and journalists are acquainted with each other, as a city like Yangzhou is 
not a big one, and there is only one television station. 
Conclusion 
Most news professionals are under considerable pressure to generate revenues from the 
news they produce. In other words, they have to find ways to attract audiences and readers. One 
such way is critical reporting. In an environment where sharp criticisms are rare and social 
problems are mounting, the public needs to release concern and anger over various problems 
without directly challenging the party-state. Criticism in news, even only at lower administrative 
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levels and on non-sensitive issues, occupies a unique niche in the news market. As the high 
rating of a critical television life news show Just in Nanjing and the high circulation rate of a 
respected liberal newspaper Southern Weekend suggest, critical news has a large and loyal 
following in the public. Based on this, the pressure from market competition may drive news 
professionals in the direction of producing critical news. 
On the other hand, criticism is bound to be challenged by local political authorities, as 
they have great incentives to present a positive and competent image in front of both the public 
and their superiors. While the lack of hard-and-fast rules on news content restriction has led to 
excessive self-censorship (Hassid 2008; Stern and Hassid 2012), it may also create leeway for 
journalists to negotiate with government officials. Indeed, creative and seasoned journalists have 
used a number of techniques, as documented in this chapter, to get around obstacles to critical 
reporting. Having investigated the influence of market forces on critical news, Chapter 4 
examines the influence of journalists, including their journalistic orientations and positions in 
news organizations, in pushing for more space for critical reporting. 
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Chapter 4 Journalistic Fracture: Aspirational News Professionals 
 
Diversity characterizes journalists in China. Chinese journalists differ from each other on 
several dimensions, including independence, advocacy (Hassid 2011), and professionalization. 
These differences partially determine that some journalists tend to be forces pushing for more 
space of critical reporting than others. Moreover, “journalists’ long-standing quest for press 
freedom is not purely a result of market pressure.” (He 2000, 600) Therefore, journalistic 
aspirations constitute an important factor influencing news content, aside from market forces. 
This chapter analyzes the characteristics of journalists in China through case studies, with a 
focus on whether and how they actively affect the content and style of critical reporting on 
television and in newspapers.  
Journalists for the Party, the Market, and the Profession 
Besides “journalist,” there are several other terms used to refer to journalists, such as 
“propaganda workers” 宣传工作者, “news workers” 新闻工作者, and “news and propaganda 
workers” 新闻宣传工作者. The terms “worker” and “propaganda” reflect the roles of journalists 
in Leninist states. Indeed, according to All-China Journalists Association, the official association 
for Chinese journalists sponsored by the party-state, the duties of journalists include serving the 
people, staying loyal to the Party, and keeping correct public opinion guidance. In other words, 
in the official account of journalism as a profession, the fundamental task is to serve the party-
state, rather than reporting the truth. After media marketization, more journalists see the market, 
i.e. audiences or readers, as the most important entity to serve, especially due to the fact that 
many news organizations have to earn profits in order to maintain operation. At the same time, 
although Chinese journalists are trained to follow the official duties and rules, many hold values 
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that resemble journalistic ideals in democracies with media freedom, which typically includes 
objectivity of factual information and independence from political and business powers.  
 Hassid (2011) provides a useful typology of Chinese journalists based on two horizontal 
dimensions—independence and advocacy. According to this typology, there are four general 
types of journalists in China: American-style professionals (high on independence and low on 
advocacy), workaday journalists (low on both dimensions), communist professionals (low on 
independence and high on advocacy), and advocate professionals (high on both dimensions). 
During my fieldwork in China, I have interviewed journalists that can be categorized into each of 
the four types. In the context of this study, Hassid’s typology also has implications for journalists’ 
orientation for critical reporting. American-style and advocate professionals may have more 
aspirations for critical reporting than workaday journalists and communist professionals. 
However, based on my observation during the fieldwork in north, central, and east China, a third 
vertical dimension necessary for us to understand whether and how journalists can become 
forces pushing for more space of critical reporting is missing in the literature. Hassid’s two 
horizontal dimensions are about journalistic characteristics at the individual level, but a more 
comprehensive understanding of journalistic behaviors cannot ignore contextual factors. Thus 
the third dimension is the position of journalists in a news organization. The hypothesis is that 
mid-level editors or producers have the most potential to become forces for critical reporting. 
Mid-level news professionals refer to those who are in charge of a department in a newspaper, 
such as the investigative reporting department, or a news show in a television station, such as 
producers. Mid-level news professionals have fewer responsibilities than high-level leaders in 
charge of a whole news organization, but they have more decision power over the content of 
news than entry-level journalists whose jobs are often assigned by mid-level newspaper editors 
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and television producers. Next, this chapter examines three cases of mid-level news professionals 
working for television stations and newspapers, detailing exactly how and why these mid-level 
editors and producers push for criticism. Then this chapter discusses and compares the results 
from a survey conducted among entry-level television journalists in a municipal-level television 
station in northeast China. 
Eyes on the West—Producer of Oriental Nightly News 
 Oriental Nightly News is a popular nightly news show aired on Shanghai Oriental 
Satellite Television (SOST). Different from other news shows aired on provincial level television 
channels, Oriental Nightly News has a broader focus, not only covering local news in Shanghai, 
but also national and international news. Occasionally it is even able to connect with reporters 
overseas for real-time live reports. 
 Being the only satellite channel in Shanghai, a highly developed city in China, SOST has 
more resources in terms of funding and journalists than many other provincial-level channels. 
The producer of the show is Li, an ambitious news professional in his mid-30s. Working at 
SOST since graduating from college, Li now also holds the position of deputy director of the 
news center at SOST. Li told me that SOST is the only channel that has the resources at the same 
level as CCTV (China Central Television). Connecting with overseas reporters for live reports is 
something that no other provincial-level channel is able to do, so far, except CCTV.  
 Speaking of this, Li was obviously excited over the abundant resources that he was able 
to use for news production at SOST. I asked him whether Oriental Nightly News has achieved 
his standards for an ideal news show. He answered, “Probably only 70%.” “What was lacking 
then?” I followed up. He pointed to three factors: himself as a producer, the restraints at the 
television stations in terms of resources and space of reporting, and the quality of reporters. 
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These three factors showed increasing professionalization of journalists, as they are not primarily 
evaluated on political orientation and loyalty to the CCP, but more on their craft as a reporter. 
More importantly, despite the envious resources in terms of both hardware (funding, technology, 
etc.) and software (journalists, management institutions, etc.) at the television station, Li 
indicated that the limited space for reporting has put constraints on the quality of the news show 
he produces. 
 Despite this sobering understanding, news production process is highly individual, which 
may lead to creative interpretations of news stories. During the day when I visited SOST, Li 
invited me to join the daily staff meeting attended by 13 journalists, which took place at around 3 
o’clock in the afternoon. This one-hour show airs daily at 11:30 p.m., so most news production 
activities take place in afternoons and evenings. The journalists and producers share a spacious 
and open office with dozens of cubicles installed. Three high-definition big-screen television sets 
were mounted on the wall faced by Li, the channels on which were CNN, NBC, and BBC. Also a 
close follower of foreign print media such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, Li 
sees these news outlets as models to compare his own news show with and to learn from. Of 
course, Li admits that due to political constraints, he is not able to produce shows comparable to 
those in the United States. Nevertheless, Li displays a unique sense of optimism, which is rare 
among Chinese news professionals. Instead of lamenting on the distance between Chinese 
television news shows and their foreign counterparts due to the political and professional 
limitations he mentioned above, he sees the distance as an opportunity to create shows that are 
different, and possibly pioneering.  
 Li’s team shares a similar mindset. The staff meeting has two sections: commenting on 
yesterday’s show and deciding news stories to be included in today’s show, including finding 
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appropriate perspectives to those news stories. The appropriate perspectives have to be well 
accepted by both the audience and government officials. During the staff meeting I attended, Li’s 
comments on the show broadcast on the day before focused on the balance between reporting 
news stories and news commentary. He said that the show should have highlighted exclusive 
footage, in order to show off the abundant resources and reporting capability of SOST. On the 
other hand, the show should have played down the commentary that might attract unwelcome 
attention from government officials. This was not to say that the show should get rid of 
independent voices and completely conform to the official political discourse, but the balance 
should have been maintained well. This is essentially the process of identifying the red lines that 
cannot be crossed for specific issues. 
The second section of the staff meeting is the discussion process that displays 
individuality in the interpretations of news, as mentioned above. Specifically, there are two 
observations through which we can discern such individuality. First, the discussion during the 
staff meeting contains frequent satire of political figures and events, and a deep dissatisfaction 
and passive anger over certain issues; second, the emphasis on how to make full use of exclusive 
video footage can be part of these political expressions, since using official video footage 
distributed by CCTV would certainly fully conform to the official political discourse. Moreover, 
Li told me that when commenting on political news that happened outside of Shanghai, they 
have more space for criticism. Such political expressions in actual news content are not full 
reflections of the individual interpretation of political news, but it is a creative and brave way to 
indirectly express a point of view under the political constraints. These two observations will be 
detailed in the description of the meeting below.  
 
	   94 
I visited Li in July 2013, during which time a bridge collapsed in a southwest Chinese 
province of Sichuan. It was a local scandal that drew national attention. At the time, print media 
had already reported on this incident and the commentary centered on the question of whether 
the tragic collapse was a natural disaster caused by heavy rains, or a manmade accident because 
of the poor construction quality. The consensus seems to point to the latter. Given the fact that 
television is more strictly controlled by the party-state than newspaper, Li and his team were 
discussing the perspective to the story, and whether they should also present the story using the 
frame of a natural disaster versus a manmade accident.  
 “Most reports in the newspaper presented this as a natural disaster versus a manmade 
accident.” A journalist said.  
 “Would it put us at risk if we continue to use the same frame?” Another journalist 
questioned. 
“We can say it is a natural disaster first, and then report on how it is a manmade accident.” 
A third journalist joked. 
 Li did not participate in this particular conversation. Maybe he already had a decision in 
mind. I tuned in to Oriental Nightly News that day, and found that the title of this news story was 
“Jiangyou Bridge Collapsed—a natural disaster or a manmade accident?” During the segment, 
the anchormen cited several major newspapers and online news portals such as Southern 
Metropolis Daily, Guangzhou Daily, and Xinhua Online Commentary. These news outlets all 
used the same frame that juxtaposes natural disasters and manmade accidents. Li later explained 
to me in a follow-up phone interview that if other news outlets have already broadly used such a 
frame, it would be less problematic for them to use the same frame. Moreover, this incident 
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happened in Sichuan province, 2,000 kilometers west of Shanghai, which made it easier for a 
Shanghai news outlet to question, if not criticize directly, a local scandal. 
 This reflects the dynamics among leading news outlets in China. Taking the lead on 
critical reporting is a risk, but only if other news outlets do not follow. In this case, for example, 
the increased number of news outlets using the same frame actually reduces the risk of being 
criticized or even punished by the party-state. For SOST, following the lead of critical reporting 
by liberal newspapers both reduced the risk for those newspapers and created space for criticism. 
This is how journalists find cracks in the censorship system. 
 The creative use of video footage is another way of political expression. During the first 
section of the staff meeting, Li commented on the previous day’s broadcast. One of the news 
stories was an earthquake that happened in Ya’an, Sichuan province. The report on the 
earthquake could be tricky because the Ya’an government did not reveal certain information 
such as the death toll and the situation of collapsed buildings, out of fear of criticism of its 
capability to govern and to restore order. Li commented that whenever there was a discrepancy 
in factual information such as the death toll between the information journalists collected and 
that released by the local government, it was best to use the government’s official information. 
This is because using non-official information may incur criticism from higher-level authorities 
at the television station or the propaganda department of the Shanghai Communist Party 
Committee. This does not mean, however, that journalists have run out of means to get around 
potential repercussions for truthful reporting. Li further commented on this news report that the 
situations of the victims of the earthquake had not received much media coverage at all, and that 
was a gap they needed to fill. Moreover, SOST had its own journalists sent to the frontline, 
reporting first-hand situations of the aftermath of the earthquake. Broadcasting video footage of 
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earthquake victims not only exhibits the exclusive footage that only SOST has, but also fulfills 
the journalistic needs to report truthfully without getting into conflict with official government 
information and data.  
 Li and his team have their own interpretations of political news. Although the political 
environment constrains what they can report and comment on, their journalistic judgment does 
not change because of this, and they have developed creative ways to get around potential 
political obstacles to truthful reporting and to express their true interpretation of news as much as 
possible. This is an example of finding the cracks in the censorship system. Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that the journalistic spin Li and his team were able to execute was limited. 
The critical reports and commentary were mostly already seen on other news outlets. If we say 
Oriental Nightly News case only mildly shows journalistic aspirations as a fracture in the 
censorship system, the following case study demonstrates how journalistic aspirations can 
actually broaden the space for critical reporting, when certain political interests meet journalistic 
inquiries. 
The Pioneer during a Time of Change—The Creator and Producer of Just in Nanjing 
The turn of the twenty-first century marks a new era for Chinese television. Since media 
marketization picked up pace in the early 1990s, reduced state funding and increasing 
competition have led to fierce competition in the media market. For television, by 1999 each 
provincial television station had established a satellite channel (Zhao and Guo 2005), in addition 
to the local channels36. The increasing number of channels that ordinary Chinese audiences can 
receive at home, along with the ever-more-diverse television content, exerted pressure on 
television producers to increase ratings and produce profits.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 While satellite channels can be received by audiences across the country, local channels only broadcast among 
local audiences. 
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 The situation is similar for television news programs. At Jiangsu television station, the 
launch of the satellite channel and the restructuring of the local channels meant personnel 
change. Jing was a mid-level producer at Jiangsu Television Station (JST). Holding a master’s 
degree in Chinese language and literature from the prestigious Nanjing University, Jing had had 
experiences in cultural programs, sports programs, and news programs at JST. During the 
personnel change in the early 2000s, Jing became the director of the local channels at JST.  
 The promotion gave Jing the power and opportunity to do a news program different from 
others. He termed the situation as “breaking-out”37 突围 (Interview 16). Back in the late 1990s, 
television news programs mushroomed, but no one seems to be leading the trend, as no particular 
news program had high ratings or had great influence among the audience. With the ambition to 
create a leading news show, Jing and his team studied a number of Taiwanese television news 
shows. They found that Taiwanese television news had a visible difference from the news shows 
in Mainland China, that is, their shows tend to use colloquial language and focus on stories of 
ordinary people. Of course, an almost inevitable result was that sometimes the news turned out to 
be more like gossip, but there were in-depth reports on social and political issues. Jing realized 
that while on the surface Taiwanese news seemed “vulgar” and loud, the core was something 
missing in Mainland China. The late 1990s was a time when everybody knew that it was more 
important for television news to attract audience than to please political leaders, but few had 
figured out how. For Jing, the key to success in such a competitive media environment was to 
use plain language and to focus on ordinary people’s daily lives. This was the core of television 
Life News 民生新闻. Indeed, for Chinese journalists, this was a major departure from previous 
news production that exclusively focused on politics and propaganda. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview 16 with a Chinese journalism professor familiar with Jing and served as on the advisory board for the 
creation of Just in Nanjing. 
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 With his insights and experiences, merely reporting on local life stories was not 
revolutionary enough for Jing. He further realized that critical reporting was another important 
aspect of the news brand he wanted to create. Of course, Jing was not the first person to realize 
the value of critical reporting in the Chinese political environment. In fact, a news show aired on 
China Central Television (CCTV) named Focus was already highly popular among the Chinese 
audience. By the late 1990s, Focus had a daily audience of 300 million (Chan 2002). The main 
reason for such popularity was its criticism of local officials and disclosure of local wrongdoings. 
However, the news program that Jing wanted to create was different from Focus. For Jing, Focus 
was still too distant from ordinary people, in terms of both the geographical origins of the issues 
and the formal language the anchors used. As a result, Jing decided to create a show that was 
distinct from other television news shows on two grounds: (1) its focus on ordinary people, and 
(2) engagement in critical reporting.  
 As emphasized earlier, the fractures detailed in each chapter do not work separately in 
actuality. I analyze each fracture individually for analytical purposes. In this case, political 
leader’s interests also played into the success of the news show Jing was about to launch—Just 
in Nanjing. In Chapter 2, I have already discussed the case of Just in Nanjing, but only from the 
perspective of local leader’s political interests. To piece together the journalistic and political 
aspects of the success of Just in Nanjing, it is important to note here again that while Jing was 
certainly the major force for the creation of Just in Nanjing, without the support and 
encouragement from then vice party secretary of Jiangsu province and the party secretary of 
Nanjing municipality Li Yuanchao (hereafter Li), this show may have had to concede at least on 
the second ground—engagement in critical reporting. Not long after its initial launch on January 
1, 2002, Li personally visited the newsroom and encouraged the team and the anchorman to be 
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bold in criticizing local officials. Li even specified that cadres up to the bureau chief局长 level38 
can be criticized. As discussed in Chapter 2, Li’s decision to encourage news criticism is 
embedded in the cadre management and promotion system in China.  
 The personal encouragement from the highest-level official in the whole province 
enabled producers and journalists to criticize officials at lower levels. Criticism became the core 
of the media brand that this show created, recognizable to its loyal audience. Shortly after the 
initial launch, the ratings rose to 9.2% between January and April 2003 (Miao 2011, 103). In July 
2004, the average rating of Just in Nanjing was 8.3%, with the highest rating of the month being 
17.7% (Wang 2011). The skyrocketing ratings had created considerable profits for JTS. In 2004, 
the advertising revenue from Just in Nanjing was over USD 13.14 million, whereas the 2001 
advertising revenue of the entire JTS City Channel was only USD 3.38 million (Xie and Zhou 
2005, 9). 
 The space for critical reporting is never still. Based on how the fractures in the censorship 
system interact with political situations, the space for critical reporting that was developed before 
can shrink again. About half a year later, Li attended to the matter of this news show again. This 
time, instead of encouragement, Li made it clear that the criticism was enough, and it was time to 
scale back. As a result, the quantity and intensity of criticism of this show declined over time. So 
did its rating.  
*** 
 When we compare the above two cases, we can find that the journalistic aspirations of 
these two mid-level producers are different. While both Li (the producer of Oriental Nightly 
News) and Jing have the ambition to create pioneering and possibly revolutionary television 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 According to the Civil Servant Law, bureau chief level (厅局正职) is the fifth level cadre from top down. There 
are eleven levels of cadres in the Chinese civil servant system. 
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news shows, their approaches reflect distinct journalistic orientations. Li has always looked up to 
western style journalism, but Jing focused more on the Chinese television news environment and 
studied Taiwanese television news shows. Moreover, Jing had a supportive political environment 
where journalistic inquiries were met by political interests. However, precisely because of such 
unique coincidence, the space for critical reporting immediately shrank once such political 
interests disappeared.  
Despite the differences, a commonality between Jing and Li is that both of them were 
mid-level producers. This was key to the success of both shows. With the power to decide news 
content while enjoying limited personal liability, Jing and Li were able to produce news 
according to their visions, within certain limits. This suggests the importance of the vertical 
dimension--journalist’s position in a news organization. If we categorize both Li and Jing as 
American-style professionals, according to Hassid’s (2011) typology, as they both pursue 
journalistic independence and are not involved in advocacy, the next case study centers on a 
senior editor at a newspaper famous for its liberal and often critical reporting, and she represents 
advocate professionals.  
Fighting, But Not Alone—a senior editor at The Beijing News 
 I met Song in a coffee shop in downtown Beijing. We talked about stories behind her 
investigative reporting, other print news outlets, and her fellow journalists with similar ideals and 
boldness. Fortunately, among the many fights that she had fought as a journalist to publicize 
social injustice—the often “sensitive” issues deemed by the party-state—she did not fight alone. 
The journalistic work that she was most proud of involves the issue of “black jails” in China. 
 Black jails, as is often referred to in the press, are places where extra-judicial detention 
happens. The people thrown into the black jails are often petitioners and political dissidents. The 
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location of such black jails can be hotel rooms and mental hospitals paid for by local 
governments. The existence of black jails reflects the failure of the “letters and calls” 信访
system, the official channel for petitions. Black jails are used by local officials to detain 
petitioners, preventing them from visiting Beijing when their grievances are not heard locally, or 
stopping them from staging local protests. Thus, black jails are mostly instituted in Beijing, 
provincial capital cities, and other major cities, as petitioners often go up the ladder of 
administrative hierarchy if their petitions are not met locally39. The case Song investigated 
involved petitioners who were arrested and thrown into a mental hospital in an eastern city in 
Shandong province without either the petitioners’ or their families’ consent. In fact, their 
families were not even aware of the petitioners’ whereabouts. For the families, the petitioners 
essentially disappeared overnight.  
At the end of 2008, the newspaper received a letter from a reader. This was not a 
conventional letter where a reader expresses gratitude for the quality of reporting or discusses 
issues reported by the newspaper. Instead, this letter intended to provide a tip for a report, albeit 
in an unconventional way. In this letter, sent from Xintai, Shandong Province, ominous red 
fingerprints marked the bottom of the page. Whether they were formed from red inkpad or blood 
could not be determined, but the symbolism was clear—an effort on the part of the writer to 
demonstrate the veracity of the information. The letter was about a severe breach of justice 
where a group of people were illegally detained simply because they petitioned local 
governments over certain issues. Especially during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the party bosses 
of local townships were required to prevent petitioners from going to Beijing (越级上访), and 
this became part of their cadre evaluation criteria (Huang 2008). Thus, township governments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For a detailed report on the black jails in China, please read a report from Caixin magazine, “A day in the life of a 
Beijing ‘Black Guard’,” at http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-02/100509391.html  
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are under the pressure to manage petitioning cases. In order to prevent repeat petitioners from 
visiting Beijing again, local governments have come up with the method of accusing petitioners 
of suffering from mental illness and thus to require treatment in mental hospitals. As a result, 
petitioners were thrown into a mental hospital without any due process of law. Legally, The 
Beijing News also pointed out that the Mental Health Law that was under draft since 1985 still 
has not been passed. Therefore, there is not a specific law in China that protects the rights of 
mental patients. It was unclear how long these “mental patients” would be detained in the 
hospital.  
According to Song’s reporting, a local mental hospital in Xintai cooperated with the local 
government and received 1,700 yuan from the government for every patient it admitted. These 
“mental patients” tried to communicate with each other and secretly wrote down diaries in order 
to preserve some kind of evidence of the horrifying experience that they endured. Song sees 
cases like this as a severe breach of human rights. She revealed that one day when she was 
working on the case till late night, she could not help but cry to herself because of the agonizing 
injustice and pain projected from the first-hand evidence she had access to. Song sent out a small 
team of journalists who, with their tremendous capability and courage, broke into the strictly 
monitored mental hospital and collected evidence and material. When the news story was ready 
to publish on a journalistic basis of accurate factual information, the burning question was, can 
the editor-in-chief, the staff, and the whole organization of The Beijing News take the risk of 
publishing such a politically sensitive report? 
The news broke back in 2008, when the term “black jails” itself was already a sensitive 
word. Thus a detailed investigate report on a black jail was unimaginable. Nevertheless, Song 
decided to press the editor-in-chief at The Beijing News to publish the report. It is important to 
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note that the editor-in-chief is the person responsible for all reports published by the newspaper, 
and there were plenty of cases where editor-in-chiefs were punished in the form of demotion, 
dismissal, fine, or even jail time. However, as an elite newspaper with the reputation of 
publishing quality reports that sometimes point directly at social and political ills, the editor-in-
chief decided to stand with Song and published the report. This, again, suggests the importance 
of a journalist’s position in a news organization. Journalistic aspirations together with decision 
power can push for critical reporting.  
 Not surprisingly, the Shandong provincial government was furious. It complained to the 
Central Propaganda Department (CPD), and asked for punishment of the newspaper. The 
Shandong provincial government denied the existence of black jails. In the meantime, they 
bribed petitioners in order to make sure they rejected interviews by the news media. To add to 
the complexity of the issue, the General Administration of Publication and Press (GAPP) 新闻出
版署 also started its own investigation on the dispute between the Shandong provincial 
government and The Beijing News. Fortunately, the seasoned journalists from the newspaper 
kept all kinds of evidence intact, such as recorded audio and materials from the mental hospital, 
in order to show the truthfulness of the report. 
 During the time of the investigation, this report was picked up by major online news 
portals such as Xinhuanet.com and people.com.cn. Several other news outlets have also 
broadcast or published commentary on this case. During a CCTV television show on legal issues 
Today’s Observation (今日观察) broadcast on December 10, 2008, one day after The Beijing 
News report was published, a commentator said, “it is black humor that the local government 
wants the mental patient to sign a pledge not to petition again. It you think he has mental illness, 
why do you want him to sign the pledge?” The program further used the Petition Work 
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Regulations issued by the State Council in 2005 to show the legal basis of petitioners’ rights. 
Other news outlets such as China Youth Daily40, Hebei Youth Daily41, and Xiaoxiang Morning 
Newspaper42 also published opinion editorials denouncing the practice of accusing petitioners as 
mental patients in order to prevent them from petitioning. The fact that both official and 
commercialized news outlets sided with petitioners and The Beijing News instead of Shandong 
government not only shows the general consensus on the lack of justice and due process of law 
in the petitioning process, but also hints at the general position of the central government on this 
issue. Note that news outlets such as CCTV are the mouthpieces of the highest leadership in the 
Chinese party-state. Moreover, the fact that a number of other news outlets picked up the story 
reduced the risk for The Beijing News, a similar observation discussed earlier in the case of 
Oriental Nightly News.  
Song told me that this case became involved with the struggle between Zhou Yongkang 
(the hardliners faction) and Wen Jiabao (the reformers faction); both were former members of 
the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making body in China.  The whole 
investigation process conducted by GAPP took almost four months, with the conclusion that 
there was nothing untrue in the newspaper report, signifying a win by the reformers faction. 
However, this prolonged process of investigation reflected how serious the struggle between the 
two factions within the top leadership of the CCP was. This also showed how much pressure the 
editors and journalists at The Beijing News undertook in order for this story to be published.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 December 9, 2008, “Why are petitioners always called ‘mental patients’?” China Youth Daily. 
http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-12/09/content_2463216.htm  
41 December 9, 2008, “Whose shame is it that petitioners are thrown into mental hospitals?” Hebei Youth Daliy. 
http://www.hbqnb.com/news/html/Hqmhsp/2008/129/08129827182413.html  
42 This is a newspaper circulated in Changsha, Hunan Province. December 9, 2008, “How healthy could the power 
be if it accuses petitioners as mental patients?” http://news.163.com/08/1209/09/4SN8QA3P00012Q9L.html  
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 This is a case where journalists and editors used their wisdom, resources, and above all, a 
determined sense of responsibility to uncover the truth. This also earned the newspaper the 
reputation of reporting the truth and standing on the side of the people and the weak. For the 
news organization as a whole, experiencing such a high-profile investigation involving high-
level government and Party agencies only served to strengthen the identity of the organization 
and its firm grasp in the news market. Moreover, this piece of investigative reporting should 
probably have attracted the attention of journalism award judges, and I asked Song about this. 
 “We despise journalism awards from the government.” Song said, “If a journalist wins an 
award from the government, that would be a humiliation.” Song told me that liberal journalists 
who take news professionalism seriously have their own journalism award, evaluated by 
experienced and liberal journalists and scholars. The Beijing News has won a number of awards 
from this small group of news professionals. These news professionals tend to be American-style 
professionals and advocate professionals, using Hassid’s (2011) typology. 
 Despite the incredible courage and professionalism that Song and her team exhibited, an 
important note is that the party-state is the ultimate authority that decides the space for critical 
reporting. In this case, CPD, GAPP, and even the top national leaders in the Politburo Standing 
Committee were all involved in the investigation and evaluation of the news report. As Song 
pointed out, a very important reason that The Beijing News could win was that this case was 
caught between the struggle within the top leadership, and it happened to be on the side of the 
faction that ultimately won.  
*** 
In the case of The Beijing News, although the black jail report was published and 
eventually acknowledged by the party-state, we should not overlook the fact that print media are 
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under strict control by the party-state. With appropriate political timing and issue areas, 
journalists can function as a fracture in the censorship system, such as in the black jails report 
case, but fractures are not fault lines. Indeed, Song told me that there are pre- and post-
publication mechanisms to ensure limited criticism and reporting space for Beijing newspapers. 
The first mechanism is pre-publication self-censorship. This is a practice established by both 
formal and informal rules. While formals rules are generally vague, such as not to publish 
information with the intention to subvert the government, informal rules are learned and 
socialized by journalists over time. For example, prominent cases where editors are demoted or 
even a whole news organization was shut down can function as warnings signifying severe 
consequences for non-conformers. The editor of Freezing Point, a column of China Youth Daily, 
was fired in 2006 after publication of an opinion-editorial questioning Chinese modern history as 
accounted by the CCP. Twenty-first Century Global News (21世纪环球报道) was a newspaper 
first published in Guangzhou in May 2002, but was closed down in March 2003, a main reason 
for which was its frequent reports on sensitive political issues such as non-governmental 
organizations being monitored by the government, sharp polarization in economic status as a 
result of the economic reform, and Taiwanese politics.  
 Besides pre-publication measures, there are also post-publication mechanisms of 
censorship, all of which are executed by the Central Propaganda Department. After news reports 
and commentary are published, if the Central Propaganda Department deems the news reports as 
crossing the red lines, a common practice of media control is known as “post-incident 
responsibility track-down” 事后追查制 (Interview 9). It is done in two ways: (1) criticizing 
specific news reports; (2) regularized monthly comments on the news reports from all media 
outlets. The main purpose of the monthly comments is to criticize certain newspapers and their 
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reports and set them as bad examples. A potential consequence of this is that when this practice 
is repeated time and time again, what was blurry boundaries for critical reporting may become 
more and more clear, at least for certain issues. For example, after the Xinjiang Uyghur riots in 
2008 that drew broad international attention, rules on how to report on “sudden incidents” 
involving ethnic minorities became clear—either not to report at all (“taboo topics” 禁令), or to 
use the Xinhua report (新华社通稿) with no change in wording in order to streamline the 
discourse (统一口径).  
Beyond this specific case, there are three general types of regulations: “Do not report” 
(不许报道), “Use Xinhua report” (新华社稿), and “Do not follow up” (不许炒作). If the 
regulation is “Do not follow up,” then there is space for critical reporting. Song told me that this 
means reports that were already finished would not be killed. Moreover, seasoned news 
professionals have learned how to negotiate with media control agencies. If criticized in the 
monthly comments report by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), for example, the editor-
in-chief of the news organization criticized has to write up a report explaining itself. Editors have 
learned to turn this report into a venue for self-defense. They may remind the CPD of how the 
news organization has been compliant by pointing to the positive reports that the news 
organization has published, or how it did not follow up reports that were not allowed to follow 
up. They may also use the argument that the sensitive reports criticized by the CPD have already 
been reported by other media outlets, as a way to shirk responsibility. 
The Elitist Minority 
While Song and journalists like her are proud of the possibility that journalism can push 
for positive change in policy, another group of journalists cautions the trend of too much 
advocacy. Lu is an experienced news professional and media observer. He summarized the steps 
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of how news reports can lead to policy change as: (a) reports on negative issues instigate (b) 
strong resonance among the audience, that leads to (c) pressure from public opinion, and finally 
(d) leaders make decisions to change policy. The downside of this, however, is that this actually 
constitutes “media court” (媒体审判). But the media are not supposed to be the judges. It should 
have been the legal system that upholds justice. This may not only undermine the main function 
of the media, that is, to report news, but also negatively affect the justice system.  
 During my fieldwork, I found that many journalists’ name cards have hotline numbers for 
breaking news (报料热线). However, the phrase “breaking news” in Chinese (报料) has the 
connotation of disclosing something negative and scandalous involving political and business 
powers. Lu was critical of this. He described this as “legitimizing rumors.” He gave me the 
example of Southern Metropolis Daily (hereafter SMD), a famous outspoken newspaper 
published in the southern city of Guangzhou. Since the early 2000s as the Internet became 
widely adopted, SMD started to make use of the online media and integrated its print and online 
sections. Part of its news production process thus became: (a) online sources of news (报料), 
then (b) SMD chooses stories, followed by (c) SMD verifies the truthfulness of the stories, and 
finally (d) SMD publishes them as real news. Lu referred to this process as “legitimizing rumors.” 
Although some of these reports have led to changes in individual officials’ political fates when 
corruption cases were exposed, overall there is little impact on institutional change. However, 
those cases that did lead to change have granted journalists a “false aurora,” according to Lu. 
 Certainly Lu is an American-style professional who holds an attitude that prioritizes 
independence and objectivity. While the difference between Lu and Song is a matter of 
journalistic ideals and standards, it provides us with a view on how political Chinese journalists 
sometimes have to be. For advocate professionals, their sense of responsibility stems from the 
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society they are embedded in. They see themselves as social actors who should contribute to 
positive social change and eliminating injustice, with the help from the modest power of the 
media. Some of them do not intend to challenge the existing political system but merely to make 
the existing laws and regulations more effective; while others desire bolder political reforms. 
These journalists are agents of potential change, although the political orientation of the news 
organizations they work for, local political environment, and their personal aspirations decide 
how effective and what kind of political change they can push for. American-style professionals, 
on the other hand, look up to Western style journalism that prioritizes objectivity and timeliness. 
The problem is, however, that in an authoritarian political environment, the pursuit of news 
professionalism is unfortunately and inevitably compromised.  
The Remaining Majority 
 According to the Hassid (2011) typology, the majority of Chinese journalists are 
workaday journalists. They are ranked low on both independence and advocacy. However, this 
may not be entirely accurate, based on a small-scale survey done with television journalists at 
Changchun television station news center, a municipal level television station in the capital city 
of Jilin province in northeast China. 
 The survey was conducted on July 15 and 16, 2013, with journalists, editors, and 
cameramen working at three television life news shows at Changchun television station. There 
are a total of 96 effective responses. The respondents do not include people at management 
positions, such as producers or directors. So the respondents are entry-level television news 
professionals. They are typically responsible for conducting interviews, shooting video footage, 
writing scripts, and post-production editing. The respondents of the survey account for about two 
thirds of all the staff in the news center of Changchun television station. Changchun is the capital 
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city of Jilin province, thus Changchun television station faces a unique situation where both Jilin 
television station, which is located in the capital city Changchun, and Changchun television 
station compete not only for the same audience, but also similar news sources.  
 Although the survey statistics are in no way representative of all journalists in Changchun, 
let alone China, they nonetheless tell us much about the journalists working at the three popular 
television life news shows in Changchun. Therefore, instead of understanding these quantitative 
statistics as a basis for statistical inference, they should be seen as merely summarizing data that 
are qualitative in nature, i.e., journalistic orientations. Moreover, using surveys to study Chinese 
journalists is not a common approach in the study of Chinese politics and the media, due to 
various practical constraints such as lack of access to journalists or the sensitive nature of the 
research topic. Lin (2010) and Pan and Chan (2003) are the recent studies that survey Chinese 
journalists. Pan and Chan (2003) survey journalists in Shanghai working for all types of media 
outlets, and Lin (2010) surveys journalists in Guangzhou working for newspapers. However, 
both studies rely on a paradigm to understand Chinese journalists that only differentiates 
between party-journalism and professional journalism. This essentially only reflects the 
independence dimension in Hassid’s typology. Given this gap in the literature, my survey with 
television journalists from Changchun television station, although not representative, is able to 
probe multiple dimensions of journalistic orientations that go beyond the independence 
dimension. Next, this chapter analyzes the results from the survey. 
In Question 10, I asked them which of the following statements is the closest to their 
understanding of journalists. The distribution of their answers is below:  
Table 4.1. Q10-Which of the following description is closest to your understanding of 
journalists? 
Description Percentage Frequency 
1. Journalists should help government better publicize policies, 3.1% 3 
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laws, and regulations, in order to create a better public opinion 
environment.  
2. Journalists are bridges between government and people. They 
should help effective communication between the two, in order 
to maintain social stability. 
28.1% 27 
3. Journalists should represent ordinary people, especially 
vulnerable social groups. 
5.2% 5 
4. Journalists should use their own influence in public opinion to 
help ordinary people solve problems. 
19.8% 19 
5. Journalists should provide reports with news values, in order 
to help people understand issues and acquire information. 
32.3% 31 
6. None of the above can represent my understanding. 3.1% 3 
7. Refuse to answer 2.1% 2 
Total 93.7% 90 
Data Source: Author’s 2013 survey of journalists working at Changchun television station. N=96 
  
There are 5 respondents who picked more than one option. One respondent picked 
options 3 and 4; two respondents picked options 2 and 4; two respondents picked options 4 and 5; 
and one respondent picked options 2, 4, and 5. For those who said none of these options can 
represent their understandings, they wrote out their understandings: 
 “Journalists should be ‘accurate,’ that is, do not stand on anyone’s side.” 
 “Record the facts, investigate the truth.” 
 “For Chinese journalists, the answer is option 2; for foreign journalists, the answer is 5.” 
 In general, most journalists chose options 5, 2, and 4. As Hassid (2011) points out, 
communist professionals are the minority, as there were only 3 journalists who chose option 1. 
However, the number of journalists who chose option 5 was unusually high, opposite to Hassid’s 
understanding of Chinese journalists. Option 5 describes a journalistic orientation that is similar 
to western style journalists, emphasizing news values and information, and the largest group of 
journalists chose this option. More interestingly, opposite to Hassid’s understanding on one of 
the two scales he proposed—advocacy, a substantial number of journalists are ranked high on 
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advocacy. Those who chose options 3 and 4 accounted for 25% of the respondents. They see 
helping people solve problems as one of their main tasks, no matter out of concerns for ratings or 
their own journalistic values.  
 To further explore their views, the distribution of answers to Question 11 is below. In 
Question 11, I asked which of the following criterion is the most important when judging the 
quality of a television life news show. 
 
Table 4.2. Q11-Which criterion below do you think is the most important aspect when 
judging the quality of television life news shows? 
Criterion Percentage Frequency 
1. Objectivity 35.5% 34 
2. Opinion 37.5% 36 
3. Information 26% 25 
4. Others (please specify) 1% 1 
5. Refuse to answer 0% 0 
Total 100% 96 
Data Source: Author’s 2013 survey of journalists working at Changchun television station. N=96 
Note: The respondent who chose “other” specified that a combination of options 1, 2, and 3 is 
preferred. 
 
 
As Table 4.2 shows, more journalists chose opinion than objectivity, which can be 
understood as being consistent with their answers to Question 10, where they emphasized their 
understanding that news should serve ordinary people. Of course, the second largest group 
emphasizes objectivity as a criterion for quality news.  
 Based on the answers to above two questions, a general understanding of this group of 
journalists is that, like advocate professionals, they are concerned about social injustice, and their 
reporting tends to focus on news stories of that nature. If so, their answers to Question 6 reveal 
an interesting pattern. In Question 6, I asked them when government agencies are mentioned in 
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their news show, what kind of news stories they are, and whether the tone towards government 
agencies is positive or negative. 
 
Table 4.3. Q6- when government agencies are mentioned in your news show, what kind of 
news stories are they? 
Description Percentage Frequency 
1. The stories that disclose incompetency of gov’t 
agencies. 
11.5% 11 
2. The stories that publicize relevant public policy 
information, to better inform citizens. 
58.3% 56 
3. The stories that exhibit competency of gov’t 
agencies. 
10.4% 10 
4. Others (please specify) 7.3% 7 
5. Refuse to answer 8.3% 8 
Total 95.8% 92 
Data Source: Author’s 2013 survey of journalists working at Changchun television station. N=96 
 
 Most social injustice involves government agencies, such as property rights disputes and 
insufficient compensation during demolition and relocation. Even for disputes between 
consumers and private businesses, such as fake products and deceptive promotions, trade and 
industry bureaus should be in charge of resolving such disputes and regulating private businesses. 
However, when it comes to actual reporting, this group of journalists responded that most stories 
mentioning government agencies are not the ones exposing government incompetency. In fact, 
the number of journalists with the response of positive reporting exhibiting government 
competency and those with the response of critical reporting exposing government incompetency 
are almost the same, 10.4% and 11.5%, respectively. What this suggests is that, while this group 
of journalists sees advocacy as an important mission of journalists, they are not able to realize 
that mission in their actual work due to political constraints. The answers to Question 7 confirm 
the political constraints.  
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Table 4.4. Q7-During the time you work at the television station, are there incidences 
where news stories could not be broadcast because they involve government agencies?  
Description Percentage Frequency 
1. Never 3.1% 3 
2. Once or twice 19.8% 19 
3. Several times 28.1% 27 
4. Often times 31.3% 30 
5. Other 1% 1 
6. Refuse to answer 16.7% 16 
Total 100% 96 
Data Source: Author’s 2013 survey of journalists working at Changchun television station. N=96 
 
 Table 4.4 shows that 31.3% of respondents said it happened often that news stories could 
not be broadcast due to political constraints. Therefore, while Tables 4.1 and 4.2 suggest a 
journalist orientation on advocacy and help the weak, Table 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that these entry-
level journalists are not able to report on the news stories they are most concerned about, due to 
the political constraints. All this suggests that mid-level news professionals have more potential 
to push for critical reporting than entry-level journalists. 
Conclusion 
Based on the case studies and the survey analysis in this chapter, we can draw three 
conclusions. First, Chinese journalists are a diverse group of professionals. For American-style 
and advocate professionals, while they may both push for more space for critical reporting, the 
rationales behind their behaviors can be different. American-style professionals focus more on 
producing pioneering shows that are popular with audiences, while advocate professionals care 
more about stories involving social injustice.  
Second, mid-level news professionals have more potential to push for critical reporting, if 
they aspire to do so, than entry-level journalists. Above all, mid-level editors and producers have 
to approve the content of news before publication or broadcast. So if they were not willing to 
pursue certain news stories, entry-level journalists would not be able to continue working on 
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those stories. Moreover, mid-level news professionals have more power when negotiating with 
higher-level supervisors such as editor-in-chiefs and senior producers.  
Finally, journalistic aspirations can only be realized with appropriate political timing and 
issue areas. Only when the news stories conform, in one way or another, to the political interests 
of certain leaders can they be published or broadcasted. Once news is produced, how will it 
affect public opinion, if at all? Chapter 5 examines media effects on public opinion in 
authoritarian China.  
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Chapter 5 Limited Effects of Critical News on Public Opinion 
 
Fractured censorship system allows sporadic criticism in news on local governments and 
officials. Such criticism serves the divergent interests of the central and local governments, the 
commercial interests of news organizations, and journalistic aspirations. Having examined the 
news production process, the next question concerns news consumption. Specifically, once such 
news is produced and broadcast or published, how will it affect public opinion on relevant issues, 
if at all? This chapter tests the effects of critical news on public opinion in China.  
Receiving news, no matter from television, newspaper, or the Internet, has become an 
indispensable part of the lives of active citizens. The effects of news, which certainly vary across 
individuals and contexts, have been extensively studied, especially in democratic societies. 
Indeed, the news media has long been viewed as an important pillar in established democracies. 
Dubbed as the Fourth Estate, the news media disseminate political information to voters, monitor 
government behavior through news reports and in-depth investigation, and provide a venue for 
politicians to communicate with voters (Janowitz 1975; Schudson 1998; Sparrow 1999).  
 In addition to the theoretical accounts of the political role of news media in democracies, 
McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) pioneer study is among the first to empirically examine the effects 
of news. The major finding, conceptualized as agenda-setting and confirmed by later studies, is 
that the focus of attention by the news media on public issues can be transferred to the public’s 
focus of attention (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; MacKuen 1981; McCombs 1981). Building on this, 
later studies of news effects find that by emphasizing certain issues over others, the news media 
can influence voters’ evaluations of political actors (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). This is the 
priming effect. More fundamentally, political and policy issues can be framed in multiple ways, 
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and which frame the news media choose to present issues can influence both voters’ and political 
elites’ considerations (Callaghan and Schnell 2000; Nelson et al. 1997; Terkildsen and Schnell 
1997). 
 Being a major way of communication between politicians and voters, the news media in 
democracies are generally more independent from political powers than those in authoritarian 
regimes. Indeed, the news media are tightly controlled in most authoritarian societies. This poses 
an interesting and challenging question for scholars of politics and the media: with less diversity 
in news content due to authoritarian media control, how do the theories of media effects apply, if 
at all, to authoritarian contexts? 
 This chapter first briefly reviews the major theories of media effects, mostly derived from 
democratic experiences. Based on this, this chapter then introduces the challenge and the need to 
examine media effects in nondemocratic contexts, such as China. After introducing the political 
issue examined in the two field experiments, this chapter analyzes and interprets the 
experimental results, with the aim to shed light on the theoretical development of media effects 
across different political regimes.   
Theories of Media Effects in Democracies 
 Despite skepticism over such categorization (Neuman and Guggenheim 2011), in general 
there are three models of media effects: direct effects model, minimal effects model, and 
powerful and cumulative effects model. Direct effects model gained popularity at the beginning 
of communication research. A representative work is Harold Lasswell’s (Lasswell 1930, 1935, 
1938) study on propaganda and the effective manipulation of public minds, especially when 
passive and atomized audiences lack independent sources of information. In 1960, Klapper 
(Klapper 1960) coined the term “minimal effects,” signifying a new phase of communication 
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research. Klapper (1960) finds that audience’s prior beliefs, personal experiences, and discussion 
with opinion leaders and friends may affect how much the media take effects on personal 
opinions and attitudes. This is referred to as a two-step flow (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), which 
means messages from the media are mediated by opinion leaders during the process of media 
messages taking effects. Finally, starting from the 1970s, a group of scholars have demonstrated 
that the media have “not so minimal effects” through empirical research (Iyengar et al. 1982). As 
briefly mentioned earlier in this paper, the media can tell the audience what to think about, i.e., 
the agenda-setting effects (McCombs and Shaw 1972), as well as how to think about it, i.e., the 
priming and framing effects (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
 One of the central debates among different media effects theories is that when we 
consider the news media as part of the democratic process, there are many other variables that 
may influence the direct versus minimal effects dichotomy (Neuman and Guggenheim 2011). 
For example, scholars find that individuals who are well informed and strongly opinionated have 
deeply rooted attitudes and thus are less likely to change their opinions responding new 
information (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 60). However, all theories of media effects, despite 
important differences among them, are based on an important assumption—diversity in 
information sources and news content. In authoritarian regimes where all media outlets are 
strictly controlled by the state, sources of information and news content may not be as diversified, 
and such media control may be a known fact to the public. Under such circumstances, how do 
the theories of media effects apply, if at all? 
 The research on media effects on public opinion in China is scarce and outdated. Chen 
and Shi (2001) is among the first to quantitatively examine media effects in China. They find 
that more exposure to the state-controlled media leads to more negative attitudes toward the CCP 
 
	   119 
regime. This was an interesting finding in that many scholars assumed that an important 
mechanism for authoritarian regimes to maintain legitimacy is through propaganda and control 
of information. Yet this finding challenges the very effects of propaganda. Despite the value of 
the study, their data come from a nationwide survey conducted in 1993 and 1994, during which 
time the major role of Chinese news media was mouthpiece. News content was thus mostly 
propaganda. In other words, there was little criticism in news in the early 1990s. Moreover, the 
measurement on exposure to the media was indirect. In the survey, respondents were asked about 
the frequency they watch television or read newspaper last week. Watching television, however, 
can include watching entertainment shows that may have nothing to do with news or propaganda. 
Therefore, the measure of media exposure was limited and outdated. 
 It is more difficult to find recent studies on media effects in China. A study on framing 
may indirectly suggest media effects in China. Zhou and Moy (2007) study the interaction 
between online public opinion and traditional media discourse. They find that the frequent input 
and output roles are mutual. Online public opinion may lead traditional media to focus attention 
on particular social events, but traditional media may shape online discussion later on. This 
implies that online public opinion, a small fraction of public opinion representing only those who 
use the Internet to participate in online discussion, may be influenced by traditional media 
coverage. However, we cannot infer from the finding whether criticism in news coverage affects 
public opinion, and if so, in what direction.  
 In fact, implicitly or explicitly, it is a well-accepted assumption among scholars that the 
state-controlled news media are effective at influencing public opinion, not only in China, but 
also in many other non-democratic regimes, as controlling information is an important means to 
establish and maintain regime legitimacy and political stability, specifically through reshaping 
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the hearts and minds of nonelites (Linz 1975; Neuman 1991). This assumption is similar to the 
one that was discussed and challenged in Chen and Shi (2001). Taking this assumption, earlier 
research on propaganda during the Maoist period has examined the institutions, techniques, and 
effects of propaganda campaigns (Yu 1964; Liu 1971). In the 1990s, scholarly attention on 
propaganda seems to have given way to censorship. During this time, scholarly research on 
politics and the media in China started to pay attention to the discernable role of journalists and 
the commercial interests of news organizations, as a result of the media reform that picked up 
pace in the 1990s in the forms of deregulation, commercialization, and partial privatization 
(Stockmann 2013). This line of research captures the sometimes palpable yet often times 
precarious role of journalists (Lee 1990; Zhao 1998, 2000; Zhou 2000; Tong 2007, 2011; Shirk 
2011), as well as the changes in the management structure in news organizations and the news 
production process (He 1997, 2000; Lee 2000; Shirk 2011; Stockmann 2013). For the studies 
that focus on either journalists or news organizations, a common underlying basis is the 
censorship paradigm, which presumes the effects of news. Indeed, without the assumption that 
news affects public opinion, censorship would be baseless and its existence would be difficult to 
justify.  
Empirically, a similar rationale applies for the Chinese party-state that continues to 
exercise the ever-more-sophisticated system of media control over both traditional (newspaper, 
radio, television, film) and the new media (online news portals and social media). For the 
Chinese party-state, so far the fear for criticism in news content and the need to control news 
production seem to be based upon both the need to maintain the dominating status of official 
ideologies and the alarming precedents such as the fall of the former Soviet Union, a common 
blame for which is the removal of control over the news media. Although the party-state has 
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been increasingly using objective research to monitor and steer public opinion, especially online 
public opinion43, the assumption remains that news affects public opinion. This is an assumption 
worth investigating. Does news actually affect public opinion to the same extent that it does in 
democracies, especially considering that the state control over the news media is not a secret 
among the public, and that the party-state exercises strict control over other areas of political and 
civil liberties? In other words, does news matter? More specifically, does criticism in news, as 
examined in the first part of this study, matter for the public?  
Using the contentious issue of demolition and relocation in contemporary Chinese society, 
I conducted two field experiments on news effects and find that critical reports of this issue have 
only limited effects on how the participants perceive demolition and relocation. In contrast to 
exposure to critical news, personal experience with demolition and relocation and discussing 
politics with family and friends are important factors affecting participants’ opinions on this 
issue. This not only suggests that media effects theories derived from democratic contexts do not 
always apply in authoritarian regimes, but also implies that allowing limited criticism in news 
may actually help consolidate the authoritarian rule in China. Next, this chapter introduces the 
issue of demolition and relocation, followed by a description of the experimental design. Finally, 
this chapter discusses the experimental results and the implications for authoritarian duration in 
China.  
The Issue of Demolition and Relocation in China 
Among the many contentious political and social issues facing China, demolition and 
relocation44 became widespread and serious especially since the late 1990s (Xu et al. 2009). This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Such examples include the annual public opinion report project led by Yu Guoming, a professor at Renmin 
University, and the establishment of the online public opinion monitoring office under the people’s website 
(people.com.cn) managed by the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily. 
44 Chaiqian 拆迁, literally means demolition and relocation. 
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issue is related to two important aspects of the Chinese political system and public policies—the 
incentive structure for the local governments and the land development policies.  
In China, land is state owned in urban areas and collectively owned in rural areas. This 
creates ambiguity problem for property rights (Zhu 2002). Specifically, “China’s practice is to 
separate land use rights from ownership; only the former are permitted to be privatized. This 
means that the land market is a leasehold system for land use rights.” (Xu et al. 2009, 893) This 
kind of demarcation of land rights, combined with the financial incentives of the local 
governments and the urbanization policy, led to the widespread practice of local governments 
selling land to developers in exchange for revenue. In fact, income from leasing land constitutes 
a substantial source of revenue for local governments. For example, Ho and Lin (2003) find that 
land sales comprises 30-70% of municipal revenue in many cities. While in theory this may 
breed market competition and stable local government revenue, the reality is that the institutional 
structure of land development contributes to the increasing rent-seeking activities, misallocation 
of land resources, land abuse, and corruption (Hsing 2006; Lin and Ho 2005; Xu 2001; Yeh and 
Wu 1996; Zhu 2002). This is because “land is still transferred non-transparently in most Chinese 
cities (through negotiation),” even though the central government has repeatedly required all 
commercial land to be transferred publicly, either through auction or public bidding (Xu et al. 
2009, 894).  
At the other end of the business of selling land is to accommodate residents living off the 
land. Facing alluring financial incentives, a natural logic of the local governments is to lower the 
price of compensation for indigenous residents, while raising the price of land sold to developers. 
Considering the fact that the real estate sector has become the pillar industry of the national 
economy (Xu et al. 2009, 895), let alone the contribution to local economy, it would be easier for 
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local governments to press more on the end of indigenous residents than the end of real estate 
developers. As a result, land acquisition, forced demolition, and insufficient compensation have 
been wide spread phenomena and problems. For example, according to statistics from the 
Beijing Supreme People’s Court, all municipal courts dealt with only a few hundred property-
related cases each year before 1992, when the property market took off. The figure increased to 
8,103 in 1999, more than 10,000 in 2000, and more than 15,000 in 2001 (Miao 2003). By August 
2003, the State Bureau for Letters and Calls, the top institution for appeals and grievances, 
received 11,641 petitions of dispute over relocation, a year-on-year growth of 50%, and 5,360 
complainants, up 47% (Miao 2003). According to a report by the Chinese Construction Ministry, 
among all 4,820 letters of complaints it received between January and August in 2002, 28% were 
related to demolition and relocation; among the 1,730 formal appeals, 70% were related to 
demolition and relocation; among the 123 collective appeals, 83.7% were about demolition and 
relocation (Zhao 2003). In 2013, the State Bureau for Letters and Calls admits that demolition in 
urban towns and cities and land acquisition in rural areas are among the top problems reflected in 
appeals and grievances, based on the statistics from January to October 2013 (Xinhua 2013).  
While disputes related to demolition and relocation are multi-folded, insufficient 
compensation is among the most common ones. It was not until June 2001 that the State Council, 
the top executive body in China, passed the Regulation Rules Regarding the Demolition and 
Relocation of Urban Structures, providing certain guidelines on the negotiation procedures, 
compensation, and relocation arrangements. However, research shows that this set of rules favors 
the interests of developers, besides the problem of inconsistencies between law and practice 
(Zhang 2004). Usually compensation for residents comes in two forms: cash or resettlement 
housing (Zhang 2004, 256). However, the specific terms are open to negotiation between 
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developers and residents. “According to the 2001 state ruling, provincial and city governments 
should provide specific criteria to determine the appropriate cash compensation according to the 
following factors: location, type of usage, and size of the structure to be demolished.” (Zhang 
2004, 256) The calculation for resettlement housing depends on the cash value of the old 
property and that of the new one, with the differences compensated by cash. Disputes arise from 
the fact that the value of homes are often times difficult to calculate, especially when considering 
the factors such as moving away from hometowns and settling into a new environment. All these 
factors may be further complicated by employment, schools, hospitals, and so on45. Scholarly 
research and news reports alike have shown pervasive dissatisfaction among residents on the 
issue of demolition and relocation (Zhang 2004).  
Experimental Design and Analysis 
 In order to test the news effects on public opinion, I designed two field experiments, one 
conducted in Yangzhou (eastern China) with adults, the other conducted in Xi’an (central China) 
with university students, both on the issue of demolition and relocation. For both experiments, I 
use the posttest-only experimental design (Campbell and Stanley 1963).  
Experiments have been used to study media effects for more than two decades (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987). For Yangzhou experiment with adults, I use a simple experimental design 
with one treatment group and one control group. The treatment was watching a television news 
report on undercompensated demolition. For Xi’an experiment with university students, I use the 
experimental design with more than two independent random groups (Levin 1999). While the 
treatment is exposure to negative news reports on the issue of demolition, the levels of this 
independent variable include television, newspaper, and the Internet. Therefore, Xi’an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 A New York Times report titled “New China Cities: Shoddy Homes, Broken Hope” documents life changes, 
mostly negative, of resettled residents. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/world/asia/new-china-cities-shoddy-
homes-broken-hope.html?_r=0  
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experiment consists of four randomized groups: one control group and three treatment groups. 
Considering possible demand characteristics, or “pretest sensitization” (Aronson et al. 1990; 
Druckman et al. 2011), I use “posttest-only control group design” (Campbell and Stanley 1963, 
25). In this design, participants are randomly assigned to either control or treatment group. 
Dependent variables are measured only once, i.e., without pretest measurements. To study 
experimental effects, researchers can compare potential differences of dependent variables 
among control and treatment groups. In this study, the major reason to choose this design is that 
exposure to negative news reports on sensitive issues such as demolition may lead participants to 
form the impression that the experiment has the intention to make them believe in the negative 
aspects of the controversial issue, as my pilot pretest conducted in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province 
shows. During the pretest, I randomly approached a woman in a public park in Yangzhou. After 
acquiring her consent, I asked her opinions on demolition. I then showed her a 2-minute video of 
negative news report on demolition, after which I asked her opinions on demolition again. She 
said, “Well, based on what you just showed me, obviously demolition is an important issue and I 
am not satisfied with the way the government is handling the issue.” This makes it difficult to 
differentiate whether the participant truly changed her opinion or just catered to her assumed 
intention of my research. This problem is what Aronson et al. (1990, 140) referred to as pretest 
sensitization, where “the interaction [italic original] between the pretest and the threat 
[treatment] might be responsible for the subject’s devaluation of the magazine [the dependent 
variable].”  
 The most important basis of such an experiment design is randomization. Because 
participants are randomly assigned to either control or treatment groups, we can reasonably 
assume that the characteristics of all participants in different groups are identical or at least 
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similar, apart from random sampling variability (Druckman et al. 2011). This functions as an 
important foundation for us to compare whatever differences there might be in the posttest, from 
which we can conclude the results of the experiment (Aronson et al. 1990, 141). In other words, 
“by comparing the average outcome in the treatment group to the average outcome in the control 
group, the experimental researcher estimates the average treatment effect.” (Druckman et al. 
2011, 17) 
While avoiding pretest sensitization, posttest-only control group design has its own 
disadvantages. First, there is no way to collect information on participants’ initial beliefs on the 
issue of demolition. It is possible that the media effects are the strongest when participants hold 
initially benign opinions on demolition. In other words, the capability of such an experiment to 
test different hypotheses is limited. Because no prior information is collected, it was impossible 
to conduct, for example, blocked design that may incorporate other variables. Second, although 
posttest-only control group design avoids an interaction between pretest and treatment effects, it 
does not indicate whether such an interaction is possible at all (Aronson et al. 1990, 142).  
Given the disadvantages, for this experiment, the central question is whether exposure to 
negative news media reports affects people’s perceptions on key social issues. Therefore, the 
posttest-only control group design is sufficient to answer this causal question, as experiments are 
able to address (Druckman et al. 2011). 
Yangzhou Experiment with Adults 
 Given the constraints of time, funding, and access to participants, I was not able to 
conduct an experiment spanning a period of time, or the within-subjects design (Druckman et al. 
2011, 18). I was only able to design and conduct an experiment where the whole process takes 
place based on the expectation that I would only be able to contact participants once. In order to 
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avoid the problem of pretest sensitization, I used the posttest-only control group design, a type of 
between-subjects design46 (Druckman et al. 2011, 18) in the Yangzhou experiment: 
 
Treatment Group:  Television news treatment  ! Posttest 
 
Control Group:  No treatment    ! Posttest 
 
 
Participants were adults that I randomly approached in three public squares in Yangzhou, 
Jiangsu Province in eastern China. Yangzhou is a municipality with a population of 4.6 million47. 
From July 18 to 25, 2013, I randomly approached 132 people in total, of which 120 consented to 
answer the survey questionnaire. Among the 120 participants, 60 were randomly assigned to the 
treatment group, and 60 were randomly assigned to the control group. For the treatment group, I 
asked participants to watch a 2-minute video. This video is an excerpt from a news report from 
China Central Television (CCTV) on the issue of demolition and relocation. Specifically, the 
news report was about a demolition dispute between a farmer and the local township government 
due to insufficient compensation. Three specific facts are presented in this 2-minute video. First, 
the farmer did not receive nearly enough money to cover his financial loss due to demolition and 
relocation; second, if the farmer were relocated to a new house, he would lose his original source 
of income; finally, the dispute was not resolved in the end. I watched the video together with 
each participant assigned to the treatment group, after which I asked three questions regarding 
opinions on demolition and relocation. Specifically, I used Likert-scale with five levels for all 
three questions. They are as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 According to Druckman et al. (2011, 18), a between-subjects design is where the researcher randomly assigns 
participants to distinct treatment groups. A within-subjects design is where a given participant is observed before 
and after receiving a treatment and there is no random assignment between subjects.  
47 This number comes from the sixth national population census in 2010.  
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1. Are existing disputes of demolition and relocation an important social issue? (Not at all 
important ! very important) 
 
2. Is it possible to solve the disputes of demolition and relocation? (Not at all possible ! very 
possible) 
 
3. Are you satisfied with the government’s way of handling these disputes? (Very dissatisfied ! 
very satisfied) 
 
 Since the dependent variables are ordinal with five categories, ANOVA is not an ideal 
test in this case because ANOVA assumes normally distributed residuals for interval dependent 
variable. Moreover, it only tests difference of means, not variance (Levin 1999, Ch. 4). Kruskal-
Wallis one-way analysis of variance does not assume normally distributed residuals, and it is a 
non-parametric method for comparing two or more independent samples. Moreover, it can also 
be used to examine groups of unequal sizes (Kruskal and Wallis 1952; Spurrier 2003). The 
results suggest that exposure to negative television news reports affects participants’ responses to 
Questions 1 and 3, as shown in Table 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics (Yangzhou Experiment) 
  Control Treatment 
Q1. Are existing disputes 
due to demolition and 
relocation an important 
social issue? 
Not at all important 0  
(0) 
0  
(0) 
Not important 5  
(3) 
1.7  
(1) 
Hard to say 16.7  
(10) 
15  
(9) 
Important 48.3  
(29) 
33.3  
(20) 
Very important 30  
(18) 
50  
(30) 
Do not know 0  
(0) 
0  
(0) 
Q2. Do you think it is 
possible to solve demolition 
and relocation disputes? 
Not at all possible 3.3 
(2) 
13.3 
(8) 
Not possible 25 
(15) 
15 
(9) 
Hard to say 33.3 
(20) 
28.3 
(17) 
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Possible  35 
(21) 
38.3 
(23) 
Very possible 3.3 
(2) 
5 
(3) 
Do not know 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
Q3. Are you satisfied with 
the government’s way of 
handling these disputes? 
Very dissatisfied 18.3 
(11) 
40 
(24) 
Dissatisfied 30 
(18) 
31.7 
(19) 
Hard to say 40 
(24) 
25 
(15) 
Satisfied 10 
(6) 
3.3 
(2) 
Very satisfied 1.7 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
Do not know 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
Source: Author’s 2013 Yangzhou survey experiment. 60 participants were randomly assigned to the control group, 
and 60 participants were randomly assigned to the treatment group. N=120. 
Note: Cell numbers are percentages. The numbers in parentheses are frequencies. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Opinions on Demolition and Relocation (Yangzhou Experiment) 
 N df Chi-squared p-value 
Q1. Are existing disputes due to demolition 
and relocation an important social issue? 120 1 3.98 0.046* 
Q3. Are you satisfied with the government’s 
way of handling these disputes? 120 1 9.51 0.002** 
Notes: Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1.  
Kruskal-Willis one-way ANOVA is used to perform the tests. 
 
 
Simulation based on the statistical results of the experiment shows that participants 
exposed to the negative news report on demolition are more likely to think the issue of 
demolition and relocation is important for the society and be more dissatisfied with the 
government’s way of handling the issue, compared to participants in the control group, as shown 
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Figure 5.1 Yangzhou Experiment with Adults 
 
Note:  
1. Black bars show simulated probabilities of choosing the categories for participants in the control group. White 
bars show simulated probabilities when participants are exposed to negative news on demolition and relocation.  
2. Simulation is conducted using the R package “ZeligChoice.”  
Zelig project citations: Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2009). “Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software,” 
http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig and Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2008). “Toward A Common 
Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development,” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, Vol. 17, 
No. 4 (December) pp. 892-913. 
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Figure 5.2 Yangzhou Experiment with Adults 
 
Note:  
1. Black bars show simulated probabilities of choosing the categories for participants in the control group. White 
bars show simulated probabilities when participants are exposed to negative news on demolition and relocation.  
2. Simulation is conducted using the R package “ZeligChoice.”  
Zelig project citations: Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2009). “Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software,” 
http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig and Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2008). “Toward A Common 
Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development,” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, Vol. 17, 
No. 4 (December) pp. 892-913. 
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Interestingly, for Question 2, when asked about the confidence in the ultimate solution of 
the issue, watching a negative television news report does not really affect participants’ attitude. 
This suggests that broadcasting negative news on mass media may serve as a safety valve letting 
off steam of public anger without sacrificing public confidence in the regime, since disputes do 
exist, broadly.  
Question may arise that individuals living under an authoritarian regime often do not feel 
free to truthfully answer political questions. This is a legitimate and important concern. 
However, for this experiment we actually have little reason to worry much about the validity of 
the answers. Among the three questions, the third question that asks satisfaction with the 
government is the most sensitive question, because it directly asks the participants to evaluate the 
performance of the government. As the descriptive statistics show, 29% of the participants chose 
“very dissatisfied” and 31% of the participants chose “dissatisfied” with the way the 
government’s handling the issue of demolition and relocation. Therefore, if participants are not 
afraid of voicing their dissatisfaction directly with the government, there is no reason to believe 
that the participants are not completely honest with the first and second attitude questions. 
Xi’an Experiment with University Students  
The second field experiment was conducted among university students at Northwestern 
University in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province in northwestern China. This experiment also uses posttest-
only experimental design, and it has four randomized groups: 
Group 1 (Control): No treatment    ! Posttest 
 
Group 2 (Treatment): Television news treatment  ! Posttest 
 
Group 3 (Treatment): Newspaper news treatment  ! Posttest 
 
Group 4 (Treatment): Internet news treatment  ! Posttest 
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The experiment took place on December 7, 2013. A total of 155 sophomores participated 
in the experiment. The numbers of students for each group are: 39 in the control group, 36 in the 
television group, 43 in the newspaper group, 37 in the Internet group. A professor from 
Northwestern University kindly agreed to use her class time to conduct the experiment. While 
the course was accounting, students from all majors can enroll in the course. On the day of the 
experiment, instead of having normal class, the professor first asked for consent of the students 
who were present that day to participate in an experiment on media effects. After acquiring 
consent, the professor randomly assigned students into four groups. Specifically, before the 
experiment I used the table of random numbers to randomly assign students into four groups 
using the student ID numbers. Based on the group assignments, the professor read the names of 
the students in each group, in order to inform the students which group they belong to. Next, the 
professor distributed questionnaires to students of the newspaper group, the Internet group, and 
the control group. For newspaper and Internet groups, the first pages of the questionnaires are a 
500-character news report on a dispute of undercompensated demolition. This passage comes 
from a television news report, which is the treatment for the television group. I transcribed the 
news report, and the passages are exactly the same for both the newspaper and the Internet 
group.  
While students of the control, newspaper, and Internet groups are answering the 
questionnaires, the professor led the students of the television group to another classroom 
equipped with a computer, the Internet, and a projector. Before distributing the questionnaires, 
the professor first played a 2-minute video of a news report from a local news program named 
Live Broadcasting Xi’an 直播西安, from which I transcribed the 500-character passage for 
students in other treatment groups. After finishing playing the video, the professor distributed the 
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questionnaires to the students. In the end, all students turned in the completed questionnaires. 
The whole process took about 30 minutes.  
In this experiment, I measured opinions on the issue of demolition in particular and 
democratic attitudes and political efficacy in general. Similar to the statistical analysis of the 
Yangzhou experiment, since I have ordinal dependent variables, I use Kruskal-Willis ANOVA 
test. The results show that among the 14 democratic attitudes and political efficacy questions, 
only 3 attitude questions for which the difference among groups were statistically significant, as 
shown in Table 5.3. Interestingly, for these 3 democratic attitude questions, exposure to negative 
news reports does not necessarily drive participants’ attitudes toward a more liberal or 
democratic direction.  
 
Table 5.3 Treatment Effects on Democratic Attitudes and Political Efficacy (Xi’an 
Experiment) 
 N df Chi-squared p-value 
Q43. If people have their different ideas, the 
society will be chaotic.  143 3 8.37 0.039* 
Q44. Market competition is harmful for 
social stability. 145 3 12.45 0.006** 
Q46. Rapid economic development is 
harmful for social stability. 147 3 9.89 0.02* 
Notes: Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1.  
Kruskal-Willis one-way ANOVA is used to perform the tests. 
 
 
 Specifically, the first attitude question concerns the statement “If everybody does not 
share the same thinking, society can be chaotic.” The vast majority (83.78%) of the student 
participants in the control group disagree with the statement. Participants in the treatment groups, 
however, disagree less with the statement. 64.71% of participants in the television group, 76.19% 
of participants in the newspaper group, and 80% of participants in the Internet group disagree 
with the statement. This suggests that the treatments made participants less tolerant. 
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The second attitude question centers on the statement “Market competition is harmful to 
social stability.” The vast majority (94.12%) of participants in the control group disagree with 
this statement. Being exposed to negative news on insufficient compensation for demolition and 
relocation, no matter through television or newspaper, makes the participants’ economic attitude 
more conservative, not more liberal. 73.53% of participants in the television group and 88.09% 
of participants in the newspaper group disagree with the statement. Reading news from the 
Internet, however, does make the participants’ economic attitude more liberal, as 97.15% of 
participants in the Internet group disagree with the statement. 
 The third attitude question concerns the statement “Rapid economic development is 
harmful to social stability.” Similarly, while the majority (58.33%) of participants in the control 
group disagree with this statement, being exposed to the negative news through television makes 
the participants’ economic attitude more conservative, as 42.42% of participants in the television 
group disagree with the statement. Being exposed to the news from newspaper and the Internet 
makes the participants’ economic attitude more liberal, as 64.28% of participants in the 
newspaper group and 77.14% of participants in the Internet group disagree with the statement.  
 In the Xi’an experiment with university students, I measured non-media factors such as 
participants’ own experience with demolition and relocation, and frequency of watching 
television, readings newspaper, and surfing the Internet. This provides an opportunity to examine 
whether and how individual characteristics affect media effects. When we take into account the 
potential influence of individual characteristics, the statistical analysis shows that the treatments 
are not statistically significant any more for the above three attitude questions, but significant for 
different attitude questions. Personal experience with demolition and relocation, frequency of 
discussing politics with family and friends, and frequency of receiving news through the three 
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media outlets became important factors influencing participants’ opinions on demolition and 
relocation in particular as well as their general democratic attitudes and political efficacy. 
 Table 5.4 shows that for opinions on demolition and relocation specifically, when we 
take into account the effects of individual characteristics, having experience with demolition and 
relocation makes participants more likely to be concerned with the issue. Watching television 
news more frequently makes participants more likely to be dissatisfied with the government’s 
handling of the issue, as simulation results also show in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 Ordinal Logistic Regression Models of Opinions on Demolition and Relocation 
(Xi’an Experiment with University Students) 
 Q23. Personal Concern Q26. Satisfaction with Gov’t 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) t-value 
Treatment Groups 0.01 (0.15) 0.07 
-0.13 
(0.16) -0.81 
Personal experience with 
demolition (1=yes; 2=no) 
-1.14 
(0.32) -3.54 
-0.18 
(0.32) -0.57 
Discussing politics with friends 
or family (1=weekly; 5=rarely) 
-0.03 
(0.12) -0.29 
-0.22 
(0.12) -1.79 
Frequency watching TV news 
(1=daily; 5=rarely) 
-0.11 
(0.14) -0.77 
0.39 
(0.15) 2.65 
Frequency reading newspaper 
(1=daily; 5=rarely) 
0.42 
(0.42) 1.00 
-0.16 
(0.35) -0.46 
Frequency reading news online  
(1=daily; 5=rarely) 
-0.07 
(0.15) -0.45 
0.15 
(0.15) 0.96 
Notes: The questions are: 
Q23. “For you personally, how much are you concerned with the issue of demolition and relocation?” (1=Not At All 
Concerned; 5=Very Concerned) 
Q26. “Are you satisfied with the way the government’s handling the issue of demolition and relocation?” (1=Very 
Dissatisfied; 5=Very Satisfied) 
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Figure 5.3 Xi’an Experiment with University Students 
 
Note:  
1. Black bars show simulated probabilities of choosing the categories when participants have friends or families who 
have experience with demolition and relocation. White bars show simulated probabilities when participants do not 
have such experience.  
2. Other variables are held at mode. Treatment group is held at television.  
3. Simulation is conducted using the R package “ZeligChoice.”  
Zelig project citations: Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2009). “Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software,” 
http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig and Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2008). “Toward A Common 
Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development,” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, Vol. 17, 
No. 4 (December) pp. 892-913. 
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Figure 5.4 Xi’an Experiment with University Students 
 
Note:  
1. Black bars show simulated probabilities of choosing the categories when participants watch television news daily. 
White bars show simulated probabilities when participants rarely watch television news.  
2. Other variables are held at mode. Treatment group is held at television.  
3. Simulation is conducted using the R package “ZeligChoice.”  
Zelig project citations: Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2009). “Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software,” 
http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig and Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. (2008). “Toward A Common 
Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development,” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, Vol. 17, 
No. 4 (December) pp. 892-913. 
 
 
Very Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Very Satisfied
Simulation of Satisfaction with Government
Satisfaction with Government
Si
m
ul
at
ed
 P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Watch TV News Daily
Rarely Watch TV News
 
	   139 
 Table 5.5 shows that for democratic attitudes and political efficacy in general, being 
exposed to negative news on demolition and relocation significantly affects participants’ attitude 
on public demonstrations and political efficacy. Specifically, being exposed to negative news 
makes participants more democratic on public demonstrations but less politically efficacious.  
 
Table 5.5 Effects of Treatment Groups in the Xi’an Experiment with University Students  
Dependent Variable (1=Strongly Agree; 5=Strongly Disagree) Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Q39. Public Demonstrations can easily turn into social 
disturbances and impact social stability. 
0.32 
(0.15) 2.16 
Q48. I don’t think the government cares much what people like 
me think. 
-0.30 
(0.15) -2.03 
Notes: R package “Zelig” was used to estimate the ordinal logistic regression models. 
Other independent variables are not shown in this table, and they are experience with demolition, discussing politics 
with family and friends, frequency of watching television news, frequency of reading newspaper, and frequency of 
reading news online.  
In the model of Q39, the variable frequency of reading news online is also statistically significant.  
In the model of Q48, no other independent variables are statistically significant. 
 
 
 Table 5.6 shows the effects of discussing politics with family and friends on participants’ 
democratic attitudes and political efficacy. Specifically, discussing politics more often with 
family and friends makes participants less democratic but more politically efficacious. 
 
Table 5.6 Effects of Discussing Politics with Family and Friends in the Xi’an Experiment 
with University Students (1=Almost Weekly; 5=Rarely)  
Dependent Variable (1=Strongly Agree; 5=Strongly Disagree) Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Q42. We need a strong government to handle today’s complex 
economic problems. 
0.30 
(0.12) 2.50 
Q43. If everybody does not share the same thinking, society can 
be chaotic.  
0.27 
(0.12) 2.22 
Q49. I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important 
political issues facing China. 
0.32 
(0.12) 2.65 
Q50. I think I am better informed about politics than most 
people. 
0.26 
(0.12) 2.10 
Q52. I feel that I could do as good a job as a cadre as other 0.27 2.14 
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people.  (0.13) 
Notes: R package “Zelig” was used to estimate the ordinal logistic regression models. 
Other independent variables are statistically insignificant and not shown in this table, and they are treatment groups, 
experience with demolition, frequency of watching television news, frequency of reading newspaper, and frequency 
of reading news online.  
 
 Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show the effects of the frequency of receiving news through 
different media outlets on democratic attitudes and political efficacy. Receiving news through 
television more often makes participants less politically efficacious, but more so if receiving 
news through newspaper. Reading news online more often makes participants more democratic. 
Therefore, the type of media outlet through which participants receive news affects political 
attitudes as well. 
 
Table 5.7 Effects of Frequency of Watching Television News in the Xi’an Experiment with 
University Students (1=Almost Daily; 5=Rarely)  
Dependent Variable (1=Strongly Agree; 5=Strongly Disagree) Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Q51. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in 
politics. 
-0.30 
(0.14) -2.08 
Notes: R package “Zelig” was used to estimate the ordinal logistic regression models. 
Other independent variables are statistically insignificant and not shown in this table, and they are treatment groups, 
experience with demolition, discussing politics with family and friends, frequency of reading newspaper, and 
frequency of reading news online.  
 
 
Table 5.8 Effects of Frequency of Reading Newspaper in the Xi’an Experiment with 
University Students (1=Almost Daily; 5=Rarely) 
Dependent Variable (1=Strongly Agree; 5=Strongly Disagree) Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Q53. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated 
that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on. 
-0.72 
(0.32) -2.27 
Notes: R package “Zelig” was used to estimate the ordinal logistic regression models. 
Other independent variables are statistically insignificant and not shown in this table, and they are treatment groups, 
experience with demolition, discussing politics with family and friends, frequency of watching television news, and 
frequency of reading news online.  
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Table 5.9 Effects of Frequency of Reading Online News in the Xi’an Experiment with 
University Students (1=Almost Daily; 5=Rarely) 
Dependent Variable (1=Strongly Agree; 5=Strongly Disagree) Coefficient (Std. Error) t-value 
Q39. Public Demonstrations can easily turn into social 
disturbances and impact social stability. 
-0.28 
(0.14) -1.98 
Q45. If a country has multiple parties, it will lead to political 
chaos. 
-0.31 
(0.15) -2.09 
Notes: R package “Zelig” was used to estimate the ordinal logistic regression models. 
Other independent variables are not shown in this table, and they are treatment groups, experience with demolition, 
discussing politics with family and friends, frequency of watching television news, and frequency of reading 
newspaper.  
In the model of Q39, the variable treatment groups is also statistically significant.  
 
Discussion 
In general, the two field experiments suggest less media effects than we would expect 
based on previous research on media effects in democratic contexts. In the Xi’an experiment, 
being exposed to negative news does not change participants’ opinions on the issue of demolition 
and relocation. In the Yangzhou experiment, although the experimental results suggest agenda-
setting and priming effects, watching negative news does not undermine public confidence in the 
ultimate solution of the issue. This implies that critical news on key social issues does not 
necessarily undermine public confidence in the regime. In fact, critical news may let off the 
steam of public anger over contentious issues that emerged during China’s economic and 
political development process, which may consolidate, rather than undermine, the authoritarian 
rule. Previous studies have found that in a more strictly controlled media environment citizens 
tend to be politically ignorant and apathetic; whereas in a less regulated media environment 
citizens are more politically knowledgeable and active (Leeson 2008). What is more interesting 
about the findings here, however, is that even with the exposure to critical news, a rare 
phenomenon in authoritarian China, citizens’ attitudes are not influenced.  
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More importantly, these results suggest the importance of non-media factors in attitudinal 
change. As implied by the literature of “two-step flow,” discussing politics with family and 
friends may be an important factor as family and friends can function as opinion leaders 
affecting individual attitudes. In this study, the more participants discuss politics with family and 
friends, the less democratic but the more politically efficacious they tend to be. Other non-media 
factors such as participants’ own experience with the issue of demolition and relocation tend to 
increase their perceived importance of the issue.  
Frequency of being exposed to television, newspaper, and the Internet also has an effect 
on attitudinal change. Watching television news more often is associated with less satisfaction 
with the government’s handling of the demolition issue, but more political efficacy. Reading 
newspaper more frequently is associated with higher levels of political efficacy. Reading news 
online more frequently is associated with more democratic attitudes.  
The differences among media outlets can be understood with the unique circumstances of 
media reform and control in China. As parts of the media reform initiated in the 1980s but gained 
momentum in the 1990s, deregulation, commercialization, and partial privatization (Stockmann 
2013) led to more space for news reports. However, television remains to be the most strictly 
controlled media outlet in China (Shirk 2011). In contrast, certain newspapers, such as Southern 
Weekend and Caixin, are known for their outspoken and often critical views on social and 
political issues. Due to its technological nature, the Internet is controlled differently than the 
traditional media such as television and newspaper, and it has been used by activists to advance 
political and social interests (Yang 2009). Partially due to the distinct nature of media outlets and 
the differing amount of space for reporting, demographic makeup of the audiences for each 
media outlet varies as well. As a result, consuming news from different media outlets may 
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further reaffirm audience’s political attitudes. This effect is somewhat similar to that in 
democracies, such as the research finding that watching politically oriented television news, such 
as MSNBC and Fox News, makes Americans more certain of their beliefs and less willing to 
weight the merits of opposing views (Levendusky 2013).   
*** 
The general lack of effects of critical news in China can be understood through 
comparison with media effects in other authoritarian states. Next, this chapter draws insights 
from media studies that center on Taiwan during its pre- and post-democratic periods. The 
central argument is that, the news effects on public opinion, or lack thereof, may have something 
to do with the status of the media in relation to the state. The centrality of media-state relations is 
similar to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three democratic media system models. In this case, state-
controlled media such as in authoritarian countries do not exert much influence on public opinion 
because they are known to the public as lacking independence. Even with marketized media that 
enjoy limited freedom, as long as the public holds the assumption of strictly controlled media 
environment, marketized and Party-sponsored media outlets alike will be thought of as 
subservient and biased sources of information that favors the political authority. Comparison 
between China and pre-democratic Taiwan, as well as comparison between pre- and post-
democratic Taiwan suggest the above argument.  
Comparison with the Taiwanese Media 
 Before the democratization process started in Taiwan in the late 1980s, the news media 
were strictly controlled by Kuomintang (KMT), the Leninist party that exercised authoritarian 
rule over Taiwan from 1949 till the early 1990s (Eberstadt 1992). During the pre-democratic 
period, Taiwanese media were state-controlled. Specifically, there were four areas that were 
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especially subject to limitations—criticism of government and officials, the independence 
movement, Taiwan-Mainland relations, and the military (Kuo 1993). In the late 1980s, the leader 
of the KMT, Chiang Ching-Kuo decided to open up the political system by reducing social and 
political control in Taiwan. The martial law was officially lifted by the KMT in 1987, and 
creation of new political parties was legalized. The media environment also experienced 
substantial change toward the direction of more press freedom. The restrictions on the four areas 
mentioned earlier did not exist any more by 1992 (Kuo 1993). Taiwan is labeled “free” in the 
Freedom of the Press Report 2013 by Freedom House.   
So how does the news effects change along with the change in the independent status of 
the media in Taiwan, if any? A study (Gunther et al. 1994) conducted in the early 1990s during 
the height of the political transition to democracy finds that, with the receding state control over 
the print media, people’s trust in newspaper increased. Moreover, people who were more 
conscious of the diminishing state control over the news media were more likely to dissociate the 
two institutions. Less trust in the media is logically associated with less media effects on public 
opinion. Thus we can reasonably assume that news effects were limited during the pre-
democratic period. The finding from another study indirectly suggests this. A study comparing 
China and post-democratic Taiwan (Wei and Leung 1998) finds that the effect of media exposure 
on political attitudes is only significant in Taiwan, not China. Indeed, in emerging democracies, 
news effects, such as the effects of television news on attitudes and vote choices in Mexico 
during the 2000 presidential election, can be substantial (Lawson and McCann 2005). The 
observation that the news media exert more influence on public opinion in post-democratic 
Taiwan than in pre-democratic Taiwan or China can be partly explained by the fact that the 
coverage of political news is more diversified in a democratic context. Indeed, Lo et al. (1998) 
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find that during the 1995 Legislative Election in Taiwan, state-owned television stations tend to 
give greater and favorable coverage to the ruling party than the privately owned cable television 
channels. This resulted in diluted pro-government bias in media coverage. Diversity in news 
content and independence of news organizations thus are important to understand the news 
effects on public opinion. 
Media Brand and Credibility 
If we say the lack of media independence due to political control is the main reason for 
the lack of news effects, Stockmann’s (2013) finding on media brand and credibility seem to 
suggest otherwise. In her study, Stockmann conducted a field experiment in Beijing on the 
effects of media brand on public opinion. Specifically, she finds that nonofficial papers have 
higher levels of credibility than official papers. This result, however, does not necessarily 
contradict with the results in this chapter, although it differs from the results here in two ways. 
First, the issue that Stockmann used in her study was perceived effectiveness of the national 
labor law, and the treatment used in the experiment was positive news reports of labor disputes 
being successfully solved, suggesting the effectiveness of labor law. Therefore, the treatment 
was positive reports, rather than negative news. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the support 
for the central leadership in China is higher than not only local governments in China but also 
that in democracies. Thus successful solution of labor disputes may conform to the already high 
confidence in the central leadership, as reflected in the belief in the effectiveness of the law. 
Second, Stockmann (2013) tested the effects of newspaper reports whereas I tested television 
news in this chapter. There can be substantial difference regarding different forms of news media. 
Chinese television is most strictly controlled among all forms of media in China (Shirk 2011). 
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Thus it is possible that the Chinese public places higher trust in print media than television. As a 
result, they are more subject to the influence of newspaper reports. 
 Despite the differences, the results presented in this chapter do not contradict with the 
varying levels of credibility among different Chinese news outlets. Indeed, reputation of news 
organizations is an important indicator of its audience size, demographics of the audience, and 
profitability of the news organization. In other words, news organizations differ, sometimes 
substantially, in terms of influence among the public. Moreover, the results presented in this 
chapter do not necessarily mean that Chinese media are not trustworthy and do not have any 
influence on the Chinese public. In fact, survey data from 2008 suggests a great amount of trust 
the Chinese public places in the news media, although such trust is likely to decrease with higher 
education levels and more online news exposure (Xu 2013).  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, contrary to the assumption of news effects on public opinion, critical news 
on contentious social issues does not affect public opinion much, at least not to the extent of 
undermining public confidence in the regime’s governing capability. Taking into account the 
findings from the first part of this dissertation, the experimental results suggest that while 
criticism in news exists in the fractured censorship system, it does not necessarily undermine 
public perceptions of the party-state. Criticism serves distinct interests of the central government 
and local officials. It can also be a result of journalistic aspirations and the commercial interests 
of news organizations. However, these fractures do not challenge the legitimacy or perceived 
governing capability of the regime. As emphasized earlier, fractures do not mean fault lines. In 
fact, criticism coming out of such a fractured censorship system is only mildly critical in the 
sense that producers of such critical news generally do not even intend to challenge the regime. 
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Based on this, the nature of such criticism is already “benign,” and such benign criticism does 
not adversely affect public opinion toward the regime. If this is true, then criticism in news 
actually helps prolong authoritarian duration in China through two mechanisms: (1) It releases 
steam of public anger over contentious social issues; at the same time, (2) it does not adversely 
affect public confidence in the political regime’s governing capability, a basis for continuing 
political legitimacy.  
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Chapter 6 State-Controlled Media and Authoritarian Duration 
 
 In the study of Comparative Politics, the strong correlation between level of economic 
development and level of democracy is among the few well-established empirical correlations. 
Beyond this, the correlation between level of political development and media freedom is 
another strong empirical observation. Based on the ratings by Freedom House, there is a strong 
linear correlation between level of democracy and media freedom in Asia Pacific, as shown in 
Figure 6.1. The more authoritarian a country is, the less media freedom there is. Indeed, it is a 
reasonable assumption to connect the lack of political freedom with the lack of media freedom. 
However, the actual situations of the lack of media freedom and the political role of the news 
media are country-specific. This is similar to the different forms of authoritarianism that are 
consequential to the democratization paths they may later take on (Geddes 1999). Based on the 
case of China, this study proposes the paradigm of fractured censorship system to understand the 
political role of the news media in authoritarian duration in China.  
The Fractured Censorship System 
The essence of limiting media freedom for nondemocratic regimes is twofold. Simply 
put, it is to control what should be reported and what should not be reported, that is, to limit 
criticism that is harmful to the image of the regime and to increase positive reports that are 
beneficial to the regime. Based on this logic, nondemocratic regimes would have little incentive 
to allow any kind of reports critical of the regime, implicitly or explicitly. In other words, 
censorship should be inclusive and effective. However, during the complex trajectory of 
institutional and policy evolvement due to the need of authoritarian duration, different actors in 
the Chinese media landscape—the party-state, news organizations, and journalists—have 
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developed distinct interests that sometimes grant them with the consistent choice of critical news. 
This constitutes fractures in the censorship system. The variations in these actors’ interests 
determine when fractures appear and how deep they are.  
Figure 6.1 Political and Media Freedom in Asia Pacific, 2012 
 
Data Source: Freedom House.  
Note: Scores of media freedom comes from Freedom of the Press 2013, with 0 being free and 100 being least free. 
Scores of level of democracy comes from Freedom in the World 2013, with 1 being most democratic and 7 being 
least democratic.  
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Fractures are not fault lines. Fractured censorship does not mean diminishing 
effectiveness of the censorship system. Instead, it means the scope of the content that should be 
censored may be shrinking when actors’ interests converge to pursue critical news. The only 
exception is when mid-level censors receive bribes from news organizations and loosen up the 
supposedly tight belt of censorship, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 More specifically, the political fractures discussed in Chapter 2 happen when the central 
leadership needs to use the news media to monitor local officials and to ensure local compliance, 
and when local leaders need to use the news media to establish personal authority. Due to the 
institutional features of the Chinese party-state, the central leadership always needs to keep an 
eye on local noncompliance. However, the extent of monitoring through the news media depends 
on the time and issue areas. During political campaigns such as the anticorruption campaign 
launched in 2012, the news media may have more space for critical reporting. For local leaders, 
they may also intentionally use the news media to achieve personal political goals. Criticizing 
local officials in this context is often limited to officials below a certain level during a specific 
time span. In the case study examined in Chapter 2, only officials below the bureau chief level 
can be criticized, and only during the time when the provincial head thinks criticism is necessary. 
The provincial head is able to close the political fracture when he thinks the criticism is enough. 
Therefore, these political fractures indicate intentional use of critical news by political actors to 
achieve well-defined political goals. In other words, these fractures do not imply lost 
effectiveness of the censorship system. Rather, they are voluntarily allowed by the party-state. 
 Because of the persistent nature of strict control over the news media by the party-state in 
China, the market fractures and journalistic fractures can only happen when experienced 
journalists find ways either to get around officials’ opposition or to play into the disagreements 
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among political factions. Of course, both have risks and are highly precarious. In the case of The 
Beijing News report on black jails discussed in Chapter 4, for example, if the result was that the 
conservative faction won over the reform faction, then the news story would undoubtedly be 
retracted and the editor-in-chief of The Beijing News would be punished.  
 Therefore, there are three key points to the framework of the fractured censorship system. 
First, although conventional wisdom reasonably assumes inclusive and effective censorship 
system in authoritarian countries, when we examine the relationship between politics and the 
media in China closely, we would find that political criticism widely exists in the Chinese media 
discourse, only the level of criticism varies across time and among different news outlets. In 
other words, the censorship system is fractured. Second, however, fractures do not necessarily 
lead to eventual collapse of the censorship system. Or at least we cannot assume so based on the 
current evidence. The political fractures are voluntary adoption of critical news by various 
political actors. The market and journalistic fractures only happen when news professionals can 
find political interests consistent with critical news. All this suggests that the party-state still has 
the full grasp of media control. Finally, as implied by the second point, the three types of 
fractures discussed in this study are in actuality intricately related. I give them different names 
and discuss them in separate chapters only for analytical purposes. In the news production 
process, negotiations among the three actors—the party-state, news organizations, and 
journalists—are constant and interrelated. The dominant force among the three actors is the 
party-state, represented by leadership and officials at various levels. While news organizations 
and journalists can push for more space of critical reporting, the party-state ultimately decides 
which fractures can stay open and for how long.  
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 Corruption is the exception when these fractures are not voluntarily allowed by the party-
state. As discussed in Chapter 3, top executives of online portal websites use gift cards to bride 
mid-level censors in order to publish reports that dwell at the borderline of censorship. So far, 
such corruption only exists at the margin and the concession given by the censors is only mild at 
best. In the case of 163.com, the concession given by the censors is only lighter forms of 
punishment. But punishment still needs to be carried out. In this sense, fractures unintended by 
the party-state do exist, but they do not yet pose major threat to the effectiveness of the 
censorship system.  
Limited Effects of Critical News on Public Opinion 
 Most critical news is intentionally allowed by the party-state to exist in the Chinese 
media discourse. The next question is whether and how does such critical news affect public 
opinion. After all, the intended audience of the critical news is ordinary citizens, and their 
perception of the regime is essential to understanding authoritarian duration in China.  
 There are at least two sources from which we can draw insights to shed light on the case 
of China. First, the research on media effects in democracies is a well-developed area. Indeed, 
agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects are among the most common media effects that are 
thoroughly studied and practiced by campaign strategists. All this directly suggests strong media 
effects on public opinion. However, such strong media effects also come with a strong premise, 
that is, the media outlets in democracies operate in a regulated but generally free media 
environment. Consequently, citizens in democracies have the freedom and the options to choose 
media outlets with diverse opinions and dispositions. The general assumption and belief in media 
integrity and a free media environment partly constitute the conditions for strong media effects. 
This also separates democratic from authoritarian media environments. In an authoritarian 
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country like China, it is never a secret that media outlets are strictly controlled by the party-state, 
and official media outlets such as People’s Daily and CCTV are the mouthpieces of the CCP. 
Given such realization, it would be reasonable to question whether theories of media effects 
derived from democracies apply to media outlets operating within authoritarian environments.  
 The second source of insight is existing research on the news effects of Chinese media. 
However, such research tends to be outdated, as the Chinese media landscape changes frequently 
as a result of media marketization. For example, using survey results, Chen and Shi (2001) find 
that more exposure to the state-controlled media leads to more negative attitudes toward the CCP 
regime. This finding directly challenges the very effects of propaganda, the premise to 
understand the role of the media in authoritarian states. However, this study is based on surveys 
conducted in 1993 and 1994, and it does not really address the effects of critical news.  
 Given the two sources of insight, we may come to two conclusions. First, media theories 
derived from democracies may not apply to authoritarian states, as the relationships between the 
media and the government are drastically different. Second, previous research on media effects 
in China suggests that while media effects on public opinion may exist, they may surprise us 
with an opposite direction of influence. Given all this, the task to examine whether and how 
critical news affects public opinion on key social issues is imminent. 
 Using a contentious issue in China—demolition and relocation, I conducted two field 
experiments with adults and university students in east and central China, respectively. The main 
findings are twofold. First, exposure to negative reports on demolition and relocation may lead 
the public to be more dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the issue, but it does not 
undermine the public’s confidence in the capability of the party-state to ultimately solve the 
problem. This means that critical news functions like the valve of a high-pressure cooker, letting 
 
	   154 
out the steam of public anger. In return, the party-state may be able to keep its positive imagine 
among the public intact while buying time to solve difficult social issues. Second, non-media 
factors are important in attitudinal change. For example, discussing politics with family and 
friends may be an important factor as family and friends can function as opinion leaders 
affecting individual attitudes. Moreover, participants’ own experience with demolition and 
relocation tend to increase their perceived importance of the issue. These findings together 
suggest that critical news is able to let off steam of public anger without compromising the 
legitimacy of the regime. Moreover, when compared to other sources of attitudinal change such 
as personal experience with controversial issues, the effects of critical news only become more 
insignificant.  
 Therefore, the general thesis of this dissertation can be summarized in Figure 2. Contrary 
to the established perception that censorship, the major form of media control, is inclusive and 
effective, the censorship system in China is actually fractured. The sources of fractures include 
distinct political interests of the central and local governments, the commercial interests of news 
organizations, and journalistic aspirations for in-depth and truthful reporting. Such fractures 
allow sporadic criticisms on local governments and officials. However, fractures are not fault 
lines. The central and local governments intentionally use the news media to achieve political 
goals. They are the ultimate authority that allows critical news when commercial interest and 
journalistic aspirations push for critical reporting. Therefore, while fractures may temporarily 
enlarge the space for critical reporting, they do not imply diminishing effectiveness of the 
censorship system. After critical news is produced and broadcasted or published, it only has 
limited effects on public opinion. While critical news may lead the public to be more dissatisfied 
toward local governments on contentious social issues, it does not undermine the public’s 
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confidence in the capability of the regime to ultimately solve those problems. In other words, 
critical news is able to blow off steam of public anger over contentious issues without 
compromising the legitimacy of the regime. In this way, the fractured censorship system 
facilitates authoritarian duration through intentionally allowing critical news at local levels while 
maintaining the overall effective censorship system.  
 
Figure 6.2 The Fractured Censorship System in China 
 
 
 
   
 
 
What Has Been Seen Cannot Be Unseen 
 While the party-state may intentionally use critical news to achieve political goals, we 
cannot ignore the capability of Chinese journalists and Internet users to creatively get around 
censorship. Indeed, even though the party-state still firmly controls all media outlets in China, 
especially for the Internet due to its interactive technological nature, Chinese Internet users have 
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used puns, homophonic characters to avoid censorship. An important consequence of this is that, 
certain ideas deemed by the regime as sensitive or even subversive, can be spread around, as 
ideas may be wiped off the cyberspace, but may not be wiped off from people’s minds.  
 Unlike traditional media such as television and newspaper, the control techniques for the 
Internet are somewhat different. For television and newspaper, the content of news has to be 
reviewed, sometimes multiple times, before broadcast or publication. Although in certain cases 
due to the commercial interests and journalistic aspirations, reports that cross or border the often-
ambiguous red lines may be publicized, in general these two types of media outlets tend to be 
strictly regulated prior to publication and broadcast. The instances of sensitive or critical reports 
are thus rare. For the Internet, on the other hand, because of its interactive and instantaneous 
nature, there are potentially tens of millions of Internet users that can publish texts at the same 
time, such as on the most popular microblogging website in China Sina Weibo. This poses a 
substantial difficulty for the party-state to monitor and control every single post on such popular 
social media sites.  
Currently, social media sites such as Sina Weibo are required by the party-state to use 
both machine censors and human censors. For machine censors, computer software is 
programmed to pick out and delete online posts with certain sensitive words. The list of sensitive 
words changes daily, and only grows longer48. However, critical news, commentary, and ideas 
can be phrased in multiple ways, so deleting online posts through detecting key words cannot 
fully censor online content. According to the recent reports by Reuters in 201349, besides the 
posts that contain “must kill” words and thus are automatically deleted by computer censors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For a detailed discussion of why certain words become “sensitive,” as defined by the Chinese party-state, see Ng 
(2013).  
49 The Reuters report can be found here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-china-internet-
idUSBRE98A18Z20130912  
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human censors read and decide which posts to spare or delete. Through these two layers of 
censorship, the Chinese party-state exercises firm control over the content in the cyberspace. 
According to King et al. (2013)50, Internet companies hire 2-3 censors for every 50,000 users. 
Based on this estimate, for example, Sina Weibo hires at least 2,400 human censors to monitor 
posts. Each censor has to go through at least 3,000 posts an hour, according to the Reuters report. 
However, due to the instantaneous nature of the Internet and the large volume of cyber content, 
savvy Chinese Internet users find that there is a short time window between posting critical 
comments and comments being deleted. Specifically, although posts on Sina Weibo may be 
deleted if the content is considered politically sensitive, active and savvy citizens may use a 
number of techniques such as puns and homophonic characters to avoid automated computer 
deletion. Since human deletion takes time, in that usually short time window, those sensitive 
posts can be read by a large number of Sina Weibo users. Some users may also take screenshots 
of the posts and later re-post the comments. In this way, even though human censors will 
eventually delete the posts, the impact of such critical posts cannot be easily wiped out from 
people’s minds. The impact stays. In other words, what has been seen cannot be unseen. 
Repetition of this process can change the political boundary in public discourse normally set by 
the party-state. Moreover, during this process, due to the unique social and political reality in 
contemporary Chinese society, Chinese Internet users have developed a distinct satirical style of 
online discourse that sometimes spills offline. This is discussed in the examples below. 
Before continuing the discussion, it is important to note that the Internet itself is only a 
platform through which a number of activities can take place. Consuming news and voicing 
opinions are two activities that the majority of Chinese Internet users do not engage in. In fact, 
the majority of Chinese Internet users go online for entertainment. 77.3% of Chinese Internet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This working paper can be accessed here: http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/experiment.pdf  
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users used online music, 59.5% played online games, 48.8% used social networking websites, 
only 41.4% read online literature (CNNIC 201351). Among the already minority Internet users, 
only a handful of them function as discourse entrepreneurs that revise and invent new words and 
phrases with distinct perspectives and understandings of current events. The new language that 
the discourse entrepreneurs developed then circle around who I call elite Internet users that are 
truly concerned about social and political problems and use the Internet mainly for news and 
opinions. They tend to be more educated, technologically savvy, and young. Therefore, the 
phenomenon that I analyze here does not, in any ways, represent the general situation of Chinese 
online discourse. On the contrary, the online discourse I analyze here only circles around a small 
group of people. Nevertheless, ideas created and spread around are not easily wiped out. With an 
effective and swift online censorship system in place, websites can be closed down and posts can 
be deleted, but ideas cannot be deleted, or at least not as easily. Next, this chapter analyzes the 
patterns of the birth and circulation of online critical discourse and discusses the techniques that 
elite Internet users use to prolong the existence and impact of critical comments and ideas 
through two specific examples.  
Homophonic Words--“Harmony” 和谐 and “River Crab” 河蟹 
 “Harmonious society” is a slogan put forward by the Hu Jintao Administration (2003-
2012), the fourth generation of Chinese leaders. In 2006 the CCP issued Resolution on 
Constructing Socialist Harmonious Society52. According to the Resolution, harmonious society 
has several indicators, including democratic legal system, social justice, social order, and 
harmonious coexistence between humans and the nature. The CCP identified several obstacles to 
achieving a harmonious society—inequality between rural and urban China, environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The report can be accessed at 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P020130221391269963814.pdf  
52 The full report can be accessed at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4932440.html  
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problems, unemployment, social stability, corruption and so on. As vague as it is, the notion of 
harmonious society dominated Chinese political discourse since 2006 till the end of the Hu 
Jintao era. Indeed, political campaigns and study groups were launched to study and practice 
harmonious society. Because of the highly comprehensive nature of the slogan, any economic, 
social, and political activities especially in government organs and state-owned enterprises were 
titled as being part of constructing a harmonious society. 
 The public’s understanding of the notion of harmonious society, however, is not 
necessarily consistent with the original proposal. In the Chinese cyberspace, for example, elite 
Internet users developed a quite satirical interpretation of harmonious society. With the central 
issue of concern being Internet censorship in particular and lack of speech freedom in general, 
elite Internet users mocked the notion of harmonious society without any belief that the CCP is 
sincerely more concerned about social ills than its own existence. For them, harmonious society 
is just another political slogan created by Hu Jintao, so that he, like his predecessors, has 
contributions to the CCP governing lexicon as his political legacy. In addition to not believing in 
the notion of harmonious society, elite Internet users mock “harmonious society” by referring to 
Internet censorship as criticism or sensitive information being “harmonized.” Because of this, 
“harmonized” became a sensitive word itself to be detected by machine censors and deleted (Ng 
2013). As a result, elites Internet users used homophonic characters “river crab” 河蟹 to replace 
“harmonized” 和谐. These two words have very similar pronunciations, but because the 
characters differ, elite Internet users were able to get around machine censors and post comments 
containing “river crab” and express the same meaning.  
 This is an example of how elite Internet users, despite the sophisticated Internet 
censorship regime, actively and creatively get around censorship and successfully communicate 
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ideas amongst themselves. Although the Internet is strictly controlled by the party-state, it can 
also function as “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985) by carrying distinct forms of discourse, 
such as homophonic words. In this way, political criticism can live in the cyberspace. 
Screenshots of Online Posts 
 Some elite Internet users have ample experience of online posts being deleted due to 
censorship. Repetition of such experience leads some elite Internet users to acquire a good sense 
of what posts may be deemed as sensitive. However, this does not dampen their decision to 
continue posting sensitive comments. One of the journalists I interviewed shared with me his 
experience of using Chinese Twitter—Sina Weibo—to participate in a small-scale public protest 
over a misjudged civil case.  
 The case involves a close friend of the journalist who I refer to as Zhu. Zhu has a close 
friend and mentor who was a former senior editor at a popular magazine in Shanghai. The 
editor’s wife was a businesswoman who was wrongfully accused of bribery, according to Zhu. In 
order to publicize the case and use public pressure to change the verdict of case, Zhu and his 
friends decided to use Sina Weibo to organize a small-scale public gathering in support of Zhu’s 
wife outside of the courthouse, on the day of the trial. However, as a veteran journalist, Zhu is 
well aware of the boundaries in the Chinese cyberspace, especially when it comes to public 
gatherings (King et al. 2013). Therefore, Zhu and his friends carefully designed a strategy to 
ensure successful delivery of the message and the happening of the gathering.  
 First, instead of using the Chinese words “public gathering” in the actual the content of 
the tweet, Zhu and his friends used “taking a stroll.” This is a common surrogate word for 
demonstration, protest, or gathering among the elite Internet users. Second, even if “public 
gathering” was replaced with “taking a stroll,” thus reducing the chance of being detected and 
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deleted by machine censors, Zhu and his friends knew that this was still a sensitive tweet that 
would have been eventually deleted by human censors. Therefore, Zhu and his friends, a group 
of about a dozen people, decided to post the tweet at the exact same time. The purpose was to 
make sure the post be seen by as many Internet users as possible, because each person has a 
different group of followers on Sina Weibo. Third, right after the post was published on Sina 
Weibo, Zhu and his friends took screenshots of the post, so that they could re-post the 
screenshots after the original post was deleted. Moreover, screenshots cannot be easily detected 
by machine censors, as they are not in text formats. Therefore, it would take longer for human 
censors to delete the posts as they have to read carefully over the content captured in the 
screenshot pictures.  
  On the day of the trial, Zhu said he was surprised by the number of people who showed 
up. It was way above his expectation. He estimated that at least 100 people gathered outside the 
courthouse to support the editor’s wife. Unfortunately, the public support was not able to change 
the guilty verdict. But Zhu told me that the experience of using Sina Weibo to make a public 
gathering happen led him to form an optimistic view on Chinese social media. Despite strict 
censorship, Zhu said, the social media is the form of media with the most potential to spread 
around information and ideas and to mobilize the ordinary citizens.  
*** 
 The fractured censorship system can be understood as part of the authoritarian resilience 
(Nathan 2003) embodied by the Chinese Communist regime. During the course of more than six 
decades of political rule over Mainland China, the CCP and its governance have been evolving. 
The CCP has transformed the relationship between politics and the media from the media being a 
mere propaganda tool to the media having limited autonomy over the content. This reflects an 
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effective adaptation of the CCP in sustaining its authoritarian rule. Because of the limited 
autonomy granted to the Chinese media, the CCP is able to use critical news to achieve its 
political goals in various realms of authoritarian duration such as ensuring local compliance and 
establishing political leader’s authority. Such critical news helps blow off the steam of public 
anger over contentious issues without compromising the overall legitimacy of the regime. In this 
way, most critical news that we observe in the Chinese media discourse actually consolidates, 
rather than undermine, the authoritarian rule in China.  
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Appendix 
 Sources and Research Methods 
  
This study adopts a mixed-methods approach to data collection. Specifically, it uses 
semi-structured interviews, direct observation, content analysis, a survey, and two field 
experiments to collect qualitative and quantitative data. This chapter details the research 
methods, with a focus on issues such as sources and data collection process that have 
implications on inference.  
Sources of Data for Analysis 
Original data comes from a three-month fieldwork in North, Central, and East China over 
the summers of 2012 and 2013. I travelled to Nanjing in Jiangsu province, Yangzhou in Jiangsu 
province, Shanghai, Beijing, Xi’an in Shaanxi province, and Wuhan in Hubei province for semi-
structured interviews and direct observation. I also conducted telephone interviews with 
journalists and scholars from Beijing, Changchun in Jilin province, Guangzhou in Guangdong 
province, and Yangzhou in Jiangsu province. The research sites are shown on the map of China 
in Figure 7.1. In total I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with journalists, editors, 
producers, and scholars and a three-week direct observation53 at a municipal-level Yangzhou 
television station in Jiangsu province. Direct observation focused on the production process of a 
local television news show Attention, including selection and presentation of news stories, staff 
meetings, on-site reporting, and write-up of news scripts by journalists and editors. The 
observation on the production process is valuable to this study, because for most Chinese, 
television remains to be the most important source of news. Although new media such as online 
news portals and blogs are easily accessible to foreign scholars, they do not represent the major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Direct observation used in this project is nonparticipant, overt and semi-structured (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). 
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source of news for most Chinese. For example, in the 2005 World Values Survey, 75.3% of 
respondents reported that they used news broadcast on radio or television the last week to obtain 
information, while 23.2% and 10.9% of respondents reported that they used daily newspaper and 
the Internet the last week to obtain information, respectively. Similarly, according to the 2008 
China Survey, 76.31% of respondents reported to have watched television for one hour or more 
the day before, while 16.72% and 7.52% of respondents reported to have spent one hour or more 
reading newspapers and surfing the Internet the day before, respectively.  
 
Figure 7.1 Research Sites in China 
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Quantitative data are collected through (1) a survey conducted among journalists working 
at a municipal-level Changchun television station in Jilin province, (2) content analysis of the 
news scripts of Attention aired on Yangzhou television from December of 2011 to July of 2013, 
and (3) two field experiments conducted in Yangzhou and Xi’an with adults and university 
students, respectively. The experiment conducted in Xi’an was administered by a faculty 
member at the Northwest Socioeconomic Development Research Center (NSDRC) in Xi’an, 
Shaanxi province. Details on the design and procedures of the field experiments are discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 In the summer of 2012, I conducted three semi-structured interviews, through whom I 
acquired further contacts for the twenty-four semi-structured interviews conducted in the 
summer of 2013. While most interviews were conducted in interviewees’ offices, some were 
conducted in coffee shops and over telephone. Interviewees can be classified into three groups: 
news professionals, journalism scholars, and journalism graduate students. The interviews 
centered on the news production process, problems with news production, understandings of the 
functions of news in a society, and the relationship between the news media and the government 
in China. 
 
News professionals: 21 
Journalism scholars: 4 
Journalism graduate students: 2 
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Direct Observation 
I stayed for three weeks at Yangzhou Television Station in June 2013. I followed 
journalists working for the news show Attention, observing the processes of selecting news 
topics, contacting sources, conducting interviews, shooting video footage, writing and revising 
news scripts. I also attended two staff meetings where the producer of the show commented on 
the previous week’s news episodes. During the direct observation process, I asked the journalists 
questions related to the stories they were working on and news production in general. This was a 
non-participant direct observation. 
A Survey with Television Journalists 
The survey was conducted in Changchun in July 2013. The results of the survey are 
discussed in Chapter 5. Originally I planned to travel to Changchun, Jilin province and conduct 
the survey. However, in July 2013 a fire broke out in a poultry company in Jilin province, killing 
121 people and injured 76. Due to the scale of the tragedy, it became a sensitive topic for news 
reporting because the government was afraid of public anger over the casualties and accusations 
of incompetence. Therefore, my contact at Changchun Television Station suggested me abandon 
the travel plan, as I may not be able to collect any information during a sensitive time period. 
Instead, he offered to administer the survey for me. As a result, I sent my contact the survey 
questionnaires. He distributed the questionnaires to the journalists on July 15, and collected them 
on July 16. After this, he sent the questionnaires back to me, and I typed and saved the answers 
in electronic format. 
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